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Conspiracy Theory
Consider how a law school textbook might introduce the elements of
traditional conspiracy law: Imagine that Joe and Sandra agree to rob a bank.
From the moment of agreement, they can be found guilty of conspiracy
even if they never commit the robbery (it's called "inchoate liability").
Even if the bank goes out of business, they can still be liable for the
conspiracy ("impossibility" is not a defense). Joe can be liable for other
crimes that Sandra commits to further the conspiracy's objective, like hot-
wiring a getaway car (it's called "Pinkerton" liability, after a 1946 Supreme
Court case involving tax offenses). He can't evade liability by staying home
on the day of the robbery (a conspirator has to take an affirmative step to
"withdraw"). And if the bank heist takes place, both Joe and Sandra can be
charged with bank robbery and with the separate crime of conspiracy, each
of which carries its own punishment (the crime of conspiracy doesn't
"merge" with the underlying crime).
Why should conspiracy liability begin at the moment of "agreement,"
before any crime is committed? Why can a conspirator be charged with
both the inchoate offense of conspiracy and the robbery? Why should the
law punish conspirators even if it's impossible for them to commit the
crime they planned? Why is withdrawal from a conspiracy so difficult? And
what about that oddball Pinkerton doctrine?
For more than 50 years, these questions have prompted a series of
critiques of conspiracy law. The major scholarly articles have alleged the
doctrine "unnecessary"' and stated that the "assumed dangers from
conspiracy.., have never been verified empirically."2 And such views
have successfully permeated the criminal law. The Model Penal Code, a
blueprint for state law first written by a commission of experts in the early
1950s, rejected many of the traditional features of conspiracy law. Over the
past fifteen years, the Federal Sentencing Commission similarly eliminated
many of the traditional features of conspiracy doctrine, so that, for example,
it is not generally possible to punish someone for conspiring to commit a
crime and for committing it.
These cutbacks are likely to be a mistake. For some years now, I have
been arguing that realistic models of crime control must incorporate, and
sometimes reconcile, economic and psychological reactions to penalties.3
This is particularly the case with the offense of conspiracy. Psychologists
have made many advances in understanding the ways in which people in
1. Philip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1973) (calling for abolition of the doctrine).
2. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 414
(1959).
3. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1043, 1063-64,
1072-73, 1086-89 (2002) [hereinafter Katyal, Architecture]; Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2441-45, 2458-70 (1997) [hereinafter Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty].
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groups act differently than they do as individuals. So, too, economists have
developed sophisticated explanations for why firms promote efficiency,
leading to new theories in corporate law. These insights can be "reverse-
engineered" to make conspiracies operate less efficiently. In reverse
engineering corporate law principles and introducing lessons from
psychology, a rich account of how government should approach conspiracy
begins to unfold.
This is a central issue in criminal law, since more than one-quarter of
all federal criminal prosecutions and a large number of state cases involve
prosecutions for conspiracy.4 Virtually every state recognizes the crime.5
Yet criticisms of the doctrine are pervasive, and generally take two forms.
First, the rationale for the offense of conspiracy is questioned. Why should
group behavior receive additional punishment, and why should any
punishment at all attach at the moment of agreement? 6 In the second
critique, conspiracy law is excoriated for giving prosecutors too much
power.' This Article concerns itself with answering the first of these
4. Beth Allison Davis & Josh Vitullo, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
777, 778 n.9 (2001) (finding that 20,132 of 70,114 defendants charged in federal court in 1997
were charged with conspiracy under one of three provisions of the U.S. Code); United States v.
Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("[P]rosccutors seem to have
conspiracy on their word processors as Count 1; rare is the case omitting such a charge."); Paul
Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time To Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More
Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 9 (1992) ("[C]hange in the growing number of
conspiracy prosecutions can be seen in large cities and small cities, in regions throughout the
country, in the federal courts and in the state courts."). Almost every headline-grabbing
prosecution has involved a conspiracy charge. For example, conspiracy charges were brought in
the Oklahoma City bombing trial, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and the
narcotics-trafficking trial of former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. See Jo Thomas, Swift,
HardAttack in Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at A12 (noting that conspiracy charges
were brought in the Oklahoma City bombing case); Blaine Harden, 2 Guilty in Trade Center
Blast, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at Al; Simon Tisdall, Jury Convicts Noriega on Drug
Charges, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 10, 1992, at 24; cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS
CAESAR act 2, sc. 1, I. 78-79 (William Rosen & Barbara Rosen eds., New Am. Library 1963) ("0
conspiracy, Sham'st thou to show thy dang'rous brow by night, When evils are most free?").
5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 573 & n.66 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that the crime of
conspiracy "exists in virtually all jurisdictions" and that "[o]f the modem recodifications, only
Alaska's is without a crime of conspiracy").
6. Ian H. Dennis, The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy, 93 LAW Q. REV. 39, 41 (1977)
("The question then is, why should this form of conduct be criminal? Why should an agreement
between two people to commit a crime itself be a crime?"); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 413-14
(questioning the group harms of conspiracy); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1140 (calling for abolition
of the doctrine); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 393 (1922)
("[C]riminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand of shifting
opinion and ill-considered thought."); see also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that because whenever "two or more have united for the
commission of a crime there is a conspiracy, the opening to oppression thus made is very wide
indeed. It is even wider if success should be held not to merge the conspiracy in the crime
intended and achieved.").
7. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation
of American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239, 303 (1993) (providing such a
criticism of conspiracy law); Albert J. Hamo, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
624, 624 (1941) ("in the long category of crimes there is none, not excepting criminal attempt,
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criticisms by offering a functional justification for punishing conspiracy.
The debate about the best way, if any, to implement conspiracy law must
naturally take place, but it should occur only after a sober assessment of the
underpinnings of the doctrine itself. These underpinnings are not
understood, which is not surprising since the last major articles on
conspiracy were written in 1959 and 1973,8 and because the dominant motif
in criminal law scholarship has veered too far toward retributivist analysis. 9
This Article outlines a case for traditional federal conspiracy doctrine
by returning to fundamental points about group behavior. By looking at
groups, the Article holistically addresses both the necessity of the offense of
conspiracy, as well as the doctrinal questions about Pinkerton liability,
impossibility, and the offense's other traditional features. This view of
conspiracy is part of a larger trend emerging in legal scholarship, one that
trains its eye on groups instead of on individuals. In corporate law, Eric
Talley, Lynn Stout, and Margaret Blair have drawn much attention to the
team-production problem;1" in torts and business organizations, Lewis
Komhauser, Reinier Kraakman, Alan Sykes, and others have usefully
analyzed vicarious liability and gatekeepers, 1 and Donald Langevoort has
similarly studied employer monitoring;' 2 and in civil law, David Schkade,
Cass Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman have developed an understanding of
the jury system based on group dynamics.13 Most law professors, used to
more difficult to confine within the boundaries of definitive statement than conspiracy."); Gerard
E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III and IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 948
(1987) ("[T]he procedural and evidentiary consequences directly or indirectly associated with a
conspiracy charge .. create possibilities of abuse."); Milton C. Lorenz Jr., Comment, Conspiracy
in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code. Too Little Reform, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1973)
("Indiscriminate or reflexive use of the conspiracy charge by government prosecutors may be
equated to a wide dragnet .... Even this overkill might be tolerable were it not for the costly
drain upon judicial and law enforcement resources ...."); Note, Vicarious Liability for Criminal
Offenses of Co-Conspirators, 56 YALE L.J. 371, 378 (1947) ("In the final analysis the Pinkerton
decision extends the wide limits of the conspiracy doctrine to the breaking-point and opens the
door to possible new abuses by overzealous public prosecutors.").
8. Goldstein, supra note 2; Johnson, supra note 1.
9. Compare, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985) (using an economic approach), with
George P. Fletcher, Criminal Theory in the Twentieth Century, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 265
(2001) (adopting a philosophical approach).
10. Eric Talley, Taking the "I'" out of Team: Jnlra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of
Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundation of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735
(2001).
11. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53
(1986); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
12. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with Law, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002).
13. See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars:
The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
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writing articles on their own, think about crime as a solo enterprise-a
tendency reinforced by the individualist prism of microeconomics and the
case-driven method of studying specific parties. The damage here, and
elsewhere, in legal education is apparent.
14
Part I outlines two reasons why conspiracies are harmful: the
specialization of labor/economies of scale and the development of a
pernicious group identity. The former is easily understood by thinking
about how difficult it is for an individual to rob a bank alone. Several
individuals are needed to carry weapons and provide firepower (economies
of scale), someone needs to be the "brains behind the operation" (a form of
specialization of labor), and another should serve as a lookout
(specialization again). Conspiracy creates obvious efficiencies, efficiencies
predicted by Ronald Coase in his path-breaking article about why firms
develop. 5
What are somewhat less obvious, but at least as important, are
psychological accounts of the dangers of group activity. Advances in
psychology over the past thirty years have demonstrated that groups
cultivate a special social identity. This identity often encourages risky
behavior, leads individuals to behave against their self-interest, solidifies
loyalty, and facilitates harm against nonmembers. The psychological and
economic accounts explain why law treats conspiracy in a distinctive way.
The law focuses on "agreement" because that decision has drastic
consequences. The law seeks to attach a broad and potentially uncognizable
set of penalties at this early stage to deter many from becoming
conspirators.
The second half of Part I discusses the converse: When A conspires
with B, B can turn around and flip-implicate-A to the authorities in
exchange for a lighter sentence. In the eyes of law enforcement, therefore,
criminal conspiracy is not always harmful. The more conspirators, the more
witnesses there are to flip and the more ominous the prisoners' dilemma for
a conspirator. Teachers of criminal law today already consider economics,
psychology, and flipping to some extent. What this Article tries to do is
systematically review the interdisciplinary literature to detail its
implications for the doctrines surrounding conspiracy. Part I therefore sets
the stage on which the tough drama about conspiracy is played out, and will
move quickly because the play is more exciting than the stage itself.
Part II explains how conspiracy law resolves the tension of group
behavior through a method of price discrimination. The law strives to
prevent conspiracies from forming with high up-front penalties for those
14. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Beyond the Law of One: The Real World Works in Groups, but
Law Schools Don't Teach That Way, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 27 (arguing that law schools
fundamentally fail to prepare students to work in group settings).
15. See generally Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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who join, but also uses mechanisms to obtain information from those who
have joined and decide to cooperate with the government. Federal law itself
has come to recognize such a tension, although scholars have not, and this
can explain the function of doctrines such as Pinkerton liability and the
exclusion from merger. These doctrines not only further information
extraction, they also make conspiracies more difficult to create and
maintain by forcing them to adopt inefficient practices. The possibility of
defection forces the syndicate to use expensive monitoring of its employees
for evidence of possible collusion with the government. Mechanisms for
defection also erode trust within the group and lead members to think that
others are acting out of self-interest. This analysis will suggest that other
doctrines in criminal law-apart from conspiracy-have information-
extraction advantages; today, however, conspiracy law is a primary vehicle
equipped for the task.
The argument in Part II, and in the Article more generally, should not
be confused with one advocating the imposition of more punishment.
Indeed, with a vibrant conspiracy doctrine, sentences may very well be
lower as a result of increased cooperation agreements. And with giving
prosecutors more tools for leverage over conspirators comes the possibility
of cultivating greater compartmentalization and other inefficiencies within
the criminal firm, thereby preventing some crime before it happens, not
simply because of standard deterrence, but also because the financial
rewards from crime are reduced. Today, perhaps as a result of the
weakening of conspiracy doctrine, Congress has required high mandatory
minimum sentences for a variety of crimes (involving guns, drugs,
violence, etc.). But ratcheting up sentences in this smattering of substantive
laws can overpunish lone actors; the single doctrine of conspiracy is more
closely calibrated to the harms of group conduct.
Part 1I therefore attempts to develop a theory of conspiracy, centered on
economic and psychological accounts of group behavior, that incorporates
its complexities. As such, the claims are not only descriptive, by detailing
unnoticed features of contemporary conspiracy law, but normative as well.
Part III furthers these normative claims by offering additional mechanisms
that cause defection and extract information. It suggests, for example, that
sentencing rewards should not only be confined to those who provide
inculpatory information, but should also be given to those who turn over
material that sets innocent people free. In addition, Part III offers other
ways to promote defection of conspirators and suggests the reversal of
several recent changes to conspiracy law that were imposed by the Federal
Sentencing Commission-changes that quietly nullified many advantages
the doctrine accreted in the past fifty years.
This Article contemplates, as its paradigm case, a criminal enterprise
characterized by repeat players, where the psychological and economic
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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effects of group behavior are at their height. The general prohibition on
conspiracy, however, reaches more than those cases. In addition to
suggesting that the offense of conspiracy should be broken apart into first-
and second-degree variants, Part III will also suggest some of the
advantages of statutes that target enterprises, such as the modem
prohibitions on drug enterprises and racketeering. 6
Accordingly, this Article does not aspire to defend every aspect of
federal conspiracy law. Rather, it contends that the criticism of some of the
doctrine's various features (such as its inchoate nature, Pinkerton liability,
the exclusion from merger, and its extension to agreements whose
successes are "factually impossible") has not appreciated their functional
benefits. Nevertheless, in many places, divergences between doctrine and
theory will exist. Particularly striking in this regard are state law treatments
of conspiracy: A significant number of states, induced by the Model Penal
Code, have ignored many of the unique harms that conspiracies pose and
have given short shrift to the justifications for conspiracy doctrine. In the
course of outlining these justifications and the accompanying divergences,
naturally many different causalities will arise. My goal is to start a debate
on how best to prioritize these causalities rather than to resolve precisely
where the contours of conspiracy law must lie.
I. Two VIEWS OF CONSPIRACY
Treatments of conspiracy law consider group crime to pose special
dangers (the more common view) or special benefits (the rarer view).17 A
16. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (providing that if at least two or more "persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both"), with id. § 1962(c)
(providing that it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt"), and 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (2000) ("Any
person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise [to violate felony narcotics prohibitions]
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may
be up to life imprisonment ...."). On the variety of approaches to conspiracy, see generally
LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 567-614. The claims in this Article are limited, moreover, to an analysis
of conspiracy law's impact on purely illegal enterprises, where a principal goal is to destroy the
efficiency of such enterprises. It does not discuss the role of conspiracy law in prosecuting crimes
by otherwise legal firms. For an introduction to such issues, see Barry D. Baysinger, Organization
Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 341 (1991); and V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liabiliy: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477
(1996).
17. Compare, e.g., BRITISH LAW COMM'N, CRIMINAL LAW: REPORT ON CONSPIRACY AND
CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 7 (1976) (discussing the harm of group activity), with Goldstein, supra
note 2, at 413-14 (observing how conspirators might leak information). For an excellent brief
attempt to consider the psychological and economic dangers of groups, see United States v.
Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[W]hat makes the joint action of a group of n
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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thorough study of the costs and benefits of conspiracies to criminals and of
conspiracy law to prosecutors has not been undertaken; the dominant motif
in the scholarship has been harsh philosophical criticism without a full
appreciation of the doctrine's functional benefits. Folding these benefits
back into the legal discourse will generate a new understanding of
conspiracy law.
Before we begin, definitions of a few concepts may help readers.
Deterrence is a function of the severity of a criminal sanction discounted by
the probability that it will actually be enforced. Marginal deterrence refers
to the need for greater sanctions to prevent greater harm; as George Stigler
poignantly puts it, "If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars,
he had just as well take $5,000. " 8 The substitution effect refers to a
common reaction to a price increase of a good: switching to an alternative
product. If the price of your latte goes up to $10 (a not unrealistic
hypothetical where I live), you might consume more tea. Similarly, if the
law massively punishes crack cocaine, then dealers may sell more heroin.'
9
Finally, cost deterrence refers to strategies that prevent criminal acts by
increasing their monetary price.20
A. The Dangers to Society from Group Behavior
Just three months ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal
agreement is "'a distinct evil,' which 'may exist and be punished whether
or not the substantive crime ensues."' 21 In reaching this conclusion, the
Justices drew upon their holding in a 1961 case, explaining that a
conspiracy
poses "a threat to the public" over and above the threat of the
commission of the relevant substantive crime-both because the
"[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of
[other] crimes" and because it "decreases the probability that the
individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality."
22
persons more fearsome than the individual actions of those n persons is the division of labor and
the mutual psychological support that collaboration affords. Both the conspiracy and the market
transaction are agreements, but only conspiracy poses the added danger of group action." (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
18. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement ofLaws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
19. See Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, supra note 3, at 2402-08 (suggesting this possibility).
20. Katyal, Architecture, supra note 3, at 1089-90 (outlining the theory of perpetration-cost
deterrence); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1006,
1039-41 (2001) (same).
21. United States v. Recio, 123 S. Ct. 819, 822 (2003) (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522
U.S. 52, 65 (1997)).
22. Id. (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961)) (alterations in
original); see also United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) ("For two or more to
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Yet, despite the centrality of these propositions to conspiracy law, and
despite the fact that Professor Abraham Goldstein prominently challenged
them over forty years ago,23 there has been virtually no attention to
examining whether these core assertions are correct. This Section draws on
psychological and economic research to show where the Court was right.
1. Psychological Analysis of Social Identity
A wide body of psychological research over the last century reveals that
people tend to act differently in groups than they do as individuals. 24 Some
of the work is tentative, thereby precluding robust results. Nevertheless, it is
generally accepted that groups are more likely to polarize toward extremes,
to take courses of action that advance the interests of the group even in the
face of personal doubts, and to act with greater loyalty to each other.
25
Much of the most influential research focuses on how group membership
changes an individual's personal identity to produce a new social identity.
In this process, a person's self-esteem becomes linked to the group's
confederate .. is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to
the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to
subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal
practices.").
Similarly, the Model Penal Code drafters observed that conspiracy "is a means of striking
against the special danger incident to group activity." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. (1985).
But the drafters did not examine this claim outside of stringing together some slogans:
[T]he act of combining with another is significant both psychologically and practically,
the former because it crosses a clear threshold in arousing expectations, the latter
because it increases the likelihood that the offense will be committed. Sharing lends
fortitude to purpose. The actor knows, moreover, that the future is no longer governed
by his will alone; others may complete what he has had a hand in starting, even if he
has a change of heart.
Id. § 5.03.
23. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 413-14.
24. John C. Turner, Foreword to S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN
ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH, at x, xii (2001) ("Moving from the 'I' to the
'we' psychologically transforms people and brings into play new processes that could not
otherwise exist. Indeed it is to this creative capacity that most organizations owe their success.");
see also id. at 26 ("[G]roups change individuals and this in turn makes groups and organizations
more than mere aggregations of their individual inputs."); Margaret Wetherell, Group Conflict
and the Social Psychology of Racism, in IDENTITIES, GROUPS, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 175, 203
(Margaret Wetherell ed., 1996) ("[G]roup membership in itself has profound effects upon the
psychology of the individual, regardless of personality and individual differences.").
25. The research responsible for these conclusions spans the range of traditions in
psychology. For example, Sigmund Freud extensively discussed Gustave Le Bon's claim that "the
fact that [individuals] have been transformed into a group puts them in possession of a sort of
collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in
which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation." SIGMUND
FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, in 18 COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 65, 72-73 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1955). According to Le Bon,
human groups behave "exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a
new being which displays characteristics very different from those possessed by each of the cells
singly." Id. at 73.
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successes and failures. Group members thus tend to refer more to each
other than they do to outsiders, listen more to each other, and reward each
other more often.26
The work on social identity began with studies of group conformity.
Muzafer Sherif's 1936 experiments showed that people estimating how far
a pinpoint of light moved in a dark room tended to conform to what others
in the room said. Even a wildly off-base group member influenced the
results. Follow-up studies confirmed that individuals internalized the views
of others and adhered to them even a year later.2 7 Furthermore, when
individuals left a group and were replaced by others, the group views
remained constant over "generations" of subjects-so much so that an
entirely new group of subjects at the end of an experiment had the same
views as the initial group of subjects. 28
Finding somewhat similar results, early studies by Solomon Asch asked
individuals in groups which of three "comparison" lines placed at a distance
matched a "standard" line. Each group was staffed largely with Asch's
confederates; when they voiced clearly wrong answers, the naive subjects
would conform over one-third of the time to these obviously incorrect
answers (compared to a one percent error rate when confederates voiced
correct answers).29 When even one confederate broke ranks with the off-
base match, however, the subject was very unlikely to support the wrong
answer-even when seven other people voiced support for it.30 The lesson
here is not that individuals blindly follow groups; rather, it is that groups
suppress dissent and induce conformity when they are visibly unanimous.
26. When one joins a group a person is likely to "self-stereotype" herself to mold her identity
to that of the group. Hedy Brown, Themes in Experimental Research on Groups from the 1930s to
the 1990s, in IDENTITIES, GROUPS, AND SOCIAL ISSUES, supra note 24, at 9, 34-35. This leads to a
"self-fulfilling process in the formation of identity: since being a group member implies behaviour
stereotypical of the group, the stereotype will tend to be inferred and created from that behavior."
JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP 182 (1987).
27. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 28-31 (1991).
28. Robert C. Jacobs & Donald T. Campbell, The Perpetuation of an Arbitrary Tradition
Through Several Generations of a Laboratory Microculture, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
649 (1961).
29. S.E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450-74 (1952). For recent work on conformity, see
Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization
and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization, 29 BRIT. J. SOC.
PYSCHOL. 97, 99-100 (1990) (discussing studies that show that groups converge in their
judgments and take frames of reference from each other, and that these judgments persist "even
when the original group members are no longer present"); and Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five
Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J.
MGMT. 345, 350-51 (1991) (similar).
30. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 27, at 31; see also Brown, supra note 26, at 9, 19 (noting
that "Asch's studies were widely replicated" and "the results were fairly consistent and in accord
with the original findings"); Stanley Milgram, Nationality and Conformity, SC[. AM., Dec. 1961,
at 45 (providing similar results from subjects who believed they were testing a signaling system
for airplanes).
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Rules that provide incentives to break ranks, such as conspiracy's
withdrawal doctrine, may therefore unravel conformist dynamics.
More generally, the psychological research will underscore why
conspiracy law cannot be understood as a device that merely deters
individuals. Rather, the doctrine functions on a group level, for in groups a
variety of psychological processes come into play, such as the relationship
between leaders and followers, the emergence of a social identity, and
polarization. By thinking about the individual, as the dominant mode of
legal scholarship has sought to do, these processes are slighted-yet they
explain why conspiracy should be treated in a distinctive way.31
We will examine several problems that emerge from social identity.
After outlining each problem, I will offer a few morsels about conspiracy
law, but the main course will be served up alongside the drama of Part II.
a. Polarization and Risk-Taking
Groups are more likely to have extreme attitudes and behavior. This
research began with findings showing "risky shifts"--predictability in the
conformity result in that people take greater risks in groups.32 Subsequent
work found that the phenomenon was not limited to shifts in risk, and that
groups polarize in the direction their members were already tending. 33 For
31. Naturally, caution is necessary in applying these psychological studies to the problem of
conspiracy. In some studies, the members of the group know each other; in others, they do not. In
some, the group is held together by a common ideology; in others, the membership in the group is
more notional. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this Subsection have appeared in a variety
of contexts, and they square with the (unfortunately limited) empirical research of criminal group
behavior. See infra notes 37-38. As such, the claim here is not that every criminal group follows
the tendencies shown by psychologists-rather it is that many may do so. See also infra
Subsection III.B. 1 (discussing the advantages of creating a first-degree conspiracy offense for
repeat players).
32. J.A. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Dimensions Involving Risk (1961)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Hofstra
University Library); ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 204 (2d ed. 1986) ("[O]ne decade
after Stoner wrote his thesis, the effects he obtained ... had been replicated so many times that
people had stopped counting."). For further descriptions, readers should consult HASLAM, supra
note 24, at 153-73; Bettenhausen, supra note 29, at 356-59; Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and
Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REv. 856, 856-60 (1999); David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm,
The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 602, 606-10 (1976); and Charles
Pavitt, Another View of Group Polarizing: The "Reasons for" One-Sided Oral Argumentation, 21
COMM. RES. 625, 625-29 (1994). For a brief mention of polarization's relationship to conspiracy,
see Sunstein, supra note 13, at 99 (arguing that "if the act of conspiring leads people moderately
disposed toward criminal behavior to be more than moderately disposed, precisely because they
are conspiring together, it makes sense, on grounds of deterrence, to impose additional penalties").
33. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 142 ("[L]ike polarized molecules, group members
become even more aligned in the direction they were already tending."); Markus Brauer et al., The
Effects of Repeated Expressions on Attitude Polarization During Group Discussions, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1014, 1015 (1995) (describing polarization); Myers & Lamm,
supra note 32, at 603 (providing a similar account). Polarization therefore runs against the finding
by cognitive psychologists that individuals avoid extreme positions. See Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty, supra note 3, at 2463-64 (discussing the studies).
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example, French students who already liked de Gaulle liked him even more
after discussing him in a group, and those who did not like Americans liked
them even less after discussing Americans in a group. 34 Once the problem is
conceptualized as polarization, it becomes possible to understand why some
groups behave with extreme caution.35
From one perspective, criminal risk-taking might be good because
lawbreakers may commit acts with a high probability of detection. While
more empirical research is necessary, there are reasons to doubt that
polarization will occur along this dimension. Polarization arises because
individuals exaggerate their conformity to perceived traits of a group's
social identity. 36 It is therefore possible to have a group of criminals acting
more cautiously with respect to what targets to attack, and more riskily with
respect to the number of crimes that they commit. A study of active
burglars provides some support for this dual shift, for it found that burglars
working in groups committed more burglaries and that they were more
cautious about which targets to burgle.37 The study also found that burglars
in groups are more likely to be aroused, raising the possibility that group
crimes lead to unplanned violence.
38
b. Acting Against Self-Interest
Groups encourage individuals to submerge their self-interest to that of
the group. Some of the most interesting work on this point is being done by
34. BROWN, supra note 32, at 223-24 (explaining the French studies); Serge Moscovici &
Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
125 (1969).
35. BROWN, supra note 32, at 207-13 (detailing the studies); Colin Fraser et al., Risky Shifts,
Cautious Shifts, and Group Polarization, I EUJR. J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 7, 8-29 (1971) (same);
Stephen Worchel, A Developmental View of the Search for Group Identity, in SOCIAL IDENTITY:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 53 (Stephen Worchel et al. eds., 1998). For studies of why
polarization occurs, see infra note 184.
36. See Abrams et al., supra note 29, at 110 ("Influence in polarization studies, as elsewhere,
may depend on shared identity, even if this identity is minimal .... ); TURNER ET AL., supra note
26, at 154-56 (similar).
37. Paul Cromwell interviewed thirty burglars and asked them to reconstruct burglaries they
had previously committed and to evaluate sites that had been burgled by other burglars
participating in the study. The burglars were interviewed alone and in the presence of their usual
accomplices. He found that the number of burglaries would increase in a group, Paul F. Cromwell
et al., Group Effects on Decision-Making by Burglars, 69 PSYCHOL. REP. 579, 586 (1991)
[hereinafter Cromwell et al., Group Effects], and that burglars in groups were more careful about
selecting targets, id. at 584-85. While Cromwell claims that the cautious shift did not decrease
apprehension rates, id. at 586-87, no evidence was provided for this claim, and it appears to be a
claim based on a different sample. Cf Paul Cromwell et al., Modeling Decisions by Residential
Burglars, in STUDIES ON CRIME AND CRIME PREVENTION 113, 119-20 (1993) (suggesting that
caution led some burglars to substitute less risky burglaries for risky ones).
38. See Cromwell et al., Group Effects, supra note 37, at 586 (finding that burglars
"pscyh[ed] each other up"); see also Charles F. Bond & Linda J. Titus, Social Facilitation: A
Meta-Analysis of 241 Studies, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 (1983) (providing a literature review that
found that the presence of others increases arousal only when individuals perform complex tasks).
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two economists, Nobel laureate George Akerlof and his colleague Rachel
Kranton. Their model puts forth a theory for why individuals act against
their own interests in order to preserve or augment their group identity.
Flouting the perceived ideals of the group generates personal anxiety over
self-image.39 Standard economic theory, Akerlof and Kranton underscore,
does not take these considerations into account, and therefore has a difficult
time explaining activities that are against individual self-interest, such as
self-mutilation through tattoos or piercing.40
Akerlof and Kranton's work follows from a number of psychological
studies about behavior in groups. In a series of famous experiments, Sherif
studied group dynamics in a boys' summer camp. Upon arrival, the boys
were free to form spontaneous friendships, but after a few days they were
split into two groups. Under isolation, the groups "developed a cohesive
structure and they came to strongly prefer the members of their own
group." When the groups were brought together for a tournament, "overt
group hostility... [and] minor acts of discrimination and aggression" were
found, and "in-group loyalty, solidarity and cooperation" were at their
height.4'
A second series of experiments, dubbed the "minimal group" ones,
found that even arbitrary formation of groups with no previous history
between the members produces similar results. Henri Tajfel's initial studies
divided schoolchildren into two groups by showing them some abstract
paintings and asking which ones they liked best. The students were told that
they were assigned to their groups on the basis of their answers (in actuality
they were randomly assigned, and in later experiments, they were not even
shown paintings, but assigned by a coin toss or by being told they were in a
red or blue group). The subjects were not told who else was in the group
and were placed in individual cubicles. They were then asked to award
money between the two groups, and Tajfel found that there was significant
discrimination in favor of one's own group.42 Indeed, individuals favored
39. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON.
715, 728 (2000) [hereinafter Akerlof & Kranton, Economics and Identity] ("Modem
scholars... agree on the importance of anxiety that a person experiences when she violates her
internalized rules."); George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and Schooling: Some
Lessons for the Economics of Education 3 (Apr. 13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (stating that individuals "gain or lose utility insofar as they belong to social categories
with high or low social status and their attributes and behavior match the ideal of their category").
40. Akerlof & Kranton, Economics and Identity, supra note 39, at 721.
41. Wetherell, supra note 24, at 205 (describing the experiments); see also id. at 207
("Experimental research since the Summer Camp Experiments has supported Sherif and Sherif's
conclusions.").
42. Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EuR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 149, 171 (1972) (describing the experiments); see also Henri Tajfel, The Achievement
of Group Differentiation, in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS: STUDIES IN THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 77 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1978); Henri Tajfel &
John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
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their group even when it was against their absolute self-interest: They gave
their group the largest relative gains instead of giving their group and the
other group greater absolute gains.43 This research suggests that the initial
decision to agree to conspire is an important pivot point. Once an individual
has made such an agreement, group identity can take hold and lead her to
submerge self-interest to the group's interest.
44
c. Dissuasion
Contracts scholars have spoken of a moral obligation to fulfill
contracts-an obligation that increases the probability of performance. 5
When A agrees to engage in a crime with B, the agreement thus makes the
crime more likely.46 What is now understood about groups is that, apart
from this obligation, groups are far more difficult to dissuade than are
individuals because they develop self-serving inferences.47 Such inferences
permit members of groups to justify their conduct as furthering either social
or group goals.
One common inference is for group members to believe that other
members are more likely to be correct and that nonmembers are more likely
to be wrong.48 Another inference is that group members are fairer than
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 39 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979); Wetherell,
supra note 24, at 211-12 (noting that the "results suggest that people will discriminate against the
out-group even when group membership is anonymous, no contact is made between group
members and there is no obvious self-interest involved.... The first effect of a group
division.., is to provide a new cognitive scheme with which to view the world.").
43. So too, real-world studies of aircraft engine workers who are asked about how wage
increases should be structured will answer the questions primarily in ways that "preserve wage
differentials. .. rather than to increase their own absolute earnings." HASLAM, supra note 24, at
29.
44. For example, Felix Padilla has noted that the "business success" of one Chicago gang he
intensely studied "is heavily dependent upon its capacity to engender a feeling of collectivism
among members. A major responsibility of the gang is to encourage this behavior, and it has
employed several methods to guarantee that its members' thinking and work practices proceed
within a collectivist context," FELIX M. PADILLA, THE GANG AS AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 109
(1992).
45. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 1 (1981) ("The promise principle.., is the moral basis of contract law.., by which
persons may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before.").
46. As the Model Penal Code puts it, "[T]he act of combining with another is
significant... because it increases the likelihood that the offense will be committed." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. (1985); see also supra note 22 (quoting the Code).
47. See Daniel Batson et al., In a Very Different Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1335 (1997); George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory
and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-Offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT:
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 214 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Trenbrunsel
eds., 1996).
48. Abrams et al., supra note 29, at 109. Many of us have experienced similar feelings when
watching sports: Mistakes by our team are considered bad luck or caused by a foul, and players on
the other team who "score" are considered to have benefited from lucky breaks. Indeed, so
pronounced is this tendency that I will catch myself doing all of this while watching televised
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nonmembers. 49 As a result of these and other group biases, members of a
group will listen to one another far more than they will listen to other
people.5 ° Consequently, people in groups are more likely to escalate their
commitments to failing courses of action and more likely to continue with
these failing courses of action. 5 1 Chip Heath, in a related finding,
discovered that people are far more likely to experience doubts about their
performance and disillusionment when they act as individuals compared to
when they act in groups.1
2
Dissuasion and disillusionment are critical ways for the government to
fight conspiracy. When criminal groups develop self-serving inferences, it
reinforces their tendencies toward crime. Members may feel more justified
in pursuing criminal activity to help other members and may develop
rationalizations (some drug dealers, for example, believe they perform the
positive work of pharmacists and steer customers away from violent
dealers). Such rationalizations can also thwart cooperation with law
enforcement. Consider the recent startling results of two psychologists who
found that prisoners' dilemma players induced to feel empathy for the other
party cooperate almost fifty percent of the time even when they know that
the other party has already defected.53 Game theory predicts constant
defection, and yet cooperation is manifested repeatedly.54 Such research
games in which I have no affiliation or knowledge whatsoever about the teams playing-such as
during the NCAA basketball tournaments. Within minutes, I will find a team for which to root,
and begin attributing successes and failures disproportionately-and I don't even like sports.
49. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 221 ("Even when little is known about the groups in question,
the groups to which we belong are typically seen as fair, just, honest and decent in comparison to
outgroups that are unfair, unjust, dishonest and treacherous."); see also id. at 31 (providing
research showing that people randomly assigned to a group are more likely to describe its
members as "more flexible, kind and fair than members of outgroups").
50. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 160 (describing such research).
51. Scott E. Seibert & Sonia M. Goltz, Comparison of Allocations bv Individuals and
Interacting Groups in an Escalation of Commitment Situation, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 134,
134-36, 146 (2001). This study also found that interaction between the group members magnified
the commitment to the failing course of action. Id. at 147. Accordingly, conspiracy law, which
reduces interaction between members of the group, may blunt this tendency.
52. See Chip Heath & Forest J. Jourden, Illusion, Disillusion, and the Buffering Effect of
Groups, 69 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 103, 104 (1997) (describing their
empirical study, which found that "[w]hile 59% of group members thought that their group
performed above the median of group performance, 64% of individuals thought that they
performed below the median of individual performance"); id. at 106 (providing studies finding
that "[g]roup activity increases positive emotions, and social support, in general, decreases
negative emotions by protecting people from emotional distress"). The study found that a
significant reason for buffering was group discussion. Id. at 114.
53. C. Daniel Batson & Nadia Ahmad, Empathy-Induced Altruism in a Prisoner's Dilemma
H: What if the Target of Empathy Has Defected?, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 25 (2001). The
participants were all told that the other party had defected, and a random assortment received a
note from the other party stating that she had just broken up with her boyfriend and hoped
something good would happen to her to cheer her up. Without that inducement of empathy, only
five percent cooperated. Id. at 28-30.
54. C. Daniel Batson and Nadia Ahmad also noted:
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explains why many do not defect from conspiracies. The group encourages
a feeling of solidarity and cultivates the view that each member needs the
cooperation of the others.55 It is harder to get people to defect-to flip-
when they share an identity.
d. Success in Tasks
Studies of group performance appear to be in some tension with each
other. On the one hand, some studies show that people perform less well in
groups than they do as individuals. For example, German experiments in
the nineteenth century found that when the size of a group asked to pull a
rope was increased, the total pull exerted would increase, but the amount
each participant pulled would drop. Dyads pulled at 93%, trios at 85%, and
groups of eight at only 49% of their individual performance levels.
56
Taylorism, a management theory dominant in the early part of the twentieth
century, was based on such notions of group inefficiency.5 7 More recent
work has argued that groups suppress dissent and stifle creativity, an idea
captured by Irving Janis's term "groupthink.
5 8
On the other hand, a number of studies find that groups enhance
performance. Early work showed that when word puzzles were provided to
Our research participants never saw the other participant. They did not anticipate
meeting her. They did not even know her name. Yet imagining her feelings about the
break-up of a romantic relationship was enough to lead many to have sufficient concern
for her welfare that they gave up all chance at winning a $30 gift certificate themselves
in order to improve her chances of winning.
From the perspective of classic game theory and the theory of rational choice, the
behavior of our empathically aroused participants makes absolutely no sense.
Id. at 35.
55. These features of group membership are evident in the Mafia Code, which includes the
following general tenets:
(1) To put the organization above wife, children, country, or religion. (2) To follow
orders of the captain without question, even to include murder. (3) To furnish no
information or help to a law enforcement agency. (4) To disclose nothing about the
organization to outsiders. (5) To respect all members, despite personal feelings; to pay
debts owed other members; never to injure, steal from, or make disparaging remarks
about other members.
NORMAN W. PHILCOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME 20 (1978).
56. Later experiments corroborated these findings even when subjects were blindfolded and
simply told how many people were pulling on the rope with them. Bettenhausen, supra note 29, at
360; see also HASLAM, supra note 24, at 244 (discussing the studies).
57. FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 72
(1913) ("A careful analysis ... demonstrated the fact that when workmen are herded together in
gangs, each man in the gang becomes far less efficient than when his personal ambition is
stimulated ... ").
58. Janis found that "members of any small cohesive group tend to maintain esprit de corps
by unconsciously developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with
critical thinking and reality testing." IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 35 (2d ed. 1982). Some
suggest that groupthink may help organizations. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Ayths
Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569, 1578 (2000) ("The stress reduction
leads to better focus, concentration and persistence.").
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individuals and groups, groups performed better. 59 Other research has found
that groups tend to have more solutions to problems, to generate them
faster, and to find more creative solutions than do individuals.60 Indeed, a
psychological literature review found a "general consensus .. that, on
average, groups outperform individuals" on tasks ranging from intellectual
problems to decisionmaking ones.6'
The findings from these studies are reconcilable in two ways. First, the
rope-pulling and other such experiments were beset with what we will later
call "team-production" problems-circumstances in which an individual's
input to the team product was not visible and shirking therefore more likely.
So, for example, individuals asked to cheer will not do so as loudly in a
group as they will on their own, but will cheer as loudly in a group setting if
they are told that a computer can discern their individual level of cheering.
62
As we will soon see, team-production analysis will generate many useful
insights for conspiracy law by suggesting doctrines that reward shirking.
Second, the group-inefficiency studies often slighted social identity. With a
shared identity, performance increases markedly.63 One literature review
found that "loyalty, rule-following and extra-role behaviour increase when
employees define themselves in terms of a relevant team or organizational
identity"64 so that when groups are given tasks that "encourage participants
to define themselves in terms of a shared sense of self, group productivity
can match that of isolated individuals and may also exceed it."
65
Conspiracies, which often cultivate such an identity, therefore can be more
productive (and impose greater harm) than isolated individuals.
59. Maiorie E. Shaw, A Comparison of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational
Solution of Complex Problems, 44 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 491 (1932).
60. James H. Davis, Some Compelling Intuitions About Group Consensus Decisions,
Theoretical and Empirical Research, and Interpersonal Aggregation Phenomena: Selected
Examples, 1950-1990, 52 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 3, 7-8 (1992) (discussing
group decisionmaking studies).
61. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REv. 687, 691 (1996).
62. Kipling Williams et al., Identifiability as a Deterrent to Social Loafing: Two Cheering
Experiments, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 303 (1981).
63. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 254-56; see also Stephen G. Harkins & Kate Szymanski,
Social Loafing and Group Evaluation, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 941 (1989)
(criticizing low-performance studies because "there is little that is 'groupy' and "little in the
procedure itself to make participants feel that they are part of a group").
64. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 304-05.
65. id. at 243; see also id. at 259 ("Rather than being a source of weakness, it is, then,
precisely because groups have the potential [to] be more productive than the sum of their parts
that they play such a key role in organization life." (emphasis omitted)); Jaap W. Ouwerkerk et
al., When the Going Gets Tough, the Tough Get Going: Social Identification and Individual Effort
in Intergroup Competition, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1550, 1552 (2000)
(describing studies that found that individuals are more likely to perform well when subtle cues of
group identity are present-for example, students better perform tasks in the presence of their
school's colors, and teams that wear uniforms perform better than those without them).
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2. Economic Analysis of Specialization of Labor and
Economies of Scale
Businesses take advantage of their size in two ways: They permit their
employees to specialize (and thereby increase production and/or quality),
and they use their purchasing power to obtain larger advantages in the
marketplace. 66 Much early twentieth-century work in economics was
preoccupied with understanding these phenomena. 67 Coase argued that the
benefit from merger arises because the manager of one firm will have
control over the other and will not need to price incentives for additional
output. A preexisting firm will economize on the search costs involved in
finding labor for each new activity, and on the costs incurred in setting a
wage structure from scratch.68 The firm develops because it is cheaper to
avoid marketplace contracts.
A conspiracy, too, can exploit these benefits-the criminal firm creates
a framework of trust to reduce the transaction costs involved in forming
new contracts with each other. 69 A criminal enterprise can hire specialists
and use its size to obtain benefits that uncoordinated individuals cannot.70
Conspiracies also create efficiencies for criminal enterprises because they
minimize competition among members. Competing against each other
imposes costs (such as the resources spent fighting) and reduces profits
(due to a greater number of suppliers).
66. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPoRATE LAW 8 (1991) ("People can organize as teams with the functions of each member
identified, so that each member's specialization makes the team as a whole more productive than
it would otherwise bc."); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF
THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 159, 169 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney
G. Winter eds., 1991) (describing the specialization advantages of firms).
67. See Coase, supra note 15, at 388 (discussing the views of Marshall, Knight, J.B. Clark,
and D.H. Robertson).
68. Id. at 390-91 ("The most obvious cost of 'organising' production through the price
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced but it will
not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information .... It is true that
contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced." (footnote
omitted)); see also Alan Schwartz, Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts, in
CONTRACT ECONOMICS 76 (Lars Werin & Hans Wijkander eds., 1992) (discussing the
transaction-cost theory of the firm); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the
Firm, 4 JL. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988) (similar).
69. Werner J. Einstadtcr, The Social Organization of Armed Robbery, 17 SOC. PROBs. 64, 74
(1969) (detailing the specialization of armed robbers); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of
the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1219 (1985) (noting that conspiracies are dangerous
because they "take advantage of the division of labor"). Indeed, the fact that criminals work in
groups for more complex crimes suggests that their behavior conforms, at least to some extent, to
the rational actor premise.
70. In a later Section, we will come to understand how flipping directly confronts these
advantages by requiring people to recontract with each other at every turn in order to reestablish
trust because membership in the organization alone is not sufficient. See infra Subsections
II.C.l.a-b.
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Economies of scale also have another set of advantages: They can
reduce the probability of detection. Although larger entities may be more
visible, they are also better bribers. 71 The laws against bribery, which
punish a small bribe with a large penalty, create marginal deterrence
problems in that police and prosecutors only take large bribes since small
ones are not worth the risk; individuals can rarely afford to pay these bribes.
Conspiracies can also reduce the probability of detection in two other ways:
by committing numerous crimes within a short time period in a jurisdiction
and overpowering limited resources for investigation,72 and by assigning
people as "lookouts" to avoid committing crimes in the presence of
witnesses or law enforcement.73
Specialization also permits crimes of diffusion, where the responsibility
for a single crime is spread over many persons. These strategies help
members evade punishment because of the difficulty involved in proving a
person's actus reus and mens rea. The former is obscured by the number of
other actors who committed parts of the crime; the latter because the
individual might only have intended to carry out a minor role and because
proof of a more culpable mental state is difficult to prove for those
performing discrete tasks. In general, those insulated will be leaders, who
orchestrate actions to maintain plausible deniability.74 (I first became
painfully aware of this phenomenon while investigating war-crimes cases;
imputing wrongdoing is exceptionally difficult because leaders hide their
actions behind layers of middlepersons.) 75 Conspiracy liability partially
71. See Andrew Dick, Organized Crime, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS & THE LAW 719 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (making such an argument). In addition
to bribery, there is also the fear that conspiracies are more likely to interfere with law enforcement
operations- Indeed, at common law, it was homicide if death was caused, even unintentionally,
when there existed "an intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his way to, in, or
returning from the execution of the duty of arresting, keeping in custody, or imprisoning any
person whom he is lawfully entitled to arrest, keep in custody, or imprison." JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS) art. 223 (photo. reprint
1991) (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1878). This rule protected law enforcement from the reaches
of a conspiracy by attaching additional sanctions when co-conspirators tried to prevent officers
from arresting or imprisoning one of the members of a group.
72. See Scott Freeman et al., The Spatial Concentration of Crime, 40 J. URB. ECON. 216
(1996), Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Crime, 17 INT'L REV.
L. &EcoN. 325 (1997).
73. See PADILLA, supra note 44, at 147 ("Youngsters carry out their work in crews... which
serve as protection against police invasions and assaults .... When a police car approaches a call
is made which acts as a waming to dealers to take cover or be extra cautious.").
74. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 201 (1998)
("[S]ometimes it might be the case that one person possesses the relevant information, another
makes the decision to act, and still another carries out the action."); PHILCOX, supra note 55, at 78
("It is difficult to obtain proof of organized crime violations insofar as the top command is
concerned. If and when they are identified it is often impossible to obtain documentary evidence
which can be used in court.").
75. See generally David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999) (describing
the problem).
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compensates for diffusion by punishing those who hide behind the veneer
of the group.
Diffusion can also remove internal restraints to crime. Like the prison
warden who flips a switch to carry out a death sentence, a person who
drives a person from Point A to Point B may not feel that he is doing
something gravely immoral, even when he is driving away from the scene
of a crime. A person who "bags" cocaine for individual consumption may
not consider herself responsible for the cocaine dependence of buyers. The
forces of morality and social norms are thus subverted through strategies
that disaggregate human behavior, playing on the idea that little bad acts are
excusable. This makes crime easier and cheaper to carry out.7 6
The above economic insights therefore help explain punishments for
group behavior. Nineteenth-century claims about the dangers of conspiracy
recognized the dangers of specialization,77 as have more recent jurists.78
76. Of course, economies of scale do not yield only advantages. As an organization gets
larger, specialization must be accompanied by institutional processes to coordinate discrete
entities. See HENRY MINTZBERG, MINTZBERG ON MANAGEMENT 100-02 (1989); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. RFv. 777, 788-89 (1972). And sometimes specialization may make a group particularly
vulnerable because the loss of a key member-whether to law enforcement or a rival firm-may
hurt the group. See V.S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES 152 (1949)("'Manufactures, where they are in perfection, are carried on by a multiplicity of hands, each of
which is expert only in his own part, no one of them a master of the whole; and if by any means
spirited away to a foreign country, he is lost without his fellows."' (quoting Benjamin Franklin)).
77. E.g., United States v. Lancaster, 44 F. 896, 899 (W.D. Ga. 1891) ("[Tlhe act of unlawful
combination is more dangerous and disturbing to the peace of society than would be the crime
which is the object of the combination, when accomplished by a single individual .... A
conspiracy will become powerful and effective in the accomplishment of its illegal purpose in
proportion to the numbers, power, and strength of the combination to effect it."); Commonwealth
v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, 337 (1807) ("A solitary offender may be easily detected and punished; but
combinations against law are always dangerous to the public peace and to private security.");
Commonwealth ex rel. Chew v. Carlisle, Brightly 36, 40 (Pa. Ct. Nisi Prius 1821) (similar).
English cases of the time voiced similar arguments. See, e.g., Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495,
530 (appeal taken from Ir.). Lord Brampton noted:
[A] number of actions and things not in themselves actionable or unlawful if done
separately without conspiracy may, with conspiracy, become dangerous and alarming,just as a grain of gunpowder is harmless but a pound may be highly destructive, or the
administration of one grain of a particular drug may be most beneficial as a medicine
but administered frequently and in larger quantities with a view to harm may be fatal as
a poison.
Id.; see also Regina v. Parnell, 14 Cox 508, 514 (Q.B. 1881) (referring to the "powers of
combination"); Mulcahy v. The Queen, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 306, 317 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken
from Jr.) ("The number and the compact give weight and cause danger, and this is more especially
the case in a conspiracy like those charged in this indictment.").
78. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[T]he basic conspiracy principle has some place in modem criminal law, because to
unite... the strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more
difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer."); People v. Welch, 264 P. 324, 325 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1928) ("[A] group of evil minds planning and giving support to the commission of crime
is more likely to be a menace to society than where one individual alone sets out to violate the
law.").
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And yet, these claims have not been considered alongside the benefits from
group behavior.
B. The Benefits to Society from Group Behavior
1. Information Extraction
The chief benefit conspirators provide is information. In the Oklahoma
City bombing prosecution, for example, Michael Fortier's testimony was
indispensable because it "connected the government's 'bricks of evidence'
by providing the only direct evidence of the plan, motivation, and
preparation" of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. 79 Because many
conspiracies operate in a shadowy netherworld without complaining
"victims," conspirators are valuable sources, and many prosecutions would
not be possible without them.
80
The primary way that a conspirator can be induced to provide
information is by threatening penalties against that individual.8 A 1998
study found that flipping helped the government obtain guilty pleas of co-
defendants, prosecution of new defendants, additional convictions and
arrests, recovery of assets, cooperation of known and new co-defendants,
82
and deportations. Indeed, flipping is so common that when the Tenth
Circuit briefly decided to shut down the practice, the Justice Department
complained that its ruling made "a criminal out of nearly every federal
prosecutor" and that the government "relies on witnesses who testify in
79. Nolan Clay, Fortier Appeals, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 6, 1999, at 3.
80. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.) ("Courts have
countenanced the use of informers from time immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other
cases when the crime consists of preparing for another crime, it is usually necessary to rely upon
them or upon accomplices because the criminals will almost certainly proceed covertly."); Gary S.
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1974) ("Enforcement is generally more effective against violations with
victims because victims have a stake in apprehending violators ...."); Ann C. Rowland, Effective
Use of Informants and Accomplice Witnesses, 50 S.C. L. REV. 679, 697 (1999) ("It is a rare
federal criminal trial that does not require the use of criminal witnesses ....").
81. Several statutes recognize the practice. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (permitting a
court to impose a sentence below the Sentencing Guidelines range in order to "reflect a
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense"); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2000) (directing the Sentencing Commission to set
guidelines that "reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence.., to take into
account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1) (providing housing and
payment for living expenses for witnesses under government protection).
82. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL
POLICY AND PRACTICE 29 (1998).
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return for leniency in literally thousands of cases each year, including major
cases."
83
The classic co-conspirator exception to hearsay at trial, which permits a
prosecutor to introduce all sorts of evidence about the parties without the
actual speakers themselves in the courtroom, facilitates information
extraction. 84 The conspirator must "bear the risk of what his agents say as
well as the risk of what they do." 85 As such, it is a powerful tool to harvest
information from a cooperator because it increases the range of statements
to which she can testify. 6 The permissiveness of joinder in conspiracy
cases similarly furthers information extraction.87 Joinder induces each
defendant to testify and lay responsibility for the crimes at the feet of the
other defendants. 88 Other features of conspiracy law have moved toward
83. Supplemental Brief of the United States at 2, 15, United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d
1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-3178); see also id. at 15 (stating that without such cooperation the
government "could not enforce the drug laws [and] could not prosecute organized crime figures");
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1998) (reporting that the conviction of
Carmine Avellino of the Luchese crime family was partly based on evidence from a co-
conspirator). In a survey, between ninety-eight and one hundred percent of federal prosecutors
stated that defendants who participate in the investigation of another offender or who testify at
another offender's trial should receive a lower sentence. MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 82, at
8.
84. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a statement is not hearsay if made by a co-
conspirator of a party "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EVID.
801 (d)(2)(E) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1183. It is sometimes remarked that the hearsay exception is
founded on concepts of agency law, due in part to Justice Story's early remarks that conspirators
are partners in crime, and that each is the agent of the others. See United States v. Gooding, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827); see also Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 n.6
(1974) (adopting an agency/partnership rationale for the hearsay exception); United States v.
Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule... is merely a rule of evidence founded, to some extent, on concepts of agency law."). But
see Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 988-89 (1959)
(arguing that agency concepts do not fully explain the hearsay exception). As such, it is not clear
whether information extraction is a cause or an effect of the co-conspirator exception.
86. Paul Marcus's survey of hundreds of prosecutors and defense attorneys found an
overwhelming belief that doing away with the hearsay exception for co-conspirators would lead to
a "[s]ignificant reduction in convictions." Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in
Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO L.J. 925, 940 (1977) (reporting that 61.7% of prosecutors and
72. 1% of defense attorneys so believed).
87. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) permits joinder when there are multiple
defendants. In general, defendants who are jointly indicted should be jointly tried, "and this rule
applies with particular force to conspiracy cases." United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1533(11th Cir. 1983); see also Note, Application of Conspiracy Statute to Prosecution for Sale of
Counterfeit Money, 48 YALE L.J. 1447, 1450 (1939) ("Only by prosecuting all the members
together and by culling the sum total of their knowledge is it possible to obtain a detailed mosaic
of the whole undertaking.").
88. Justice Jackson noted:
A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will
be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that
birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as
often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other,
they convict each other.
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facilitating information extraction, such as the diminishment of the rule of
consistency. 89
The information-extraction benefits of conspirators have been known
for some time. As early as the year 1130, medieval law recognized the
practice of approvement, whereby an indicted person could plead guilty but
offer to cooperate with the prosecution. The accuser had to implicate
accomplices before the jury deliberations began, and the accuser was not
simply to reveal "the whole truth" of the particular crime, but also all
felonies to which the person had knowledge. 90 If the accomplices were
convicted, he would be pardoned, but if his accomplices were not, then the
accuser was sentenced to death. 91 Because this was not often a sufficient
inducement for information, England developed the crown-witness system.
Rather than receive a right to a postconfessional pardon from the King via
an approvement, the crown witness would be granted pretrial immunity
from local magistrates: a promise from the authorities not to prosecute
him.92 (The witness was not necessarily pardoned, contrary to what some,
including the Supreme Court, have claimed.) 93 Further, so long as the
crown witness made a good faith effort to assist the prosecution he would
go free. Under these dynamics, a race to become a crown witness often
ensued.94 Some criminals even kept journals of their offenses to bolster
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)-
89. The rule of consistency prevents one conspirator from being convicted when his
compatriots have been acquitted. See United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1986)
(describing the rule); JOSEPH F. McSORLEY, A PORTABLE GUIDE TO FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW
128 (1996) (describing the rule's application). So, too, a new Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6),
which governs forfeiture of confrontation clause rights by wrongdoing, has been interpreted to
permit hearsay evidence when one conspirator murders a cooperating witness. See United States
v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that "a co-conspirator may be deemed to
have 'acquiesced in' the wrongful procurement of a witness's unavailability ... when the
government can satisfy the requirements of Pinkerton").
90. The King v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114, 1116 (K.B. 1775); see also 2 MATTHEW HALE,
THE HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 228, 280 (George Wilson ed., Dublin, E. Lynch 1778)
(1736).
91. Frederick C. Hamil, The King's Approvers: A Chapter in the History of English Criminal
Law, II SPECULUM 238, 238 (1936); John Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal
Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 91 (1983). Conviction rates for those
accused by approvers were low and some approvers were hanged despite the convictions of all
their accomplices, so "the approvers were the losers and victims of the entire system." A.J.
Musson, Turning King's Evidence: The Prosecution of Crime in Laic Medieval England, 19
OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 467, 479 (1999).
92. See Langbein, supra note 91, at 91-96.
93. See Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 600 (1878) (describing the crown witness system as
giving "a kind of hope to the accomplice that if he behaves fairly and discloses the whole truth, he
may, by a recommendation to mercy, save himself from punishment and secure a pardon").
94. JOHN LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 107-09, on file with author); see also Langbein, supra note 91, at 88-90 (describing
the race).
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reliability of their evidence. 95 This system became crucial to English law
enforcement. 96
Given the English success, it is not surprising that early American law
employed similar practices and that the United States Supreme Court
blessed them. 97  As Americans backed away from the draconian
punishments of old England (typically, death), however, new inducements
for cooperation were needed. Conspiracy law, as we shall see, became one
such inducement. Not only has this proven to be an exceptionally effective
way of controlling crime, flipping has also reduced the monetary costs of
law enforcement, bypassing expensive informants and detectives.
I will be discussing the details surrounding the American practice of
flipping, and its recognition in the current law and the Sentencing
Guidelines, in a moment. For now, all that is necessary is the basic point
that a conspiracy can sometimes aid law enforcement. The criminal who
robs a house by himself may be less likely to get caught than the duo who
robs two houses. Working in a group can expose a criminal to additional
law enforcement risks because his partners can implicate him. Prosecutors
can also obtain information about entirely unrelated crimes of which a
conspirator learns from dealings with other members of a criminal
syndicate.
Research on multiplayer prisoners' dilemmas illuminates methods to
induce defection. When the game is played only once, game theorists have
surmised that everyone will defect unless coercion can be used to secure
cooperation.98 The law of contracts, as we shall see, rightly refuses to
95. See infra note 316.
96. LANGBEIN, supra note 94 (manuscript at 110) ("For most of the eighteenth century the
crown witness system was practically the only resort of the London-area authorities in dealing
with gang crimes."); see also J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS OF ENGLAND: 1660-1800,
at 366 (1986) (stating that crown witness "evidence was very common in trials at the Surrey
assizes from the late seventeenth century").
97. See Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 604 (stating that when a defendant "testifies fully and
fairly as to his own acts in the case, and those of his associates... he is equitably entitled to a
pardon, and the prosecutor, and the court if need be, when fully informed of the facts, will join in
such a recommendation"); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 312-13 (1855)
("[A]ccomplices, though admitted according to the usual phrase to be 'king's evidence,' have no
absolute claim or legal right to a pardon. But they have an equitable claim to pardon, if upon the
trial a full and fair disclosure of the joint guilt of one of them and his associates is made."); United
States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The prosecutorial prerogative to recommend
leniency in exchange for testimony dates back to the common law in England and has been
recognized and approved by Congress, the courts, and the Sentencing Commission of the United
States."); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. 477, 494 (1830) ("[W]here the king's witness
makes a fair and full discovery to the satisfaction of the judge, he is to be recommended to
mercy .. "); Ingram v. Prescott, 149 So. 369, 369 (Fla. 1933) ("From the earliest times, it has
been found necessary, for the detection and punishment of crime, for the state to resort to the
criminals themselves for testimony with which to convict their confederates .... [T]herefore ... a
state may contract with a criminal for his exemption from prosecution if he shall honestly and
fairly make a full disclosure of the crime, whether the party testified against is convicted or not.").
98. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 169-71 (1957); Henry
Hamburger, N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma, 3 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 27, 30 (1973).
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enforce agreements that prevent conspirators from defecting. So, too, the
witness protection program reduces the ability of the group to exert
coercion. Strategies to reduce coercion further will take the form of
measures that increase the anonymity of defecting players.
99
When the multiplayer dilemma is iterated over multiple stages, the
number of players makes collusion to prevent defection very difficult.
Theory would predict defection even in early stages,1° ° although individuals
often will not defect when they have stakes in forming reputations. In these
reputational scenarios, defection is less likely when it can be detected by
the group, and more likely when the group believes that its activities are
coming to a close.' 0' Members on the precipice of leaving a group have an
incentive to cheat, and this fact may stimulate defection by others. Viewed
this way, criminal law should encourage renunciation and withdrawal, not
only because a person's renunciation or withdrawal removes that person
from the organization, but because it may also increase the defection of
other members of the group.'
0 2
Two other findings from game theory deserve quick mention. First,
Robert Axelrod found that hierarchy and organization concentrate
interactions between individuals and promote cooperation. 10 3 As we shall
see, conspiracy law targets organizers and leaders with special penalties,
thereby incapacitating them and deterring the formation of hierarchy.
Second, cooperation is significantly promoted by group identity.'
4
Conspiracy law, by reducing the number of groups and fracturing the
identity within those that do exist, minimizes such harms.
99. See CRISTINA BICCHIERi, RATIONALITY AND COORDINATION 225 (1993) (stating that
anonymity or the inability to punish defection in future rounds increases defection).
100. In a finitely repeated game, every player knows when the game ends and, as such, has an
incentive to defect at the very last stage in order to capture defection profits. If every player
knows that every other player is rational, then all players will know that the others will defect in
the last stage and, as such, will defect in the second-to-last stage because they have no mutual
cooperation to gain by cooperating. Inducting backward in this fashion gives the result that all
players will defect at every stage of the game. Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners' Dilemma, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 71, at 89, 91 ("The idea
of resolving the prisoners' dilemma through repeated interaction is appealing, but there is a logical
time bomb hidden in the argument. To sustain any cooperation requires that there be no final
period to the game, no matter how distant.").
101. Defection is more likely to occur in small groups when it is known that the group will
soon dissolve or when a member plans to leave soon. See BICCHIERI, supra note 99, at 240.
102. See infra Subsection III.A.5.
103. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 130-32 (1984).
104. Henry Hamburger et al., Group Size and Cooperation, 19 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 503, 520
(1975). The psychology literature on social dilemmas finds that "the decisive condition" for
cooperation is "the extent to which players come to see themselves as a collective or joint unit, to
feel a sense of 'we-ness,' of being together in the same situation facing the same problems."
TURNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 34. For example, when people are divided into short-lived
groups and asked to play prisoners' dilemmas against members of their own team as well as
against members of other teams, cooperation occurs sixty percent of the time when playing their
own team, twice as much as for intergroup competition. Id. at 35.
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2. Physical Evidence and Perpetration Cost
Working in a group often results in physical evidence that increases the
probability of being caught and sentenced. Because conspirators need to
communicate with each other, their messages can be intercepted. E-mails
can be captured, phone conversations tapped, mail read, and discussions in
public places overheard. 0 5 The lone criminal does not face these risks.
The Title III wiretap statute therefore permits the government to take
advantage of these benefits of group activity. By creating mechanisms to
intercept communications between conspirators, law enforcement can
prevent some criminal acts, further ongoing investigations, and generate
evidence that may be introduced into court proceedings. (A similar point is
true for newfangled interception techniques, such as the FBI's e-mail-
interception system called "Carnivore.") 106 Ex ante, such rules also make
communication among members of the firm more difficult, thereby
combating its ability to coordinate tasks and engage in specialization.
In addition, conspiracy may be financially costly. A leader who runs a
conspiracy has to devote time to management: making sure that employees
are happy, the books are working, the suppliers are paid, and so on. Profits
need to be split among many different actors. At some point, a conspiracy
gets large enough that it does not generate enough profits for each
participant. This is particularly the case when changes to architecture, such
as better locks and more powerful lighting, require criminals to work in
larger groups or to expend money on better equipment. These costs, by
reducing gains to the criminal, can diminish incentives to commit crime.
II. THE THEORY OF CONSPIRACY
This Part outlines three somewhat hidden features of conspiracy law
that, taken together, generate a new theory of the crime. Conspiracy law
employs price discrimination to change the valence of conspirators from
negative to positive, introduces additional uncertainty to make criminal
contracts more difficult to strike, and forces criminal enterprises to adopt
bundles of inefficient practices that ultimately destabilize trust and cue
defection.
Two caveats are appropriate at this juncture. First, in some cases, the
argument will depend on the assumption that criminals know the contours
of conspiracy law. For example, if Pinkerton liability is to deter additional
105. See Katyal, supra note 20, at 1042-44.
106. The wiretap statute is Title i of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safc Streets Act. 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 & Supp. 2002); see also John Schwartz, Wiretapping System Works
on Internet, Review Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A19 (describing Carnivore).
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criminal acts, in general, conspirators must understand the doctrine.0 7 Yet,
even in these settings, there will be marginal offenders, such as leaders,
who know the doctrine and can be deterred through legal sanctions. And, if
ignorance of the law is widespread, it suggests all the more why
governments must publicize the meaning of conspiracy law to
communities.108 There will also be other occasions for law enforcement to
educate individual criminals about particular sanctions, such as in the
cooperation and sentencing processes, in order to influence their behavior
and facilitate flipping. Nevertheless, even when many participants lack
knowledge about it, conspiracy law can deter criminal activity. Conspiracy
law encourages organizations to adopt practices, such as employee
monitoring, that generate inefficiencies, stymie group identity, and sow
distrust within the group.10 9 In so doing, it helps make criminal enterprises
unattractive places in which to work, regardless of the members'
understandings of their personal legal risks.
Second, conspiracy law extends liability in a range of circumstances
beyond the criminal enterprise, such as to individuals who "agree" to
commit a single crime. Much of the analysis in this Article views criminal
groups as enterprises, and the positive effects of conspiracy law will be
most robust in these settings. The Supreme Court has claimed that the
economic and psychological harms of groups are applicable to the panoply
of situations that constitute a "conspiracy,"' 10 but, single-shot agreements
do not pose precisely the same dangers as repeat ones. Because of their
closer calibration to enterprises, it might be thought that modern
"conspiracy-plus" statutes such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute
(CCE) may have advantages over the traditional conspiracy offense. It is
not altogether clear, however, that RICO is so limited since some courts
have interpreted it to reach single-shot agreements."' This Article,
107. Knowledge of the doctrine will not always be necessary for deterrence, for Pinkerton
may help generate social norms against joining conspiracies. These norms can deter crime even
when individuals lack information about their source. See Katyal, Deterrence ' Difficulty, supra
note 3, at 2449-50 (discussing the role of lore as a solution to informational problems in
deterrence).
108. See infra Subsection IllI.B.4 (discussing the publicizing of conspiracy law).
109. A similar point concerns decisional simplification. Psychologists have shown that
individuals tend to simplify their decisionmaking processes, so changing technical details of
conspiracy law and the rules of evidence may not provide much direct deterrence. See Charles R.
Schwenk, Cognitive Simplification Processes in Strategic Decision-Making, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 11, 112-22 (1984) (discussing simplification processes). However, the pronounced effects of
conspiracy law on flipping, monitoring, and cuing internal distrust will loom large (perhaps even
larger) in the minds of potential conspirators under conditions of decisional simplification. See
infra text accompanying notes 164-184.
110. See supra text accompanying note 22.
111. See United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1991) (upholding a RICO
charge from a single narcotics importation because "a pattern" arose from violation of two statutes
that prohibit possession of cocaine and travel across state lines to facilitate criminal activity,
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therefore, serves as a template to help understand the function of such
statutes and to outline the many advantages that accrue from retooling them
to target repeat players.'2
Statutes like RICO and CCE, moreover, often have significant
limitations that preclude them from supplanting the function of the
conspiracy offense. Both have been limited to reach only particular types of
offenses and particular types of illegal enterprise.'" 3 Because even single
agreements have the potential to cascade into repeat ones, some sanction on
criminal agreement is appropriate to further deterrence at an early stage,
before group identity has taken root. Relatively minor sanctions in that
phase can have greater crime-prevention benefits than will larger sanctions
once a conspiracy has blossomed into an enterprise. And even at these early
points, specialization of labor and economies of scale can make the
concerted action more dangerous. So, too, might the mind-set produced by
the agreement, for the psychology literature suggests that even "minimal
groups" can form a group identity that leads them down a path of
escalation. This may explain why some courts have put pressure on RICO
to reach single-shot agreements, but the traditional offense of conspiracy
can easily fulfill this role by attaching liability at an early stage.
The traditional offense of conspiracy will also be necessary when law
enforcement is unable to discover the existence of criminal enterprises
without leverage against those known to have made a criminal agreement.
The only way for prosecutors to learn of a RICO violation (both in terms of
the triggering offenses and their repetition), for example, may be to flip
someone they know who made a single agreement. For information-
extraction reasons, the offense of conspiracy should attach liability earlier
in time-at the moment of agreement-though it will often be appropriate
respectively); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that a conspiracy
to commit murder and the object crime of murder are separate crimes that fulfill the two predicate
crimes for a RICO violation). See generally NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW 488-91 (3d ed. 2000).
112. This is particularly so for RICO, since one of the more common ways to use RICO is to
charge a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000). An
understanding of conspiracy law may illuminate RICO's operation because similar principles
apply to § 1962(d)- See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997) (relying on
interpretations of the general federal conspiracy statute, in particular Pinkerton, to determine the
scope of RICO's § 1962(d)).
113. For example, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000), is
limited to narcotics felonies. And under RICO, an 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering
activity'; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). This means that
purely illegal enterprises may escape the reach of RICO. See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339,
1352 (8th Cir. 1997) (suggesting this possibility). RICO is also limited because one of its major
provisions, § 1962(c), which punishes participation in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, applies only to those involved in the management or operation of the
enterprise. See Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-85 (1993).
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to lower the punishment or, in some cases, decline to prosecute altogether,
after investigation determines that the conspiracy was a single-shot one."'
A. Price Discrimination
Conspiracy law has subtly become a vehicle for a practice akin to price
discrimination. Price discrimination refers to the ability to charge different
prices for the same good, such as selling a box of widgets to A for $1000
and to B for $2000. Price discrimination is often tough to implement
because of arbitrage-A can buy the widgets for $1000 and sell them to B
for a profit. But, when the price is set by a monopoly, then arbitrage ceases
to be a constraint." 5 The government distinguishes among offenders by
charging high prices to some conspirators and low prices to others-
depending on whether they provide useful information. Learned Hand once
famously called conspiracy the "darling of the modem prosecutor's
nursery,"' 6 and while his words referred to the procedural advantages
conspiracy gave to prosecutors, they also describe well a series of other
"darlings"-flipped witnesses.
Conspiracy law imposes an up-front and early penalty on criminal
agreements. 1 7 That penalty is a combination of the statutory sentence for
conspiracy and the liability for acts committed by other members
(Pinkerton liability). The high price is necessary to deter people from
entering conspiracies in the first place. As such, it reflects the view that
fewer people should be in conspiracies. Additional people can create the
possibility of polarization, or economies of scale and specialization of
labor. Once someone has joined a conspiracy, however, the matrix changes
and the law attempts to provide a conspirator with incentives to turn
evidence over to the government, thereby creating price discrimination.
Accordingly, prosecutors need the ability to make credible threats of large
penalties and credible promises of low ones.1 8 This is a point about
114. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (advocating higher penalties for repeat players in an
enterprise).
115. See Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, supra note 3, at 2439-41 (outlining these features of
price discrimination).
116. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
117. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975) (noting that "agreement remains
the essential element of the crime"); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912) (stating that
"the combination of minds in an unlawful purpose was the foundation of the offense"). An overt
act, required in some jurisdictions, is discussed infra text accompanying notes 182-183.
118. See Rowland, supra note 80, at 680 ("Before approaching a co-conspirator or an
accomplice, the Government must have sufficient leverage to induce cooperation ...."). Because
flipping is so important, attempts by Congress to cut back on the leniency prosecutors give some
defendants in conspiracy cases by requiring mandatory minimums risk harming law
enforcement's interests instead of helping them. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 846 (imposing mandatory
minimums for drug conspiracies). Mandatory minimums should not be written to make it difficult
for prosecutors to lower sentences in exchange for information.
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substantive criminal law (and particularly, but not exclusively, about the
offense of conspiracy), as well as about criminal procedure (which vests
prosecutors with the discretion to make threats and offer concessions,
including, of course, plea bargaining). 19
This model helps explain why law focuses on an "agreement," a
question that has puzzled commentators for some time.' 20 Before the
agreement is solidified, group identity has not yet taken hold and
individuals are less likely to follow the group against their self-interest.
Indeed, the process of joining a group often brings these tensions between
self-identity and group identity to the fore.12 1 Moreover, once an individual
makes an agreement, cognitive dissonance manifests itself, making it
difficult to dissuade an individual from her chosen path. Psychologists have
shown that people conform their choices to decisions they have already
made, creating a "sunk-cost trap" that locks in and escalates previous
behavior.1
22
It may also be asked why conspiracy law employs a blunt punishment,
such as the five-year prison term in the general federal conspiracy statute,
123
instead of always calibrating punishment to the object of the illegal
agreement. After all, by lumping all criminal objects together, such statutes
may create pernicious substitution effects whereby conspirators only
119. Group identity is only one factor that prevents conspirators from cooperating; fear of
retaliation surely is another. But such fears can often be deterrents to joining an organization in
the first place. See infra text accompanying notes 175-176. If a person nevertheless joins, law
enforcement needs to develop ways to reduce the expected sanction the enterprise would levy on a
cooperator, thus creating price discrimination of a different sort. See supra text accompanying
note 99 (discussing the witness protection program); infra text accompanying note 196 (same).
120. E.g., Dennis, supra note 6, at 41.
121. See Bettenhausen, supra note 29, at 349 (providing psychological studies supporting the
claim that "[n]owhere is the conflict between self and group more evident than when a person first
becomes a member of the group").
122. Robert Cialdini explains that there is a
nearly obsessive desire to be (and to appear) consistent with what we have already
done. Once we have made a choice or taken a stand, we will encounter personal and
interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment. Those pressures
will cause us to respond in ways that justify our earlier decision.
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 57 (rev. ed. 1993); see also
ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 178-79 (7th ed. 1995) (describing the lock-in effect);
George A. Akerlof& William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance,
72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 307-10 (1982) (providing an economic model of the problem); Donald
C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1501 n.5 (1998) (discussing legal implications of
cognitive dissonance).
123. See supra note 16 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)). Several statutes provide even
larger punishments for particular types of conspiracy. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (subjecting Hobbs
Act conspiracies to a twenty-year penalty equivalent to that imposed for the substantive offense).
Whether the punishment is five years or more, the large fixed sentence will provide leverage to
prosecutors who otherwise may lack the ability to threaten high sentences against minor
participants. The Model Penal Code, which grades the punishment for conspiracy in general the
same as that for the object offense, lacks this important information-extraction feature. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1995).
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undertake the most harmful acts. Consider, however, three functions of the
penalty. First, the punishment for conspiracy provides a high baseline
sentence that helps prosecutors secure cooperation. If prosecutors could
only threaten potential cooperators with their personal wrongdoing, it might
not be a sufficient inducement to flip them. The specific crime law
enforcement agents discover may be too small (a likely result given the
shadows in which conspiracies operate). Moreover, because the people
most likely to be arrested are low-level operators who take the most visible
risks, such as street-level drug dealers, the threat of a greater sentence may
be necessary to induce cooperation. Second, Pinkerton liability can provide
an inducement to moderate criminal activities. Because the individual bears
the cost of the group's dangerous conduct, the substitution problems are
lessened. Third, the five-year sentence for conspiracy is only a maximum,
and thus can be reduced for minor conspiracies. Nevertheless, because a
group formed for one (more minor) bad purpose may eventually succumb
to the temptation of additional (more major) crimes, complementarity may
require a relatively high sentence within the sentencing range to avoid
escalation effects.1
24
Many have complained that conspiracy law permits sentences that are
too long compared to the underlying acts committed. But a focus on
information extraction reveals that this is the wrong comparison: People are
being sentenced not only on the basis of what they did, but also on the basis
of what they knew and did not reveal. This shift in the understanding of
criminal penalties is underappreciated. Under this theory of moral wrong,
the basis for sentencing is not only the underlying crime but also the
information held. Information alone should not be the sine qua non of
sentencing; a person's role in the offense is at least as, if not more,
important. But a person who did not play a great role in the commission of
offenses but had much information will receive a higher sentence than
someone who played the same role but lacked it.
125
124. In some jurisdictions, conspiracy liability does not extend to all crimes, but rather only
to conspiracies for the most serious offenses. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.01(A)
(Anderson 1996) (specifying the crimes eligible for conspiracy). Once the danger of groups is
recognized, however, it becomes possible to understand how acts with minimal social danger (and
that may themselves not even be illegal) can ultimately be harmful when committed by a group.
125. Flipping raises the possibility that low-level participants will receive higher sentences
than leaders. The outlines of this so-called cooperation paradox arc contestable, in that it harkens
back to a paradigm in which lawbreakers were sentenced only for commissions. Under the
information-based paradigm, it is to be expected that many low-level participants will not receive
high sentences because they did not play a serious role and lacked the information necessary to
help law enforcement. Empirical evidence so suggests: A 1998 study by the Sentencing
Commission concluded that the "oft-cited 'truth' that drug conspiracy members at the top of the
organization are more likely to secure reduced sentences due to substantial assistance than those
lower in the criminal organization is not supported by these exploratory data." MAXFIELD &
KRAMER, supra note 82, at 13. The study found that "the defendant's relative position in the drug
trafficking conspiracy hierarchy was not proportionally related to his/her probability of receiving
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The conventional wisdom that American law rejects affirmative duties
and that criminal liability only extends to commissions has obscured our
understanding of information-based sentencing. Yet affirmative duties are
often placed on those with "unclean hands," and liability in the conspiracy
context occurs for an act of commission (the agreement) and an act of
omission (not providing information to law enforcement). Whether one
believes information-based sentencing is normatively justified, it is a shift
in the paradigm of criminal law that has happened sotto voce and deserves
discussion.
If conspiracy law centers around obtaining information, however, then
we are back to the question of why an agreement is necessary. Why not just
focus on people who have information and refuse to divulge it? While a
deeper consideration of information-based sentencing will no doubt suggest
that the case for revival of misprision of felony is stronger than is
conventionally thought, in the current milieu conspiracy law has become a
popularly accepted way to extract information. Juries may not convict for
misprision of felony, prosecutors may not prosecute, and witnesses may not
come forward. 126 The richer point is that conspiracy law is concerned not
only with obtaining information, but also with creating dynamics that make
conspiracies harder to form. In particular, agreements solidify group
identities and create cognitive dissonance that together culminate in
dangerous behavior. The fusion of these two elements-a commission that
furthers group identity and an omission that produces social harm-
generates an understanding of conspiracy's special status in American
law.
127
Naturally, flipping is possible even without the formal crime of
conspiracy. I am consciously describing a more general shift in criminal
a substantial assistance departure." Id. at 12. Indeed, "passive participants were approximately
twice as likely to receive §5K1.1 departures as were the highest-level defendants." Id. at 12-13.
126. See Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, supra note 3, at 2450-52. Current information-bascd
sentencing does not resurrect misprision of felony. A voluntary act-joining a conspiracy-is a
prerequisite before the omission of failing to tell law enforcement has legal consequence. The first
portion, the voluntary act, is the crime; the second portion, the inaction, goes to grading-
127. Because the focus of this explanation of conspiracy centers on information, it is
inappropriate to prosecute individuals who lacked knowledge of the conspiracy. Older doctrine
required the government to prove that the defendant had such knowledge, but some courts have
attached liability when a person knowingly contributes efforts in furtherance of a group's activity.
Compare Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) ("Without the knowledge, the intent
cannot exist." (citation omitted)), with United States v. Crouch, 46 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding that a "person intentionally joins a conspiracy when the person knowingly contributes
efforts in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives"), United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422,
1430 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that a "defendant who acts in furtherance of the object of the
conspiracy may be presumed to be a knowing participant"), and United States v. Becker, 569 F.2d
951, 961 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Once it has been established that a conspiracy exists and that a
particular defendant was clearly connected to the conspiring group or acted in a manner which
unmistakably forwarded the conspiracy, then only slight additional evidence suffices to permit an
appellate court to find that the jury could reasonably infer that .. a participant was in fact a
knowing participant.").
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law, although three features explain why the offense of conspiracy has
unique information-extraction potential. First, timing: The violation
attaches at an earlier point in time, permitting law enforcement to intervene
at a formative stage. A criminal organization ex ante will have to fear
cooperators are in its midst from the moment of agreement, for it is at that
point that its members have committed a crime. Ex post, without
conspiracy, prosecutors may lack the leverage necessary for flipping
because they do not know of other offenses until it is too late. Second,
sanction: Because conspiracy law has a five-year term, it may provide a
prosecutor with more bargaining power than will other crimes, particularly
when the substantive crimes most visible to law enforcement carry the
lowest penalties. Third, evidence: Conspiracy law has a series of doctrines
attached to it, such as the hearsay exception and liberal rules on joinder,
that facilitate information extraction.
There are ways to codify these advantages of conspiracy in other
criminal offenses. Nevertheless, conspiracy law has evolved to become a
crucial tool for information extraction by focusing on joint activity and by
attaching liability at a point early enough to yield significant intelligence to
law enforcement. Indeed, the doctrine could blunt the legislative temptation
to give prosecutors more leverage by increasing prison terms for
substantive offenses.128 Using the single doctrine of conspiracy also places
prosecutors on notice that information extraction is a crucial component of
their mission; trying to use hundreds of substantive crimes to accomplish
this task is more difficult.129 And because individuals working alone will
commit these substantive crimes, increasing sanctions on those crimes will
be overinclusive and confusing.
The focus on information extraction sets up two points that will be
highlighted later. First, if information is hard to glean in underground
settings, a premium for information should not simply exist for information
that inculpates others, but also for information that exculpates. Second, law
should develop other mechanisms besides flipping witnesses to extract
information, such as monetary rewards. These two points are connected, for
rewards should not only go to those who help secure convictions, but also
to those who help free the wrongly accused.
128. High sentences can reflect low probabilities of detection, but in recent years the
penalties on several crimes (particularly drug offenses) have increased while the probability of
detection has stayed relatively constant. Something else must be afoot. These sentences may have
been increased to provide leverage for information extraction, particularly in light of the
Sentencing Commission's cutback on conspiracy's baseline sentence. See infra text
accompanying notes 267-270.
129. With appropriate guidelines on how much prosecutors can charge, conspiracy law may
be a better way to serve law enforcement interests than the use of high mandatory minimums for
substantive offenses. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1963-66 (1992) (discussing how such minimums give prosecutors an unchecked
opportunity to overcharge and generate easy pleas).
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B. Reversing Contract Law Principles To Increase
Transaction Costs and Uncertainty
Many scholars tend to see criminal law through the prism of torts, but
there is a sense in which the criminal law is a restriction on the ability to
contract. In lawful society, people use contracts to structure their affairs in
ways that reduce uncertainty about future performance and constrain
opportunistic behavior. 130 The costs of contracting are considerably reduced
by a regulatory climate that encourages the exchange of information-so
that the parties know each other's terms, conditions, and reputation. The
rule of mutual assent, furthermore, permits greater search efforts by
quelling the fear of being in a contract after mere negotiation. 3 ' And state
enforcement of contracts further increases certainty and decreases
opportunistic behavior. 1
32
Consider how the general criminal law inverts these doctrines. When
the parties begin their search efforts, information is not freely available, so
criminal organizations cannot easily seek the best or most trustworthy
participants. The state's enforcement power is not extended to illegal
agreements, promoting self-regarding behavior and reducing certainty at
every stage in the contracting process. Mutual assent remains a touchstone,
but disincentives to search efforts still exist. Because criminal agreements
are not immediately apparent to law enforcement, investigation is required
to know who agreed to conspire. Individuals who discussed joining a
conspiracy will be obvious targets of these investigations, even if they
declined to join the syndicates. This is not guilt, but investigation, by
association; as such, even under a strict view of "agreement," there are high
costs to search efforts.
There are other ways in which contract law and conspiracy can be
brought together. As with any employment contract, a conspirator will
expect compensation for her input and labor costs, and will also seek some
premium for her legal risks. 33 In some conspiracies, compensation will
take the form of splitting proceeds from the crime; in others, the
130. See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 736-37 (1931) (stating that "the major importance of legal contract is to provide a framework
for well-nigh every type of group organization... which affords a rough indication around which
such relations vary, an occasional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of ultimate appeal when the
relations cease in fact to work").
131. See Steven Shavell, Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW, supra note 71, at 436, 436 (stating that mutual assent "means that search for
contracting partners will not be chilled due to the risk of unwanted legal obligations").
132. E.g., Russell Hardin, Trust, in 3 id. at 623, 624 ("We have the law to back contracts for
major exchanges, to protect us in our ordinary dealings, and to reduce the likelihood of at least
some massive end-game losses.").
133. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 1234 (using the same analysis in the vicarious liability
setting). Even if the labor pool is large, the number of loyal conspirators is likely to be far smaller.
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conspirators will use a wage or commission structure. (There is nothing
approximating the stock market system whereby an employee may receive
an alienable share or option in the company, although in light of recent
events, one wonders whether this system would help or hinder
performance.) The appropriate premium for legal risk, however, is very
difficult to determine. In essence, an incomplete contracts problem arises-
the parties cannot specify all the terms because they are not omniscient and
it would be expensive for them to try to do so.
The uncertainty about getting caught plays a subtle role at the time of
contract formation. Legal risks cannot be contracted away because the
parties cannot know the risk with precision; therefore, an agreement may be
more difficult to strike. Each party could view the uncertainty differently, in
a way that benefits its overall position, leading to disagreements and a
breakdown of negotiations. In the single-actor assumption of criminal law,
it is thought that increasing the certainty of enforcement promotes
deterrence. 134 But in the multiactor context, such increases can make it
easier for the parties to reach agreement.1 35 A variable probability of
detection therefore has advantages in the group-crime setting that do not
appear in the single-actor one.
These disagreements about risk and payment streams will persist at
every level of the conspiracy-leaders may feel their risks are higher, so
too might subordinates-leading everyone to overstate their risks in
exchange for higher pay and furthering cost deterrence. 136 Government can
increase this uncertainty: It could, for example, use legal rules with more
uncertain meanings (thereby suggesting that abolition of the lenity doctrine
will have unique payoffs in the multiactor context) or establish incentives
for conspirators to act in disloyal ways (such as whistleblowing). Such
uncertainty will deter conspiracies from forming and, among those that do
form, make it more difficult to compensate individuals for their levels of
134. E.g., Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 414 (2000)
("[W]e have believed for centuries that certainty and swiftness of punishment are critical to the
effectiveness of deterrence."); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 379 (1997) ("A high-certainty/low-severity strategy, in contrast [to a low-
certainty/high-severity strategy], is more likely to generate a low crime-rate equilibrium.").
135. The argument here is not that governments must shy away from raising the probability
of enforcement-rather it is that one cost of such a strategy is to make it easier for criminals in
groups to operate, and that the resources needed to increase this probability may, in some
circumstances, be better spent elsewhere. If, however, criminals have a preference for risk, then
variability may induce more agreement instead of less.
136. For an analysis of this issue in torts, see Sykes, supra note 11, at 1245 ("If transaction
costs prevent efficient shifting of risk to the principal, then the principal must compensate the
agent more generously than he would in an ideal world. The costs of production increase.., and
economic welfare declines as principal-agent enterprises operate at a smaller scale and charge
higher prices.").
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risk and force everyone to incur costs to ascertain the probability of
detection. 137
Probability of detection is, of course, only half of the story. Uncertainty
about the sanction can promote deterrence too. Under the single-actor
assumption, it is thought that sanctions of a fixed and known length will
better serve deterrence because they eliminate the hope of leniency. 13 8 Yet,
for group crime, uncertainty about the sanction will have the same effect as
uncertainty about the probability of enforcement. When individuals are
unsure of the length of the penalties that might be imposed against them, it
can be more difficult for them to come to an agreement on who should bear
what risks and for what price. (The fact that juveniles receive lower prison
sentences may explain both why criminal organizations use juveniles so
frequently and why they receive such little pay for their services.) 139
Blackstonc made a similar, though largely neglected, point centuries ago:
[I]f a distinction were constantly to be made between the
punishment of principals and accessories... it might prevent the
perpetration of many crimes, by increasing the difficulty of finding
a person to execute the deed itself; as his danger would be greater
than that of his accomplices, by reason of the difference of his
punishment. 1
40
Blackstone's "differences in punishment," of course, is what price
discrimination is all about. The existence of flipping therefore makes
137. Uncertainty about probability of detection also explains the puzzling evidentiary
doctrine that a person who joins a conspiracy can be liable for statements uttered before she joined
it. Joseph McSorley has noted:
[O]nce a defendant's participation in the conspiracy is established, he or she may be
held accountable-as relates to the conspiracy charge-for everything said, written, or
done by any other conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, even where the acts
were done before the defendant joined the conspiracy and even if he or she was
unaware of precisely what was done and who did it.
MCSORLEY, supra note 89, at 107. These earlier statements, when made, augment the likelihood
that law enforcement will learn of the scheme and, because they are admissible, raise the chance
of conviction. As such, informational asymmetries raise the barriers to criminal agreement-
existing conspirators know of the statements that have been made and new entrants do not.
138. E.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42
MD. L. REV. 6, 18 (1983) ("A rational deterrence strategy, supposedly, would make it more
certain that all criminals convicted of major felonies would receive, at a minimum, a substantial
punishment-thus eliminating this hope of leniency.").
139. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Shooting Up: Crime and the Drug Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, June
13, 1988, at 17 (finding that "the increasingly harsh criminal penalties imposed on adult drug
dealers has [sic] led drug traffickers to recruit juveniles").
140. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39-40. The analysis of uncertainty
regarding sanctions makes Pinkerton liability quite complicated, for it at once makes it more
difficult for a person to know her legal risks (in that she might not have enough foresight to know
what future crimes a court will claim she objectively knew her co-conspirators would commit),
while also reducing the disparity in sanction among members of a conspiracy. The latter might
shed light on why some conspiracies decide to split profits equally, See infra text accompanying
note 212.
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contracting more difficult. Covenants not to compete and laws protecting
proprietary information are two mechanisms by which corporations prevent
employees from using company information to benefit themselves. But
contracts that preclude self-interested behavior against illegal businesses are
not enforced. Rather, the law seeks to encourage such deliberate misuse of
information. Because defection can be hidden, individuals cannot easily
trust that their co-conspirators will not be acting as informants down the
road, and this makes it more difficult for firms to structure arrangements to
entice persons to join.141
Some psychologists have found, however, that people have an
"optimism bias" that leads them to understate risks. For example, engaged
couples minimize the risk that they will get divorced, and taxi drivers
overestimate their skills at avoiding accidents. 142 Thus, the possibility exists
that enhancing the uncertainty about probability of detection and length of
sanction may make it easier, not harder, to create agreement between
potential conspirators. Yet, for the great bulk of individuals, optimism bias
provides a further explanation of why the law should penalize criminal
agreements. A key reason why the optimism bias arises has to do with the
way the question is framed: Engaged couples and taxi drivers, for example,
have already made certain lifestyle commitments, and cognitive dissonance
principles explain why they would underestimate risks when asked about
them. 143 And, in the group setting, there is some evidence that suggests that
viewing oneself as part of a team may promote greater amounts of
optimism about the team's activities.44
Until now we have been presupposing that the "contract" between the
conspirators is akin to a written document. Of course, both law and
common sense virtually ensure that no such documents will ever be
141. David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 105 (James E. Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds., 1990) ("[W]hen
one player cannot observe directly that the agreement is being carried out, and when this player
can only rely on noisy, indirect observations, the problem of finding self-enforcing arrangements
is vastly more complicated.").
142. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993) (marriage); James R. Dalziel & R.F. Soames Job, Motor Vehicle Accidents, Fatigue
and Optimism Bias in Taxi Drivers, 29 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 489, 492 (1997)
(taxi drivers).
143. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings To Extend the Boundaries of Consumer
Sovereignty, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 211,227 (1999). Cognitive dissonance is a major factor
in explaining optimism bias, but it is certainly not the only factor. It is possible, for example, to
imagine situations in which an individual, well before making an agreement, will be overly
optimistic about the probabilities of getting caught. Yet, for a great number of marginal offenders,
though not all, the agreement stage is where much of the optimism bias is likely to manifest itself
due to cognitive dissonance and group antidisillusionment effects. See supra text accompanying
note 52 (discussing buffering effects of groups); supra note 122 and accompanying text
(discussing cognitive dissonance).
144. E.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130-32 (1954) (finding such a result in sports).
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written. 45 The inability to memorialize agreements, coupled with the lack
of legal enforcement of agreements between the parties, may discourage
conspiracy. Transaction costs are increased, uncertainty about contractual
terms is magnified, and the risk of disagreement within the group can loom
even larger.
146
Contractual analysis is one instance of the larger point that much is
gained from reversing corporate law principles that promote efficiency.
Consider Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's claim that corporate law
endeavors to provide default rules to save time in reaching agreement,
thereby reducing contracting costs. 147 Law performs this function, they
argue, because no single firm has the incentive to work out the range of
possible hypotheticals. Unlike corporate law, criminal law aims to increase
the costs of reaching agreement. By getting law out of these organizations,
each entity must take the costly step of developing its own governance
structure.
Many enforceable default rules of partnership law promote their
efficiency, such as: (1) "All partners have equal rights in the management
and conduct of the partnership business";148 (2) "Any difference arising as
to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business may be decided
by a majority of the partners"; 149 (3) "Every partner is an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of every
partner... for apparently carrying on in the usual way... binds the
partnership"; 50 and (4) rules (too wordy to describe here) that govern
discontinuation of the partnership. 5 ' Unlike legal partnerships, members of
a conspiracy lack well-settled principles about voting arrangements, capital
contributions, and methods of resolving disputes among partners. The
145. See PETER REUTER, DISORGANIZED CRIME 143 (1983) ("The need for concealment of
participation ensures that disagreements are likely to be far more common in illegal markets than
in legal markets .... Genuine misunderstandings about the terms of a contract are common in
illegal markets, since oral contracts take into account only a very limited range of
contingencies."). Of course, there are ways to enforce such contracts that go beyond the law, but
the law may be able to destabilize such mechanisms. See Dick, supra note 71, at 720 ("In markets
where contracts cannot be court enforced, private mechanisms including reputation and Mafia
codes ofhonour can provide substitute means for contract enforcement." (citations omitted)).
146. These phenomena are not generated by conspiracy law alone, but rather by the broader
set of criminal laws that punish substantive offenses. By making the act of agreement itself a
crime, however, conspiracy law may induce such phenomena at an earlier point in time.
147. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 66, at 34 ("[C]orporate law is a set of terms
available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of
contracting .... ").
148. UNIF. P'SHP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. pt. II, at 101 (2001).
149. Id. § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. pt. II, at 101.
150. Id. § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. pt. I, at 553.
151. See, e.g., id. § 31(1), 6 U.L.A. pt. 11, at 370; see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 65
(2002) (stating that the Uniform Partnership Act and judicial decisions "serve[] in effect as an
implied standard-form agreement of partnership" and that often "an effort to provide tailor-made
rules to fit the needs of the individual firm would not be worth the cost in time and money").
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parties cannot go to the police or to the courts to resolve their
disagreements. And, of course, withdrawal from the partnership is made far
more complex.
The "duty of loyalty" in partnership and corporate law is another
mechanism to increase the efficiency of the firm.' 52 Members of criminal
organizations, however, have no explicit legal duty to act fairly toward each
other or the partnership more generally. Again, instead of being agnostic on
the question regarding the duty of loyalty, law could go further and reward
disloyalty. Flipping is one way to accomplish this end, but that may occur
too late in the game. Instead, law could reward employees who self-deal
and trade information.
Rewarding self-dealing members is one example of a larger strategy at
play: destroying group efficiencies. Firms arise in part because it is too
costly to write and enforce full contracts between the parties. Instead, a
firm's "corporate culture" fills in the gaps.' 53 If law can encourage
conspiracies to adopt unappealing corporate cultures-such as ones filled
with violence-it can reduce the number of people who might join
conspiracies and simultaneously increase the number of defectors among
those who have already joined. This is the focus of the next Section.
C. Norms and Trust: Undermining Group Efficiencies
To promote their efficiency, partnerships and corporations devise
mechanisms that encourage their members to act in the interest of the
enterprise and that discourage self-dealing. To understand these
mechanisms, an economist might place relative emphasis on the role of
contract, a psychologist on trust and reputation, and an attorney on law.
Criminal enterprises use mechanisms to reduce self-interested behavior as
well. The preceding Sections have discussed ways in which contracts and
law are brought to bear on the problem, and this Section takes up devices
that disrupt trust and social order within the conspiracy.
1. Fracturing Trust
Perhaps the most important asset of a firm is its trust between members.
Trust is the glue that allows diverse individuals to work together easily. As
152. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that
partners "owe to one another.., the duty of the finest loyalty"); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note
151, at 39-40, 71-73 (outlining the fiduciary duty).
153. Kreps, supra note 141, at 92 (noting that "contingencies typically arise that were
unforeseen at the time of the transaction itself' and that "transactions will potentially be too costly
to undertake if the participants cannot rely on efficient and equitable adaptation to those
unforeseen contingencies").
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Kenneth Arrow has stated, "Virtually every commercial transaction has
within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a
period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence . . .. 54 More recent analysis has found that "[f]ow trust can
also discourage innovation. If entrepreneurs must devote more time to
monitoring possible malfeasance by partners, employees, and suppliers,
they have less time to devote to innovation in new products or
processes."' 55 While conspiracies themselves defect from the legal order,
they seek to promote trust and cooperation among their members. 156 To
generate inefficiencies law should reduce this trust.
The ex post advantages of flipping are obvious from television shows.
But the ex ante effect is subtler-it gives every member of a conspiracy an
overt and powerful weapon against her confederates. The mere existence of
these weapons diminishes trust, for trust declines and long-term cooperation
suffers when parties possess visible defection opportunities. 5 7 Consider, for
example, the Trucking Game. In the game, there are two manufacturers,
and each one must transport goods for sale. The problem is that the shortest
road to their sales point can be used by only one manufacturer at a time.
Each manufacturer can run her trucks on the road to block the other's
access. In addition, each controls a gate that permits blockage of the other's
access:
154. Kenneth Arrow, Gifrs and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972).
155. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payofr? A
Cross Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1252-53 (1997).
156. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 86 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) ("[1]f there is any society among robbers and
murderers, they must at least... abstain from robbing and murdering one another.").
157. Government efforts to fracture trust through flipping, moreover, will sometimes risk
solidifying group identity, particularly for groups that define themselves in opposition to the law.
But there may be acoustic separation between the ex ante and ex post effect, so that the less overt
ex ante incentives to adopt inefficient practices do not carry these risks to the same extent.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1347











', ,, ,,, -- ,, "
Experiments reveal that when the gates are placed on the roads, cooperation
suffers markedly, and when the gates are removed, cooperation increases.
Visible gates cue a defection strategy. 59
The pervasive and well-understood legal practice of flipping, when
combined with penalties for conspiracy, functions like these gates. These
legal tools fragment trust among members of the conspiracy and inspire
defection. As jealous types learn, once some distrust is present, it can spiral
even further;160 numerous studies have affirmed the common-sense notion
158. The following figure is based on the "Map of the Trucking Game" from David Good,
Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 31, 35 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
159. Id. at 35-36. Good also noted:
The deleterious consequences of the players being able to threaten one another in the
Trucking Game may partly be accounted for by the way in which the prominent
positioning of the gates focuses attention on that potential threat.... [T]his prominence
leads each to increase the subjective probability of the threat being implemented. This
in turn could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy as each attempts to get his retaliation in
first.
Id. at 44; see also Morton Deutsch & Robert M. Krauss, The Effect of Threat upon Interpersonal
Bargaining, 61 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 188 (1960) ("[T]he availability of threat
clearly made it more difficult for bargainers to reach a mutually profitable arrangement .... );
Morton Deutsch & Robert M. Krauss, Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining, 6 J. CONFLICT RES.
52, 58-59 (1962) ("[I]f threat-potential exists within a bargaining relationship it is better to
possess it oneself than to have the other party possess it. However, it is even better for neither
party to possess it.").
160. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 158, at 213, 234.
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that "sustained distrust can only lead to further distrust."'' 6  Trusting
relationships are always hard to forn,' 62 and even harder in conspiracies
because the harm imposed by a single traitor-via information-far
outweighs the limited benefit of an extra member.
A common strategy to build trust is to begin with small acts of
cooperation. For example, Palo Alto homeowners were asked to place a
large, crude sign saying "drive carefully" in the front of their homes. Only
seventeen percent agreed. Other homeowners were asked to perform a
small task, either sign a petition or place a three-inch-square sign in their
cars, and the vast majority of owners so agreed. Two weeks later, these
individuals were approached to put up the crude sign and seventy-six
percent did so-over four times the percentage of the first group. These
findings have been replicated with many subsequent studies in a variety of
locations and involving a number of different messages on the sign. 1 63 They
suggest an explanation for conspiracy law's use of high penalties against
those who join the conspiracy and take minor overt acts to further it. These
acts, without a strong legal sanction, may be relatively costless to the co-
conspirator but may promote group trust. Before trust thickens, strong legal
161. Jd. at 213.
162. Philip Worchel has noted:
It takes a series of positive experiences to establish a relationship of trust; sometimes it
takes only one "betrayal" to establish distrust .... Once aroused, distrust is resistant to
change .... Distrust produces a predisposition to perceive the other person as a threat,
and perceiving the person as a threat leads to greater distrust. The "self fulfilling
prophecy" tends to reinforce and increase distrust of the other person. The problem of
reducing distrust is further complicated by the suppressive effect of communication.
Distrust discourages the development of channels through which credible messages can
be transmitted.
Philip Worchel, Trust and Distrust, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS,
supra note 42, at 174, 185. This point suggests that law should encourage other forms of
disloyalty besides flipping, such as taking monetary rewards for information. See infra Subsection
III.B.3.
163. See Katyal, Architecture, supra note 3, at 1076-77 (discussing the studies). One of the
richest accounts of visible cues and trust concerns the Minnesota Mycological Society. The costs
of error are exceptionally high-if a member of the group trusts another mistakenly and eats a
poisonous mushroom, she may die. Because of these high costs, and because exit from the group
is easy (in that it is a voluntary association), the organization developed methods to promote the
perception of mutual trustworthiness. For example, novices are induced to consume the dishes of
others prepared at banquets, even when they may lack trust in the group. "Thus, even if members
remain privately anxious, their public behavior connotes high levels of trust. Collectively, these
displays constitute a potent form of social proof to members that their individual acts of trust are
scnsible." Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives,
Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 569, 579-80 (1999) (describing the study). A
sustained socialization process also occurs whereby novices are taught about mushrooms and the
group's members, and the result of these processes is to promote the long-term trustworthiness of
members. Gary Alan Fine & Lori Holyfield, Secrecy, Trust, and Dangerous Leisure: Generating
Group Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations, 59 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 22, 27-29 (1996). These
methods of promoting trust-socialization processes and visible displays of trust despite private
anxiety-have analogues in organized crime.
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sanctions are placed on these relatively minor acts in order to deter them.
The hope is to disrupt cooperation and trust before they take root.
Groups promote efficiency because their members deal with one
another on the basis of trust and sidestep costly information gathering about
each other.164 Flipping targets this group benefit by creating conditions
under which group membership is not a salient enough trait to guarantee
individual trustworthiness. By rewarding group members who defy the
interest of the group, fuzziness is interjected into the signal of being a group
member. Because members cannot know whether any of the others is
trustworthy or cooperating with law enforcement, each of them will need to
undertake her own investigation and/or precautionary measures. These
measures undoubtedly will reduce one's gain from the criminal enterprise
as well as, in the aggregate, the organization's gain. In this way, criminal
law fragments trust because it forces criminal organizations to adopt a
bundle of inefficient practices (monitoring, compartmentalization, and
avoiding discussion) that each cue more distrust.' 65
a. Encouraging Costly Monitoring
When trust is weak, monitoring is common. Corporations expend
resources to screen potential employees and to watch those that they hire.
Conspiracies do the same thing, although the costs of monitoring can be
even higher because defection is not visible and agreements are not written.
By increasing the cost of criminal activity relative to the potential profit,
flipping promotes cost deterrence.166 This is a simple application of the idea
164. As Stanford Business Professor Roderick Kramer puts it, "[S]hared membership in a
given category... bypasses the need for personal knowledge and the costs of negotiating
reciprocity." Kramer, supra note 163, at 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also id. at 582-83 (explaining how trust reduces transaction costs within organizations).
165. See David Laibson, A Cue-Theory of Consumption, 116 Q.J. ECON. 81 (2001) (arguing
that behavior is often the result of various cues); Bernard Williams, Formal Structures and Social
Reality, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 158, at 3, 4
(stating that imperfect information exists in any cooperative relationship, "both about other
people's preferences and about their assessment of probabilities," and that the acquisition of such
information may be costly in that "any actual process of inquiry may itself change preferences,
destroy information, [or] raise more questions").
166. Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman have noted:
[C]riminal organisations need to monitor strictly the activities of their members to be
able to punish credibly their opportunistic behaviour, since they cannot rely on external
judicial intervention. These monitoring costs increase more than proportionally with the
number of their members, and therefore represent a rather stringent limit to the efficient
operating scale of such organisations.
Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman, Introduction to THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANISED CRIME 1,
12-13 (Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman eds., 1995); cf Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes,
Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 (1996) (arguing that corporate criminal liability
forces "an inefficiently high level of investment in monitoring"). Instead of monitoring, a firm
may pay efficiency wages to stave off defection. See generally George Baker et al., The Wage
Policy of a Firm, 109 Q.J. ECON. 921 (1994) (outlining some of the factors that legal firms use in
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in torts that when principals are liable for the sins of their agents, it
increases the cost of hiring agents. 1
67
Monitoring costs are not simply financial. If the firm is large enough,
there may be layers of monitors, and the question of who will monitor the
monitors looms large. Intermediate monitors could prove to be costly to the
firm if one of them flips because of the greater information they possess-
both against higher-ups as well as those below. (This point is somewhat
similar to one made regarding vicarious liability for corporations, that they
have a disincentive to monitor because doing so may increase their legal
exposure.) 168 Apart from costs, there are also reasons why monitoring will
not prevent flipping in many cases.
16 9
Possibly the most severe cost of monitoring is that it flays trust in the
group. When individuals believe that other members in a group are
trustworthy, for example, they are much less likely to defect. 70 Monitoring
can cue defection by making disloyalty seem like the norm. It "may
simultaneously reduce the trust that others have," and it "introduces an
asymmetry which disposes of mutual trust and promotes instead power and
resentment."' 17 1 Monitoring therefore may be "self-defeating, for while it
may enforce 'cooperation' in specific acts, it also increases the probability
of treacherous ones: betrayal, defection, and the classic stab in the back."'
' 72
setting wage policies); John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents. An
Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 10 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) ("If motivation is particularly important and monitoring is
costly, wages may be set above the amounts workers could earn elsewhere; the small chance of
termination will then be a powerful incentive."). These solutions are expensive as well, and to the
extent criminal firms use them, cost deterrence again comes into play.
167. Sykes, supra note 11, at 1248 ("Vicarious liability reduces the value to the principal of
the agent's services by adding to the expected cost of hiring an agent or, equivalently, reducing
the value of the agent's marginal product."). High monitoring costs may alternatively promote
cost deterrence on the part of consumers. If the conspiracy sells illegal products, monitoring costs
may be passed on in the form of higher prices for the product (be it narcotics, prostitution, or
whatever). The higher price may deter some people from engaging in the conduct at all, and may
induce others to moderate their level of activity.
168. See infra note 246.
169. See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 1573 (discussing studies showing that people
overestimate their ability to predict how others will behave based on personal factors such as
character as well as underestimate situational factors).
170. David de Cremer et al., "The Less I Trust, the Less I Contribute (or Not)?" The Effects
of Trust, Accountability and Self-Monitoring in Social Dilemmas, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 93,
94-95, 103 (2001) (arguing that low levels of trust increase rates of defection and that people who
expect trust will cooperate); see also Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 115 Q.J. ECON.
811, 840 (2000) (reporting on an experimental study that found that "to determine whether
someone is trusting, ask him about specific instances of past trusting behaviors," but "[t]o
determine whether someone is trustworthy, ask him if he trusts others").
171. Gambetta, supra note 160, at 213, 220 (emphasis omitted).
172. Id. at 220. Kramer has also noted:
[Tihere is increasing evidence that [monitoring] systems can actually undermine trust
and may even elicit the very behaviors they are intended to suppress or eliminate....
First, there is evidence that when people think their behavior is under the control of
extrinsic motivators, intrinsic motivation may be reduced. Thus, surveillance may
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Workers have more motivation and loyalty when they believe that their
organization treats them with respect. 73 Accordingly, conspiracy law's
inducement to monitor does not simply enhance cost deterrence, but also
prevents crime by creating fissures of trust within an organization. An
organization that does not provide the same "license to act creatively-as
trusted members of the group" is less likely to motivate its employees, and
less likely to cement group identity. 174
Finally, enforcement of sanctions for suspected disloyalty can hurt the
firm. Evidence suggests that conspiracies adopt a Beckerian approach-
decreasing the probability of enforcement and increasing the sanction
(serious physical violence, including death) to conserve costs. 75 Payments
to kill a (suspected) informant may be quite steep and such practices may
fragment the relationship of trust within the group if the leader was seen as
acting rashly or erroneously. Prospective employees, moreover, will fear
undermine individuals' motivation to engage in the very behaviors such monitoring is
intended to induce or ensure. For example, innocent employees who are subjected to
compulsory polygraphs, drug testing, and other forms of mass screening designed to
deter misbehavior may become less committed to internal standards of honesty and
integrity in the workplace.
Kramer, supra note 163, at 591 (citation omitted); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team
Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869, 884 (1999) ("[M]onitoring creates a
destructive atmosphere of distrust. Psychological evidence is clear that people who know that they
are distrusted tend to behave in accordance with that perception."); id. at 887 ("[Monitoring] can
only exacerbate the anxiety and lack of trust that exists among workers. These conditions are not
conditions in which team (that is, cooperative) production is likely to flourish.").
173. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate with Organizations: An Identity-Based
Perspective, in 21 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 201, 201 (Barry M. Staw & Robert
1. Sutton eds., 1999) ("When people receive favorable identity-relevant information from
membership in an organization they respond behaviorally by cooperating with the
organization... [and] by developing internal values that lead them to voluntarily engage in such
cooperative behaviors."); Tom Tyler et al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures
Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 913, 927 (1996) (similar).
174. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 113; see also Langevoort, supra note 12, at 98 (stating that,
in corporate law, monitoring of employees can promote "mistrust" and "embedded
mistrust.., sends a signal that wrongdoing is expected to be commonplace ... [which] breeds a
cynicism that by itself can lead to a lower degree of firm-regarding behavior"); Jennifer S. Lerner
& Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 259
(1999) ("Boomerang effects... appear in work on surveillance. Performance monitoring inhibited
intrinsic motivation to perform a task if the surveillant revealed a lack of trust and controlling
intentions .... ). Close monitoring may induce some employees to act with even greater
precision and may possibly even promote trust in some criminal groups. If such monitoring
promotes the efficiency of the criminal firm, it will occur irrespective of the sanction for group
crime. It is likely, however, that such sanctions distort the behavior of the firm by providing extra
inducements for close monitoring, and thereby deter individuals from joining the conspiracy in the
first place.
175. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 184 (1968) (outlining such a strategy). As one FBI official wrote, "By experience, custom,
and practice, organized crime's conspiratorial groups are usually very quick and effective in
controlling and disciplining their members, associates, and victims. Therefore, organized crime
participants are unlikely to disassociate themselves from the conspiracies .. " PHILCOX, supra
note 55, at 6. To the extent a conspiracy punishes every defection with lethal force, however,
marginal deterrence is undermined and those who defect are likely to give away everything.
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joining the firm.17 6 Accordingly, even when law enforcement "loses" a
source due to retaliation, the impact on the firm can still be great.
Nevertheless, attempts to minimize the prospect of retaliation, such as the
aforementioned witness protection program, will promote defection and
seed further distrust.
b. Compartmentalizing Information and
Chilling Effects
Conspiracy law also reduces the efficiency of criminal enterprises and
combats group identity by creating incentives for members of organizations
not to share information with each other. Information is closely held within
the criminal firm in order to minimize the damage from a flipped witness
(compartmentalization), and the group's members avoid communicating
because it increases the probability of detection (chilling effects).
The more information someone knows, the greater the chance that that
person can use it to obtain a better deal from prosecutors. Accordingly,
members of a conspiracy have an incentive to hold back information from
colleagues. 7 7 Yet compartmentalization of information hurts organizations:
Because one side of an organization does not always know what the other
side is doing, many of the efficiencies from group behavior are undermined.
Firms cannot easily take advantage of either economies of scale or
specialization of labor, for the firm is unable to act as a collective entity.
178
Because information is tightly held in the conspiracy, moreover, initiative
and solutions to problems from unexpected sources within the firm are
unlikely to materialize. Instead, compartmentalization will promote
groupthink, further reducing efficiency.
1 79
176. See Worchel, supra note 162, at 183 ("[E]xperience or knowledge about the other
person indicating a general propensity to be helpful or equitable in his or her relationship would
tend to encourage the initial exposure [between two individuals]. One would be reluctant to risk
being hurt if the other were known to be self-oriented or exploitative."); cf Pratt & Zeckhauser,
supra note 166, at 12-13 (arguing that lawful businesses employ high penalties for defection
because the threat "is rarely carried out" and create "little deadweight loss because the probability
that the penalty is paid is small").
177. See REUTER, supra note 145, at 147 ("Agents, wishing to control the dissemination of
knowledge about their participation in illegal enterprises, can demand more autonomy so as to
minimize the number of persons within the enterprise aware of their participation. This reduces
the effectiveness of managerial control."); Annelise Anderson, Organised Crime, Mafia and
Governments, in THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANISED CRIME, supra note 166, at 33, 45 (similar).
178. Specialization can be counterproductive without proper coordination. See supra note 76.
Anyone who has worked with the intelligence community recognizes this cost; the classified
information system, while necessary, decreases innovation because information is shared among a
small and fairly homogenous set of people.
179. Janis found that groupthink was more likely to occur when the groups members (1) are
insulated from the outside world, (2) lack a method for making decisions and resolving disputes,
(3) engage in "defensive avoidance"--when there is some external threat and they perceive that
their decision is already very good, (4) are not encouraged to act autonomously, (5) are prevented
from consulting with outside experts or receiving information from people not in the group, and
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In addition, compartmentalization diminishes a key benefit of working
in groups-information storage and retrieval-a particularly important
benefit for groups that avoid using written records.18 0 Flipping forces
information to be more closely held, and thereby subject to less "storage"
and slower retrieval. Holding information in this way, in turn, will fragment
trust even further. The sharing of information is crucial to creating group
identity and to motivating members. 18' Creating information-haves and
information-have-nots strains a group's identity.
In addition to compartmentalization, discussion about illegal and legal
acts is chilled by a legal regime that attempts to listen to conversations
among conspirators and watches the streets for their joint presence. Law
enforcement strategies, such as physical surveillance of hot spots of crime,
wiretaps, and prohibitions on mail and wire fraud, not only serve the ex
post goal of providing evidence for use in a trial, but ex ante they also
disrupt communications between the players. Because members of a
conspiracy fear being overheard or seen together, they do not communicatc
as much as they would otherwise, and this lack of communication reduces
trust and increases friction. 182 The overt act requirement for conspiracy,
which may be satisfied by a communication from one conspirator to
another, may function as a tax on discussion, and can be justified by
reducing opportunities for trust to develop and for group identity to grow.
(6) have a stable composition. See IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING 131, 231-
64 (1977). Conspiracy law works along each of these six dimensions to encourage groupthink in
that it (1) isolates members of the group from society; (2) strips away methods of legal dispute
resolution; (3) establishes an external threat; (4) creates incentives to centralize control and
diminish individual decisionmaking; (5) raises the stakes of consulting outsiders significantly; and
(6) destroys the employment relationships typically associated with the marketplace, so that
employees cannot be hired and fired easily.
180. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REv. 687, 695 (1996) (describing findings that groups store and retrieve information
more easily than individuals).
181. Alexander Haslam notes:
[T]he sharing of information to which all group members have access may have a
positive motivational impact upon groups-making them feel committed and self-
assured.... [S]haring common information is essential for a shared sense of self to
emerge amongst group members.... [T]he process of sharing common information
derives from and instantiates a sense of "we-ness"....
HASLAM, supra note 24, at 134 (citations omitted); see also Kramer, supra note 163, at 588
("[S]ocial categorization may heighten distrust and suspicion between individuals from different
groups within an organization... [and it] may create a climate of presumptive distrust between
groups within an organization.").
182. See Good, supra note 158, at 36 ("[T]he greater the amount of communication there is
between the players in a wide variety of games, the greater the likelihood of there being a
mutually beneficial outcome."); see also id at 44-45 (observing that cooperation increases with
communication); Edward H. Lorenz, Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of
Subcontracting in French Industry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS, supra note 158, at 194, 207 (finding communication critical to trust among French
subcontractors); TURNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 32-33 (summarizing the findings that
cooperation in multiplayer prisoners' dilemmas is increased by "the extent of communication and
contact between players").
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The emphasis on visible indicia of trust, moreover, explains why
government publicity about a few defectors can sow distrust more generally
among criminal firms.
More generally, group identity is most likely to emerge in the context
of free-flowing discussion among members.1 3 Accordingly, if conspiracy
law can reduce the frequency of discussion by penalizing agreements and
overt acts, it can weaken the identity of the group. Indeed, one of the most
significant reasons why groups polarize concerns group discussion. 184 As a
result, even if criminal law does not catch perpetrators red-handed, its
surveillance of conspiracies and criminalization of overt acts may reduce
group identity. These government strategies require criminal groups to
eliminate most discussion of their options and strategy, to have such
discussions among only a limited few, and to have these discussions
underground. Part III will explore other ways to seed distrust within
criminal enterprises, such as by publicizing instances of defection, targeting
a conspiracy's payments to loyal individuals, financially rewarding disloyal
conspirators, and increasing the cost of cooperating with a criminal group.
2. Destabilizing Group Identity
Perhaps the most pernicious aspect of a conspiracy is the way it takes
advantage of group identity. Group identity promotes polarization,
increases performance, and reduces defection. Conspiracy law, as we have
seen, creates a series of structural incentives to minimize the formation and
persistence of group identity. Monitoring, compartmentalization, and
183. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 53-55; id. at 133-34 ("[C]ommunication with these others
may become necessary to define and coordinate the content and form of that social categorical
self. In this way, communication is an essential path to social self-knowledge and to self-oriented
collective behaviour." (emphasis omitted)); see also Paul G. Bain et al., The Innovation
Imperative: The Relationships Between Team Climate, Innovation, and Performance in Research
and Development Teams, 32 SMALL GROUP RES. 55, 56 (2001) (finding that open communication
is critical to creative, well-functioning teams).
184. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 32-33 (summarizing the findings that cooperation
in multiplayer prisoners' dilemmas is increased by 'the extent of communication and contact
between players"); Brauer et al., supra note 33, at 1020-21 (reporting on an empirical study that
showed that repeated discussion leads to polarization); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 89 (stating that,
without discussion, the shift toward risk "is only about half as large as the shift produced by
discussion"). Prominent explanations for polarization all focus considerably on group discussion.
Social comparison theory states that people seek approval from other members of the group, and
therefore polarize in the direction of the other members. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 26, at
144-47 (providing a description of the theory). Persuasive argumentation theory claims that the
group follows whichever arguments appear to be the most powerful. The group functions as an
"echo chamber"-where individuals' previous positions become solidified and strengthened
through discussion. See BROWN, supra note 32, at 200-26; HASLAM, supra note 24, at 153-73. A
newer explanation claims that those who hold the riskiest position in groups are likely to lead
them. See Daan van Knippenberg & Barbara van Knippenberg, Who Takes the Lead in Risky
Decision Making? Effects of Group Members' Risk Preferences and Prototypicality, 83 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 213, 221, 229 (2000).
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chilling are some of these methods; later Subsections will consider others,
such as stratifying compensation within the firm. Apart from incentives,
however, the process of securing a defendant's cooperation can decimate
group identity.
To understand this procedural point, return to Akerlof and Kranton's
observation that individuals in a group act to restore identity when identity
is threatened. 185 From this perspective, offering sentencing rewards to
defendants can be counterproductive by provoking backlash and
resentment. As law school graduates schooled in the prisoners' dilemma
learn the hard way, sentencing rewards do not always induce flipping. One
reason why is that cooperation with the government involves breaking
identity with a group and acting in ways that are contrary to its interests.
The identity view thus explains a phenomenon I encountered while working
in the Justice Department-that when attempting to flip someone, the way
to do it isn't as much to talk about their sentence payoffs, but to offer them
a "new life," a mechanism to obtain "salvation," and a "way out. '1 86 And
yet this is not the way many scholars understand flipping. For example,
Graham Hughes writes that "most cooperation agreements would be
difficult to fit into any concept of repentance or rehabilitation. These are
agreements to sell a commodity-knowledge." 87 But an agreement to
cooperate is far more than a purchase of information. To get people to
cooperate, prosecutors often talk in religious terms--emphasizing that the
first steps of a moral life start by telling the truth. Information extraction
should not cloud this valuable function of cooperation agreements. Indeed,
by emphasizing the role of repentance and salvation, cooperators are more
likely to be reliable and to tell the truth. In the cold language of purchase-
of-information, by contrast, a defendant-witness is more likely to tell a
prosecutor what he wants to hear. An effective flipping strategy, therefore,
cannot emphasize only information extraction; it must also stress
redemption.' 88
185. See supra text accompanying note 39.
186. See, e.g., Interview with Mary Jo White, Former United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 27, 2002) ("Often times, you can flip someone
by appealing to Team America. Many defendants are sick of a life of crime, or are looking for a
new path. Sentencing rewards of course matter for some people too, but it isn't as if there is a
single formula.").
187. Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1,
13(1992).
188. This idea also has important consequences for the treatment of defendants by law
enforcement. If police and prosecutors in the interrogation room paint a negative identity of a
potential cooperator, then they reaffirm that individual's group identity as a criminal conspirator.
Instead, police and prosecutors need to appeal to the other identity within a person, an identity of
goodness. In this respect, if police are suspected of being racists or not part of the community
from which the criminal is drawn, then it will be very difficult to appeal to this latter identity of
goodness because they do not have the credibility necessary to talk about giving people a "way
out."
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Put differently, the argument here is that it is not simply the legal threat
and calculation of odds that induce someone to flip, but often a shift in their
identity. The simple descriptions of flipping, in both the prisoners' dilemma
and on television, do not capture this dynamic. This is, ultimately, a story
about government actors manipulating the identity of people. It does not
involve massive government largesse in an effort to change the identities of
everyone all at once (which is what the somewhat utopian work on social
norms in criminal law scholarship has advocated' 89)-but rather localized
prosecutors and detectives doing so. In the group-crime setting, law does
not need to go so far as to change everyone's norms; rather, law
enforcement can undertake the far easier task of changing the way in which
criminals view themselves. If individuals perceive themselves as promoting
social good, they are more likely to act that way.
The architecture of federal sentencing can facilitate this shift in identity
in significant and underappreciated ways. A key way that prosecutors
encourage a defendant to flip, used thousands of times each year, is to hold
out the promise that they will file a section 5K1.1 motion asking a judge to
impose a lower sentence due to a defendant's "substantial assistance."' 90
Unlike all other sentencing departures, the government must approve a
section 5K motion and then submit a request to the court. This odd scheme,
whereby a judge must approve a prosecutor's motion for departure, may be
explained by identity shift. Because a defendant may need to convince not
only a prosecutor, but also a judge, of her willingness to become a law-
abider, it can further the transformation of identity.' 91 The ritualized
formality of the proceeding, which takes place in a somber courtroom with
189. E.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1. As Dorothea Kubler has recently explained, some
norms are "bandwagon" ones that are difficult to change once they become entrenched, so that it
may be very difficult once an organization inculcates a strong norm against defection to induce
cooperation. See Dorothea K(Ibler, On the Regulation of Social Worms, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
449,454, 470 (2001).
190. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.I (1998) ("Upon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the
guidelines."); see also United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (lst Cir. 1993) (stating that
the section 5K departure "provides defendants, ex ante, with an incentive to cooperate in the
administration of justice"). Prosecutors in 1996 filed section 5K1.I motions in 19.2% of all
federal cases. Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 577 n.50(1999); see also id. at 577 (stating that "substantial assistance is also far and away the most
common ground for departure, with twice as many cases involving cooperation as all the other
factors put together").
191. While judges no doubt look to it, a propensity to obey the law is not a formal element of
section 5KI. [, in contrast to other departures, such as section 3E1.1 's departure for acceptance of
responsibility. See United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 99-100 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that
"presentence rehabilitation.., can be factored adequately into the sentencing equation by an
acceptance-of-responsibility credit" and that a change in attitude is the touchstone of
rehabilitation). One way judges subtly look to propensity in section 5K settings is to inquire
deeply about whether the defendant was absolutely forthright in the cooperation process.
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a judge presiding, marks the shift in identity away from being a member of
a lawbreaking group toward being a valued member of law-abiding society.
This might make some deals harder to strike because defendants fear the
uncertainty of what a judge will do; yet the system not only seeks to extract
information, but also to transform identity.
The persistence of group identity also provides an argument in favor of
providing only modest sentencing reductions for cooperators. If the
premium for cooperation is too great, it may clarify to the potential
cooperator exactly how much of the cooperation arrangement is motivated
by the individual's self-interest.' 92 Without some time served in prison, the
individual's identity is unlikely to be destabilized. This also suggests the
need for a credible promise of rehabilitation and the chance for a fresh start.
Otherwise individuals will lack the fundamental shift in identity necessary
to feel that they are not merely "passing" in law-abiding society!
93
Prosecutors could bring identity shift into more explicit focus. For example,
in deciding what sentencing reduction to propose, they could factor into the
calculus the likelihood that a defendant's identity could be altered through
cooperation. Plea agreements could also state specifically that they become
void if the defendant engages in illegal conduct of any sort. 194 And
prosecutors could permit joint flipping arrangements that benefit more than
one member of the group.1 95 The argument above also provides a new
justification for the witness protection program, which literally forces a
shift in identity and monitors compliance to ensure that a person does not
revert back to lawbreaking.
196
192. Appealing only to an individual's self-interest is likely to be unproductive for members
who bear strong group identities because it is so destabilizing to their sense of self. For those
individuals, prosecutors and detectives may resort to strategies that emphasize how a potential
witness's cooperation is actually good for the members of the group. For example, they could
point to rival gang activity and the risks of violence or allude to an undercover operation against
the group that may turn violent unless action is taken to break up the syndicate.
193. For a rich illustration of some of the complexities this point raises, see Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
194. See Rowland, supra note 80, at 686 (discussing the clause). To the extent additional
inducements are necessary to achieve cooperation, some of the inducements might be financial.
Monetary rewards for cooperation may be incommensurate with jail time (in that a witness does
not feel he is "trading" one year of his sentence for one year of time for his co-conspirator and
because the government foots the bill for the testimony).
195. Studies on group identity show that it can form at a level apart from the entire entity,
such as colleagues in a firm's working group. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 110 (describing studies);
T.E. Becker, Foci and Bases of Commitment: Are They Worth Making?, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 232
(1992) (showing narrower identity formation); T.E. Becker & R.S. Billings, Profiles of
Commitment: An Empirical Test, 14 J. ORGANISATIONAL BEHAV. 177 (1993) (similar). A
criminal might not want to cooperate with the government because doing so places his friends in
jeopardy, even though he might not have the same loyalty to the entire organization. For this
reason, permitting two individuals to "jointly" flip or finding other ways to bring critical people
into the cooperation regime will increase the amount of information prosecutors will have.
196. The importance of fracturing group identity is underscored by an article that
coincidentally appeared the same month and in the same journal as the groundbreaking Akerlof
and Kranton paper. Steven Levitt and Sudhir Venkatesh studied the financial arrangements of a
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3. Exacerbating Team-Production Problems
Most groups, including criminal ones, face the risk that their members
will shirk dangerous duties. The team-production problem, to which
corporate law scholars are devoting increasing attention, may therefore
yield significant payoffs for understanding conspiracy. The problem arises
when there exists "production in which 1) several types of resources are
used... 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each
cooperating resource ... [and] 3) not all resources used in team production
belong to one person.' 97 Because each additional criminal act can increase
an individual's likelihood of being caught, and involves the personal
expenditure of resources, a conspirator has an incentive to refrain from it
and to free-ride off of the contributions of others. Conspirators may
similarly shirk the performance of acts that enhance their syndicate's
reputation, particularly when their contributions are not discernable to other
members.
The inability to write contracts exacerbates these production problems
because the regime cannot reliably specify what the distribution of profits
will be. Any agreement made can be broken, and any agreement will be
infected with inefficiencies anyway. If the profit-sharing arrangement is
agreed to ex ante, each member of the conspiracy will have an incentive to
shirk because the member will get the same share regardless of how hard
she works. By contrast, if the arrangement is discerned ex post, it will invite
rent-seeking behavior and generate squabbling over the take afterwards. 198
large criminal gang. Because one of the leaders kept detailed financial records and agreed to
cooperate with the authors, they were able to understand much of the way it operated. They found
that "[s]treet-level sellers appear to earn roughly the minimum wage" and surmised that the
"primary economic motivation for low-level gang members appears to be the possibility of rising
up through the hierarchy." Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Vcnkatesh, An Economic Analysis of
a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances, 115 Q.J. ECON. 755, 757 (2000). But once the substantial risk ofdeath from being a "foot soldier" is factored into the equation, the authors found it difficult tojustify their decisions on economic grounds. Id. at 786-87. But the group identity perspective finds
these decisions much easier to understand. Such decisions are reactions to a world in which
employment opportunities are perceived to be limited, and in which a gang provides comfort and
social support. Gang members may live with, indeed perpetrate, high levels of violence, but that
behavior is consistent with reinforcing group identity. "
Levitt and Venkatesh's paper, while providing extraordinarily useful data, does not provide
much in the way of policy prescriptions. The suggestions-providing legitimate jobs for youths,
enforcing laws against drug purchasers, and legalizing drugs-are familiar. Id. at 787.
Incorporating group identity, however, generates many more ideas. Consider, for example, Levitt
and Venkatesh's finding that gangs spent thousands of dollars in payments to families of deceased
members. Id. at 769. A perspective rooted in identity explains why: The payment structure to the
families of victims reaffirms the group-centered nature of the enterprise, an enterprise in which
families are cared for and the dead are mourned. Law can attack these insurance agreements quite
easily. See infra text accompanying notes 281-283.
197. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 76, at 779. See generally Bengt Holmstrom, Moral
Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) (outlining the problem).
198. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 24 J. CORP. L. 751, 752-53 (1999); Holmstrom, supra note 197, at 325-28 (explaining why
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These team-production problems are enhanced by the fact that in most
conspiracies, the members wear two hats-they act as productive members
of the conspiracy and also as potential monitors. Accordingly, the more law
can force them to monitor each other (here, not only for defection, but also
for productivity), the less time and resources they themselves have to
engage in productive activity.' 99 In short, a goal of criminal law should be
to enhance the team-production problem. To do so, law should make it
difficult to adopt the solutions to the problem that corporate law scholars
have uncovered.
One solution to the team-production difficulty is to designate a team
member as a "monitor" that pays employees fixed wages. 200 The monitor
receives whatever is left after the wages, thus providing the monitor with an
incentive to guard against shirking. Narcotics conspiracies have a somewhat
different method of monitoring: They divide inputs by providing
commissions for each sale. Law might punish such commission-based
arrangements with special sentencing enhancements. By minimizing these
arrangements, criminal law can generate more squabbling over individual
effort and how much a particular employee should be paid, contributing to a
further drop in productivity.
A second, closely related, solution is to use a hierarchical monitor to
allocate financial rewards ex post.20 1 An ex ante determination of profit
division invites shirking, so the monitor's ex post solution can be the best
one from the standpoint of the group. Because this is a plausible modus
operandi, law might want to penalize such monitoring through sentencing
enhancements on leaders.202 Without monitors, each individual must watch
the others for shirking. By reducing hierarchy, moreover, other
inefficiencies are created, such as increasing the cost of decisionmaking and
inviting possible holdouts.
A third solution to the team-production problem is to stimulate a group
identity that detests shirking. Some analysis of gangs suggests that leaders
try to do this.20 3 For this reason, the law's ability to destabilize group
shirking is optimal once shares are specified in advance); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 66, at 9 ("So long as no monitor can determine what each member's marginal
contribution to the team's output is, each member will be less than a perfectly faithful
representative of the interests of the team .... ").
199. This is the reverse of a problem identified by Talley in corporate law. See Talley, supra
note 10, at 1001.
200. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 76, at 781-83.
201. See Blair & Stout, supra note 198, at 767-71 (putting forth such a proposal in the
corporate context).
202. See infra text accompanying notes 215-228.
203. E.g., MARTIN SANCHEZ JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND AMERICAN
URBAN SOCIETY 114 (1991) ("The leadership of the gang also encourages members to invest their
time in collective economic projects by nurturing the social pressures to participate. Here, the
leadership reinforces the ideology of group commitment, that every member must give of himself
to the brothers of his gang.").
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identity will have a significant effect on team production. Explicit moderate
sentencing rewards for conspirators who can prove they shirked their duties
to the conspiracy may prove helpful as well.2° '
4. Targeting Stakeholders
The problem of conspiratorial intent is familiar to any student of
criminal law: What distinguishes the seller of goods (such as the
saleswoman who sells lingerie to a known prostitute) from a criminal? The
test offered by Judge Learned Hand provides one answer:
It is not enough that he does not forego a normally lawful activity,
of the fruits of which he knows that others will make an unlawful
use; he must in some sense promote their venture himself, make it
his own, have a stake in its outcome. The distinction is especially
important today when so many prosecutors seek to sweep within
the drag-net of conspiracy all those who have been associated in
any degree whatever with the main offenders. That there are
opportunities of great oppression in such a doctrine is very plain,
and it is only by circumscribing the scope of such all
comprehensive indictments that they can be avoided.2 ° 5
Hand's words are not simply about profiting from a criminal act; they also
center on identity, about an individual taking on a group identity rather than
a solitary one-"promote their venture himself' so that the venture is "his
own." Merely focusing on the financial details misses this, for Hand's test
is not just about brute economics, but also about the subtle question of
whether the individual is advancing collective interests.
Nevertheless, Hand's formulation has received some rough treatment in
the past half-century. 20 6 This is a mistake. Corporate law teaches us that
those who have residual claims are more likely to care about the overall
204. Instead of trying to encourage shirking, criminal law could alternatively encourage
inputs to be less divisible to exacerbate team-production problems. In one respect, individualistic
criminal law already does this by encouraging crimes of diffusion. See supra text accompanying
note 74. Conspiracy law therefore could be said to be at odds with the team-production problem,
in that it eliminates an incentive to pool inputs. Nevertheless, incentives to pool remain under
conspiracy law because doing so may reduce the probability of detection (even if it does not
reduce the sanction). An individual who commits part of a crime will be less likely to be caught
than someone who completes the entire crime. As such, the lost chance to exacerbate team-
production problems is not overwhelming.
205. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940)(affirming the judgment below because the defendants did not have any knowledge of the
conspiracy).
206. The Supreme Court in Falcone disregarded it, focusing only on whether the defendants
had knowledge of the conspiracy. 311 U.S. at 210-11. However, two years later the Court began
resurrecting part of the stake test, saying that it "is not irrelevant" to proof of criminal intent,
though it "may not be essential." Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943).
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success of the venture, and will accordingly demand more control over the
organization.20 7 To the extent that people have a stake in the venture, trust is
increased and defection is minimized. This provides a powerful account for
why conspiracy law should reach stakeholders and why Justice Holmes's
early formulation of conspiracy as a "partnership in criminal purposes',
208
has significant promise.
Recent psychological findings also confirm that joint profit
arrangements are likely to contribute to group identity. Consider one study
in which subjects were asked to make paper chains. They worked alone in
the first part of the experiment and were divided into three groups in its
second part. Group A was told that the study was measuring the
performance of the group as a whole, Group B was called a "work-team"
and led to believe that they would be working together in the future, and
Group C was told that they would receive a $20 bonus if the group's
performance exceeded the average level of performance on the task.
Performance was highest in the third group, where a bonus was awarded for
group performance, and shirking was highest in the first group.20 9 In a
second paper-chain experiment, one group (g) was told that the study was
measuring total group performance and that they would receive a personal
cash reward if their personal contribution exceeded certain criteria. Three
other groups were told that each group member would receive the same
cash reward if (a) the best person's performance exceeded certain criteria,
(b) the worst person's performance exceeded the criteria, or (c) if the
average of the group exceeded the criteria. The study found that the
existence of the reward led to enhanced performance in all four groups, but
that productivity in the first group (g) was lower than it was in the other
three.21 ° Significantly, even though an individual had more control over the
reward in the first circumstance, it was in the latter three groups that
performance was higher!
These results reveal that the existence of a group reward made the
group's identity salient and enhanced performance. Questionnaires given to
the participants found that the latter three groups had a more robust social
identity than did the first and that the latter three "perceived themselves as
207. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 22 (1996). Of course, some commission-based strategies can
reduce agency problems, see, e.g., Steven C. Michael & Hollie J. Mocre, Returns to Franchising,
2 J. CORP. FIN. 133, 134-37 (1995) (discussing this point in the context of franchising
arrangements), but control remains a stronger inducement.
208. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910). Indeed, Edward Lorenz's study of
French subcontractors revealed that one of the best ways to increase trust is to develop
partnerships. Lorenz, supra note 182, at 194, 209.
209. Stephen Worchel, A Developmental View of the Search for Group Identity, in S.
WORCHEL ET AL., SOCIAL IDENTITY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 53, 53-74 (1998).
210. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 264-65. The other three groups did not have significant
differences in performance.
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more of a group, liked each other more, and had a stronger desire to
continue working together in the future.",211 This finding suggests that when
individuals have stakes in the success of the enterprise, they are more likely
to share an identity that enhances their performance. In this sense, Hand's
test is a brilliant attempt to attack the foundations of social identity: Those
groups that reward their members out of collective profits are similar to the
212latter three groups and the most likely to develop a salient social identity.
This research also suggests that the offering of individual rewards to
conspirators in exchange for information can splinter group identity.
Conspiracy law encourages group members to focus on their individual
goals instead of their collective ones by highlighting how each may pay the
price for disloyalty by someone else through flipping arrangements.2 13 Part
III builds on these insights by suggesting other individualistic rewards for
conspirators.
5. Promoting Cost Deterrence and Attacking Leadership
We have seen how conspiracy law permits prosecutors to extract
information from one conspirator and use it to develop criminal cases
against others. This Subsection uses cost deterrence to present an argument
for a second complementary relationship. It explains how even if the law
cannot threaten high-level leaders, it can deter them by attacking low-level
street operators. This account, however, does not depend on cooperation
agreements.
In the context of a single wrongdoer, an offender weighs an increase in
the level of punishment against the expected gain produced by a criminal
act. In some circumstances, an increase in expected punishment will not
reduce those gains. In others, the increase in punishment might induce
criminals to spend more to avoid detection (better thieves' tools, greater
211. Id. at 265. Diane Mackie has also found that group polarization is more likely when the
members in a group focus on a shared goal as opposed to an individual one. See Diane M. Mackie,
Social Identification Effects in Group Polarization, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 720,
725 (1986) (finding polarization when the rules gave the winning group a prize but not when the
rules specified that the best group member would receive one).
212. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV.
313, 352 (1985) (arguing that a sharing model of law firm partner compensation is often superior
because it "captures the gains from diversification and avoids the divergence between profit
maximization for the firm and profit maximization for the individual partner that accompanies, to
a greater or lesser extent, any productivity formula").
213. Concerns about stakeholders do not exactly mirror those regarding information
extraction. A stakeholder may not have as much information as a nonstakeholder, so focusing on
stakeholders will result in a loss of information for law enforcement. Yet stakeholders pose other
harms to society by cementing group identity. Conspiracy law attempts to balance these goals by
focusing on both the omission of not providing information and the commission of the agreement
(with the intent behind the agreement being determined in part by whether the person is a
stakeholder). But there are costs to this balancing scheme.
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information, etc.) and reduce the gain from crime. In the group-crime
context, by contrast, cost deterrence is always at play. Any increase in
punishment will affect the negotiating positions of each party to the
transaction. When the expected punishment for some members increases,
their gain must increase to induce commission of criminal acts. 2 14 Increases
in the levels of punishment for any member therefore have cost-deterrence
implications for others in the group. For example, if the penalty on street-
level drug dealers is doubled, it reduces the gain of managers of drug
organizations who must then pay their dealers more. The loss in gain at the
top, in turn, reduces the incentives of managers to be in the business in the
first place.
The beauty of this point is that it suggests that deterrence can work by
reaching any member of the criminal conspiracy, instead of only top-level
offenders. If these top-level offenders are difficult to punish, either because
they are insulated from the decisionmaking process or are kept physically
away from the reach of law enforcement, cost deterrence suggests another
avenue to prevent criminal activity. An increase in the punishment for any
member of the group will produce cost deterrence for every one of its
members. Of course, money is not the only reason people conspire, but low
wages can become a deterrent to people agreeing to commit a crime in the
first place (before social identity takes root) and can prompt some of those
who have joined to shirk their duties.
The theoretical underpinnings of cost deterrence, however, call into
question schemes that enhance penalties for leaders. The Coase Theorem
predicts that in the absence of transaction costs, where liability is assigned
will not change the efficiency of the outcome. In the tort context, this rule
suggests that regardless of where liability is placed-either on the agent or
on the principal-an efficient result will be reached.15 Likewise, it could be
said that it does not matter whether liability is placed on leaders or
subordinates of conspiracies because only the total level of punishment
alters group behavior.2 16 The legal system's allocation of punishments will
be modified by side payments within the group, so that those who take
greater legal risks will receive additional compensation.
214. This analysis flows naturally from the vicarious liability insight that when agents have
wealth constraints, greater liability should be imposed on the principal in order to calibrate
optimally relations between principal and agent in their internal contracting. See Alan 0. Sykes,
An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law ofAgency, 91 YALE L.J. 168 (1981).
215. Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 1347-48; Sykes, supra note 11, at 1257-58.
216. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 64 (2000) ("[T]he particular allocation of
sanctions may not matter when, as would be the natural presumption, the principal and the agent
can reallocate sanctions through their own contract."); Roberta Romano, Theory of the Firm and
Corporate Sentencing: Comment on Baysinger and Macey, 71 B.U. L. REV. 377, 377 (1991)
("The Coase theorem suggests that the same efficient outcome will obtain whether liability is
placed on the individual or the firm.").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1364 [Vol. 112: 1307
Conspiracy Theory
But in the course of emphasizing side payments, this Coasean analysis
misses the way in which differential pay alters group dynamics. In
particular, leaders who take higher wages are likely to destabilize group
identity. Study after study reveals that for a leader to be successful and for a
collective identity to emerge, a leader must be perceived as fair.217 As an
old French politician remarked of his supporters, "I must follow them; I am
their leader."21 8  J.P. Morgan once stated that "[v]ery high
salaries ... disrupt the team [and] quench[] any willingness to say 'we' and
to exert oneself except in one's own immediate self-interest. ' '219 Am
exhaustive review of the literature by Alexander Haslam led him to
conclude that "pay structures that are perceived to differentiate unfairly
between leaders and followers (and which create a sense of 'us' and 'them')
will undermine leadership and group productivity." 220 Viewed this way,
singling out leaders for special punishment does not only deter leadership, it
also destabilizes group identity.
An important feature of this system is that it works even if conventional
deterrence is failing. That is, even if the leadership enhancement does not
provide enough of an incentive for an individual to avoid a senior position,
its existence will alter compensation differentials within the firm. When
such differentials are large and known, they can destroy group identity or
prevent such an identity from forming in the first place. As such, the
Coasean argument does not prove that leadership enhancements fail to
prevent crime; rather, it simply explains that the path of prevention can be
complicated. Again, deterrence comes in many forms, and legal risks are
just one. Here, crime is prevented by adjusting income within the firm
through a threatened penalty; the adjustment has psychological
repercussions on the group that reduce criminal activity.
In this respect, consider section 3B of the Sentencing Guidelines. That
provision levies a four-level enhancement-approximately forty percent-
on an organizer or leader with five or more participants or a group that is
"otherwise extensive. 22' One could justify such rules on traditional
217. See HASLAM, supra note 24, at 66-67 (describing studies); E.P. HOLLANDER, LEADERS,
GROUPS, AND INFLUENCE 231 (1964) ("[I]t is therefore important that the leader, by his behavior,
manifest a loyalty to the needs and aspirations of group members."); Mario von Cranach,
Leadership as a Function of Group Action, in CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP 115, 128
(C.F. Graumann & Serge Moscovici eds., 1986).
218. HASLAM, supra note 24, at 66 (quoting Alexander Ledru-Rollin).
219. Id. at 83.
220. Id. at 304. Conversely, such enhancements might provide a rationale for high payments
to leaders. Given most people's inability to empathize, and informational asymmetries between
leaders and other group members about sanctions, this is an unlikely possibility (although
empirical evidence would be illuminating). This is a circumstance where widespread knowledge
about the law might actually reduce deterrence.
221. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.l(a) (1998). Under this guideline,
managers or supervisors receive a three-level enhancement, and an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor will receive a two-level enhancement if the organization lacks the five participants and
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accounts: such as that leaders are more culpable,222 or the need for marginal
deterrence to becoming a leader.2 23 But there is more to the story. Section
3B forces leaders to extract more profit to compensate for extra risk, and
that profit must be squeezed from somewhere. The two obvious places are
subordinates in the criminal enterprise and customers. If the leader tries to
pass off the costs to customers, however, that has cost-deterrence
implications of its own. The extra price may scare off new customers, while
encouraging existing customers to reduce the level of their criminal
activity. If leaders instead reduce the gains of subordinates, it may induce
some subordinates to leave the enterprise, posing many risks (from drawing
in law enforcement to helping rival organizations). As such, leaders may
prefer to handle an increase in punishment by reducing the gain for new
entrants to the conspiracy. But that strategy, too, has drawbacks because it
will make it more difficult to attract skilled and loyal employees. 2 24 Leaders
who take too much money from subordinates might fracture the identity of
the group, thereby decreasing its collective benefits and also raising the
probability of defection.22
is not "otherwise extensive." Id. § 3Bl.1(b)-(c). The focus on five is somewhat odd, in that it
creates a cliff effect that encourages people to work in groups of four. It is even odder when one
considers that the sentencing reductions for minor players do not focus on size at all-so that one
receives the same reduction whether someone is a minor player in a conspiracy of one hundred or
one in a conspiracy of three.
222. Consider Judge Posner's view:
Anyone who agrees to join a criminal undertaking is a conspirator, and he is liable for
all the criminal acts of the conspiracy that are foreseeable to him, regardless of how
large or small his own role is. The result is that a minor participant in a major
conspiracy is potentially subject to very severe punishment. One purpose of the
discounting scheme in section 2B1.2 [sic] of the sentencing guidelines is to reduce the
rigidity of this punishment scheme by differentiating the liability of the major and
minor participants.
United States v. Almanza, 225 F.3d 845, 846 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that downward mitigation under
section 3B 1.2 depends on relative culpability).
223. Judge Eastcrbrook, for example, has observed that "giving chauffeurs the same
punishment as bigwigs ... reduces the marginal penalty for being a bigwig (although the chiefs
do get separate enhancements)." United States v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1995).
224. Some empirical evidence suggests that "[tihe gang leader earns 10-20 times more than
the average foot soldier." Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note 196, at 774; see also PADILLA, supra
note 44, at 170 (stating that street-level employment "yields only modest wages" and "mere
survival income"). This profit structure might be the result of penalties against leaders.
Alternatively, they may reflect differences in probabilities of detection: If leaders are more likely
to get caught, they will demand higher pay. So, too, with followers. These mechanisms promote
cost deterrence, and may interfere with group identity.
225. When leaders are not able to pass on the costs of the increased sanction, there are other
reasons to target leadership. Studies of gangs show that the action and disposition of a gang is
typically due to the character of its leader. See LEWIS YABLONSKY, THE VIOLENT GANG 151-56
(1962). The most successful leaders are those who cement group identity, what some have termed
"entrepreneurs of identity." HASLAM, supra note 24, at 63, 69. By minimizing the returns to
leadership, section 3B reduces the marketplace of successful leaders and thereby diminishes
groups' cohesiveness and effectiveness.
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Section 3B also greatly reduces sentences for minor players.226 As a
result, the group's fortunes do not rise and fall together in equal ways, and
this divergence can lead to additional cooperation. Because the designation
of whether someone is a minor, minimal, or major player is quite vague, 22 7
agreements between conspirators are more difficult to strike (returning to
Blackstone's point), and individuals may flip earlier than they would
otherwise, in hopes of securing a lower designation. From this perspective,
reducing the length of the sanction for minor participants may actually
promote deterrence by fragmenting group identity and by increasing
precontractual uncertainty between the players if there is substantial
variation in who receives the departure. Of course, these sentencing
departures may have confounding deterrence effects that overwhelm this
result, but the story is more complicated than the formula from the
individualistic literature that raising sanctions increases deterrence .228
6. Reversing Intellectual Property Law
Conspiracies benefit from the creation of brand identity in several
ways. As those familiar with The Princess Bride know, a group of outlaws
can develop a reputation for toughness to lubricate dealings with the outside
world.22 9 A drug purchaser, for example, need not know the identity of
every dealer in a firm; the reputation of the organization is a less costly
226. A minimal participant has his sentence reduced by four offense levels, while a minor
participant has his sentence reduced by two offense levels. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3B 1.2. A defendant whose role is found to be between minimal and minor may have
his sentence reduced by three offense levels. Id. A "minimal participant" is one who is "plainly
among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group," and his "lack of knowledge
or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is
indicative of a role as a minimal participant." Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.. This definition accords with
information-based sentencing, in that those who lack information to help law enforcement are less
culpable. See United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
minimal participant designation because the defendant had knowledge of the drug conspiracy's
important details).
227. Timothy P. Tobin, Drug Couriers: A Call for Action by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1055, 1056 (1999) ("Perhaps no aspect of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines has created as much confusion and uncertainty for courts engaged in
crucial sentencing decisions as section 3B1.2." (footnote omitted)).
228. See Becker, supra note 175, at 180 ("If the aim simply were deterrence, the probability
of conviction, p, could be raised close to 1, and punishments,f could be made to exceed the gain:
in this way the number of offenses, 0, could be reduced almost at will.").
229. PADILLA, supra note 44, at 110 ("[T]he gang provides individuals with a reputation,
serving as a safeguard against possible customer snitching ...."); REUTER, supra note 145, at 151
(stating that a "good reputation' becomes an important asset" in organized crime transactions); cf
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 143 (1981) ("I conjecture that in trades where,
because of cost or other reasons, legal sanctions for breach of contract are ineffectual,
businessmen will be extremely sensitive to accusations of sharp dealing because reputation is the
only surety of faithful performance between contracting partners.").
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substitute. 30 So, too, the brand names for particular illegal narcotics
themselves function as brands-such as the Nike ecstasy tablet and Bart
Simpson LSD.
In legal markets, intellectual property law safeguards the name of the
firm and its products to preserve reputations.2 3 1 But these protections are
stripped away for illegal firms and illegal products, permitting dilution of
the trademarks. Nonmembers of a gang can pose as members (Joe claims to
be part of the K-Street Crew) and products can be counterfeited (the Nike
"ecstasy" tablet for sale is 100% sugar). Moreover, because a conspiracy
cannot advertise itself or its products, its reputation further suffers. While
criminal organizations will resort to word-of-mouth advertising and
violence against posers and counterfeiters, these methods of enforcement
are unlikely to be as successful as the methods legal firms have available to
them.
The reputation of firms is particularly vulnerable to attack from posers.
"Counterfeiting of such affiliation is a common phenomenon in illegal
markets, where concealment makes checking credentials difficult." '23 2
Government might further this process of trademark dilution by reducing
sentences of posers. 33 Such individuals diminish the value of the firms'
signal, and may possibly even fray group identity by creating uncertainty
about group boundaries. Law might also reward the sale of spurious
products, like Nike sugar pills, that dilute the value of a brand. Current law
in some instances punishes these sales with penalties similar to those for
actual ecstasy;3 these sentences could also be lowered.235
In addition, law could make it more difficult for organizations to
standardize transactions. Narcotics dealers, for example, benefit from
standard units of measurement, the "eighth" of marijuana, the "dimebag" of
230. PADILLA, supra note 44, at 11I (stating that the gang "provides customers with a
reputable source from which to purchase drugs and other items, and.., gives customers the
background information necessary to trust that the merchandise they buy is authentic and first-
rate.").
231. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1981) (stating that
"trademark infringement inhibits competition and... deprives consumers of their ability to
distinguish among the goods of competing manufacturers").
232. REUTER, supra note 145, at 144.
233. Information-extraction tools such as flipping and informants also reduce the reputational
signals arising from group membership. See supra notes 163-165 (observing that firm
membership is a proxy for loyalty).
234. E.g., United States v. Sobrilski, 127 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
"impossibility is no defense to a charge ... of attempting to distribute a controlled substance"
because "a person may be guilty of attempting to distribute such a substance even though, had the
attempt succeeded, there would have been no crime").
235. Both posing and counterfeiting should still be punished for the harm they cause society,
particularly in their conveyance of the impression that crime is rampant. These broken windows
effects explain why the law should not decriminalize posing and counterfeiting, though it may
want to recognize that these acts have less harm than sales of nonspurious products by actual
members of a conspiracy.
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heroin, and so on. These practices facilitate quick transactions, reducing the
possibility of being caught. Law could isolate a few of these standardized
measurements and attach special penalties to these sales. These sentencing
enhancements would lengthen transaction times and would force sales to
depend even more heavily on reputation, thereby creating additional
vulnerabilities that reversed-intellectual property law may exploit. These
are not, of course, points about conspiracy law as such. But, just as with the
contract law analysis, they point the way toward a comprehensive approach
to the problem of group crime.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSPIRACY
Federal conspiracy law evolved, somewhat unconsciously, to take
advantage of many of the pressure points generated by the theory of group
behavior outlined in Part II. In particular, concepts such as group identity,
price discrimination, contractual uncertainty, and the destabilization of trust
provide a new vantage point from which to understand the functions of
various doctrines in federal law. This sharply contrasts with the trend in
state law, which has moved in a different direction (prompted by the Model
Penal Code's rejection of extra punishment for conspiracy, its decision to
permit merger, and its refusal to permit Pinkerton)26 The function of these
federal doctrines, and their connection to the economic and psychological
dangers of groups, suggest that the states should rethink their choices.
As promised, the case for such rethinking has centered on a utilitarian
account. There are retributivist justifications that may be offered as well,
insofar as the individual who agrees to commit a crime with another
undertakes an act that is likely to produce social harm. In the same way that
someone who drives drunk deserves punishment, the conspirator should be
culpable for the dangerous inchoate agreement. Yet in addition to the
individual's culpability, there is also a sense in which the criminal group is
culpable too. Although the notion of collective guilt seems ill-fitting in our
individualistic American system, some aspects of conspiracy law come
close to it. As we will see, the Pinkerton doctrine makes each member of a
group liable for the collective faults of the group in certain circumstances-
thereby approximating collective guilt without outlawing particular groups
or associations. And cooperation agreements, in practice, often make the
liability of one individual the basis upon which to secure convictions
against the larger organization. The retributivist case for conspiracy,
236. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985) (grading punishment for conspiracy by the
punishment for the object offense); id. § 1.07 cmt. (stating that "at least" sixteen jurisdictions had
adopted or proposed provisions based upon section 1.07, which in effect requires merger); id.
§ 2.06 (rejecting Pinkerton); id. § 2.06 cmt. (noting that most states that have reformed their
criminal codes reject Pinkerton).
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although well beyond the scope of this Article, is one worthy of further
exploration and thought.
A. Traditional Features
1. Extra Punishment for Group Activity
Conspiracy law imposes two additional sanctions on group behavior.
First, it takes the punishment a lone offender would receive and authorizes
the government to double it when two offenders conspire to commit the
same crime. Second, traditionally conspiracy law refused to permit merger,
so that when A conspires with B to steal government funds, both are liable
for the theft and the offense of conspiracy. The functional case for these
doctrines begins by observing that the first method, doubling the total
amount of punishment, rarely happens. Doubling is used as a threat to
promote information extraction, but cooperating defendants do not receive
the full sanction. Total punishment increases (though at a level below
doubling), and is justified because of pernicious group dynamics at work in
conspiracy-from polarization to conformity, performance success to
loyalty. If government punished crimes equally, whether they were
committed by one person or many, no legal incentive to desist from
conspiracy would exist. To the contrary, additional co-conspirators would
defray the legal risks of getting caught. The formation of such criminal
groups, in turn, would threaten society even further because they would be
spurred to commit greater crimes. Their behavior in groups would be, on
average, more dangerous than their individual activities.
237
But this raises the question of why, if groups cause so much danger,
conspiracy law does not levy additional punishments upon existing
conspirators when they add new members to their group. The answer to this
237. Some, including the influential Phillip Johnson, have called for the abolition of the
conspiracy offense, reasoning that accomplice liability serves the same goals. See Johnson, supra
note 1, at 1150-52; see also Goldberg v. State, 351 So. 2d 332, 334 (Fla. 1977) (arguing that
"alternatives" such as attempt and accomplice liability "are available and could be used in lieu of
a conspiracy charge" anA that "[o]f course, the law of criminal attempt is sufficient to protect
society against the danger of incipient wrongdoers"). Yet accomplice liability in fact does not
train its eye on the evils of group conduct. After all, for accessory liability no "agreement" is
necessary nor must a person have a "stake" in the venture. See Cox v. Adm'r United States Steel
& Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1410 (1 th Cir.) (stating that a "defendant may wittingly aid a criminal
act and be liable as an aider and abettor, but not be liable for conspiracy, which requires
knowledge of and voluntary participation in an agreement to do an illegal act" (citation omitted)),
modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (11 th Cir. 1994); MCSORLEY, supra note 89, at 56. The
structure and penalties of accomplice liability do not further information extraction nearly as well.
Moreover, the conspiracy doctrine-by dint of its simplicity-serves useful purposes. The fact
that it lumps so many offenses together, instead of varying the punishment by the object offcnse,
is a virtue. Not only does it facilitate understanding of the law by laypersons, it also singles out
the agreement as a generalized harm above and beyond the object offense.
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riddle is twofold. First, the law invests its resources primarily in deterring a
potential new member of the group. Penalties against the existing members
have already proven to be somewhat ineffective; applying those penal
resources to potential entrants may generate more deterrence. Such
penalties will also facilitate information extraction by providing leverage
for flipping. Second, as we will see momentarily, Pinkerton provides other
incentives to existing conspirators to moderate the size and activities of the
group by making them liable for the substantive crimes of new members.
Nevertheless, how can the exclusion from merger be justified-
particularly when criminal attempts merge?2 . Merger is inappropriate
because the punishment for an object offense does not capture the harm of
carrying out crime as a group. Liability for an attempt, by contrast, may
merge with the substantive offense because attempt does not involve the
pernicious group. Moreover, by attaching an additional penalty to the
completion of a substantive offense, the merger exclusion bolsters marginal
deterrence from inchoate to completed criminal conduct.
There is another reason to preclude merger. Recall that a fixed penalty
for conspiracy is necessary to induce cooperation; the large baseline can
compensate for circumstances in which prosecutors only know about a
small crime committed by a potential witness. If the punishment for
conspiracy merged downward-to the underlying offense-then
prosecutors may lack leverage to flip witnesses (particularly for many state
offenses that carry lower penalties). If, by contrast, the conspiracy charge
merged upward-to the conspiracy charge-then the law would be creating
massive substitution effects. If all conspiracies received the same
punishment, regardless of their specific criminal aims, then these groups
would have no incentive to refrain from the most dangerous conduct.
Conspiracy law thus uses both-a general punishment that reflects the
dangers of acting in groups and that facilitates information extraction plus a
specific punishment calibrated to the particular crime to minimize
238. Attempt is considered a preparatory step that merges into the completed offense. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(b). By contrast,
a conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offense from the crime that is the object of
the conspiracy. The conspiracy, however fully formed, may fail of its object, however
earnestly pursued; the contemplated crime may never be consummated; yet the
conspiracy is none the less punishable. And it is punishable as conspiracy, though the
intended crime be accomplished.
United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1915) (citations omitted); see also United States
v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1992) ("[T]he conspiracy charge.., was an offense distinct from
any [substantive] crime for which he had been previously prosecuted, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not bar his prosecution on that charge."); Callanan v, United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589-
90 (1961) (discussing the common law against merger); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,
643 (1946) (similar); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 5 Mass. (1 Tyng) 106 (1809) (same). After
much debate, Britain approved a rule that requires prosecutors to justify bringing both the
substantive and conspiracy counts and that gives a judge the power to overrule a prosecutor. See
Practice Note, 2 All E.R. 540 (Q.B. 1977).
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substitution dangers. 239 The general punishment is weighted heavily against
acting in groups in order to avoid the dangerous consequences of group
identity and specialization of labor.
2. Pinkerton
The editors of the Harvard Law Review proclaimed in 1959 that "[n]o
court which has taken the Pinkerton approach has offered an adequate




More recently, George Fletcher has claimed that while vicarious liability
"might make some sense in the field of torts... it is patently absurd to
think of conspirators controlling each other's acts." 241 Such views have led
to the conventional wisdom that Pinkerton liability is some sort of criminal
monster.
Nevertheless, a broad range of evidence suggests that conspirators often
do influence, in profound ways, each other's behavior, not simply through
their direct commands but also by their mere presence. This level of
influence, in a world where criminal law looked only to commissions,
would probably not justify Pinkerton. But the information-based paradigm
yields a different answer because it calibrates liability on the basis of
knowledge as well as activity level. Pinkerton should not be condemned
before assessing its information-extraction function. Without it, there would
be less flipping, and with less flipping, more coercive law enforcement
techniques would be necessary. Privacy intrusions would increase, and the
pressure to water down criminal procedure protections would be even
greater.
The benefits of Pinkerton are not limited only to information extraction.
In addition to punishing crimes of diffusion, the doctrine also increases
precontractual uncertainty about the sanction. Under Pinkerton, a criminal
takes her chances when she joins a conspiracy, in that she is liable for all
the crimes that are within the scope of the organization. Greater liability
239. For another serious substitution problem and an attempted solution, see Katyal, supra
note 20, at 1042-47 (arguing that conspiracy law creates substitution effects by encouraging
individuals to conspire with their computers without additional penalties, and suggesting that
criminal law treat computers as quasi-conspirators).
240. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 85, at 998. The editors
offered a rationale based on economies of scale, so that "which of the conspirators committed the
substantive offense would be less significant in determining the defendant's liability than the fact
that the crime was performed as part of a larger division of labor." Id. at 999. But if the provision
of services to a group can be the basis on which an individual can be prosecuted for the group's
sins, then the legal rule would swallow all conduct by anyone that benefits a group, such as the
mailroom clerk who unknowingly sends out fraudulent mail on behalf of a group.
241. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 663 (1978); see also Statement
from the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 1975), quoted in
Marcus, supra note 4, at 7 n.28 (finding that Pinkerton "goes too far, and does not easily admit of
rational application").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1372 [Vol. 112: 1307
Conspiracy Theory
will deter some from joining the conspiracy, and it will also make the
contract for payment tougher to strike. 242 Because people are less likely to
know the full extent of their liability under Pinkerton, moreover,
uncertainty increases and the conditions for trust thus diminish.243
Psychological experiments have shown that uncertainty leads to less trust;
in situations where a bad apple could poison a group, trust is weak.
244
Lawful partnerships operate under similar precepts since each member is
liable for what the others do. Such arrangements work well when the
members of the firms are homogenous, practice the same trade, have
similar educational backgrounds, and are subject to the same ethical rules
(such as law firms), but they become unwieldy and inefficient once
heterogeneity is introduced. The criminal conspiracy, often composed of
relatively heterogeneous members who lack the same reputational
mechanisms to secure trust among each other, will face particular problems
from joint liability. Put somewhat differently, Pinkerton reverses the well-
known advantages of limited liability for corporations.
2 45
242. This understanding of Pinkerton, therefore, provides one argument (although by no
means a decisive one) for retention of the much-maligned felony murder rule in the context of
group crime. The rule treats killings that occur during perpetration of a felony as murder. Under
the rule, the contract becomes even more difficult to contemplate between the criminal enterprise
ex ante, as the sanction is not simply what is within the scope of the conspiracy, but also possibly
any death occurring while the group pursues its scope. Indeed, many early felony murder cases
arose in circumstances akin to conspiracy. See Le Seignior Dacres Case, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B.
1535) (describing the facts as a group of men who went to hunt unlawfully in a park and who
killed the keeper of the park when the keeper tried to stop them, and finding that all were guilty of
the death); Salisbury v. Ellis, Plowden 101 (1553) (finding three defendants responsible for the
death of a servant who was killed during an assault on another man). Today, the felony murder
rule's definition in many states explicitly targets accomplices and co-conspirators. See, e.g., 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (1998) ("A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree
when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the
perpetration of a felony.").
243. Liability for complicity, which may exist even in non-Pinkerton jurisdictions, cannot
capture these advantages because a specific mens rea to carry out the offense will generally be
needed. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06(2)(a)-2.06(4).
244. See Sharon G. Goto, To Trust or Not To Trust: Situational and Dispositional Elements,
24 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 119, 129 (1996).
245. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 447-48 (1992) (outlining costs to unlimited liability,
including the difficulties "for owners to delegate decisionmaking functions to managers without
retaining a significant monitoring role"). Information extraction may explain why Pinkerton
employs an objective test for liability. Conspirators are responsible for objectively reasonably
foreseeable acts of their compatriots that were in furtherance of the conspiracy, "but not acts in the
conspiracy that were not within the scope of the defendant's agreement." United States v.
Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11 th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Garcia, 954 F.2d 12, 15
(1st Cir. 1992) (objective liability); State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270 (N.J. 1993) (reversing in part a
lower court opinion requiring subjective liability for Pinkerton charges). This test better responds
to the incentives of vicarious liability: If conspirators understand that they will be liable only for
what they subjectively know, they will turn into ostriches and look the other way. The objective
test attempts to divine, based on a person's agreement, how much information they should have
had, and holds them liable for it. Objective liability helps avoid willful blindness and provides an
incentive to hoard information. To blunt the ostrich defense and create ex ante incentives to gather
information, some courts have held that willful blindness as to certain aims of a conspiracy will
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Furthermore, just as vicarious liability in torts will produce more
monitoring, so too will Pinkerton. Here, the major reason why is that the
increasing amounts of leverage will result in more instances of cooperation
with law enforcement. In the lawful entity context, vicarious liability may
force corporations to take wasteful precautions.2 46 This is, however, exactly
the result we want when the organization is an unlawful one. Monitoring
will be driven by the climate of uncertainty about loyalty, so that more
monitoring begets less trust, and less trust begets more monitoring. Like a
romantic couple where one party suspects the other of infidelity and begins
tracking the other's movements, the acts of monitoring themselves may
contribute to a cycle of distrust, thereby eliminating many advantages of
joint activity.
Yet there are reasons not to punish all members of a conspiracy equally.
Pinkerton creates a strong incentive for someone not to join in a conspiracy
at all, for any conspirator can be liable for the multitude of crimes carried
out by the conspiracy. But for those who do join, it could generate negative
substitution effects. If one will be held liable for the drug dealing of leaders
even when the person is a small fry, the person might as well try to be a
leader or ratchet up her activity level. This is a serious challenge, but there
are three competing considerations. First, Pinkerton only attacks actions
that were reasonably foreseeable within the scope of the agreement, and
therefore creates incentives to reduce that scope. Second, other provisions
in federal law, such as the sentencing enhancements for organizers, leaders,
and managers, and the reductions for minimal and minor participants,
produce marginal deterrence. 247 Pinkerton increases the punishment base,
but the degree of liability within that base differs markedly due to one's
role in the offense. Third, as we will see in a moment, the withdrawal
defense provides clear incentives for participants to minimize their conduct
and to weaken group identity, and thereby promotes marginal deterrence.
Conspiracy law could build on this idea and permit partial withdrawal
defenses. It could permit, for example, a defense to Pinkerton liability for
those acts that a defendant made a genuine and honest attempt to prevent.
not insulate a party from liability. See United States v. Stone, 987 F.2d 469, 470-72 (7th Cir.
1993); United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1271 (8th Cir. 1992).
246. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (arguing that strict liability may induce firms to engage
in suboptimal monitoring when monitoring efforts can be used against the firm to establish or
magnify its liability); Fischel & Sykes, supra note 166, at 325 (finding that "penalties against
corporations must be appropriately limited to avoid serious inefficiencies"); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence
of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240 (1993) (arguing that legitimate firms
should have their penalties reduced if employees face public sanctions for wrongdoing because
otherwise "the price of the firm's product would exceed the social cost of production").
247. See supra Subsection II.C.5.
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Such a rule may induce conspirators to voice caution about the group's
activities, which can blunt polarization and group identity.
This defense of Pinkerton, like the rest of the Article, is confined to its
functional justification. Unfair discrimination in the way the doctrine is
applied, if any,248 may very well be a reason to reject Pinkerton or to take
other mitigating steps. Yet some level of unfairness will always be present
in the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, innocents will be punished
wrongly, and the less culpable will be found liable at times for more than
they should. And, if further study shows that Pinkerton is applied unfairly
in a great number of cases, then the advantages of the doctrine outlined
above, particularly in preventing the formation of conspiracies, will have to
be weighed against these costs. But, a precondition to this balancing is to
understand the function of Pinkerton, in terms of providing an ex post
mechanism to extract information and an ex ante incentive for conspiracies
to adopt inefficient practices.
3. Inchoate Liability
Conspiracy, from the time of Lord Coke to the present, has been an
inchoate offense.24 9 This choice is no doubt disquieting to many.2 5° Yet
other inchoate doctrines, such as attempt, attach liability at a far later stage
in criminal planning, for example, when there is "dangerous proximity to
success. ' ' 1 ' And the psychological work on group identity makes the case
for why conspiracy law should attach liability at the incipient stage. The
argument has to do with complementarity-that the formation of a criminal
group, even one that may be far from achieving its success regarding a
particular crime, poses dangers to society because it is likely to have
engaged in, or will engage in, other crimes. The penalty attaches to
confederation for a bad end. Because groups are not only more likely to
engage in crime than are individuals, but are also faster at accomplishing
them once they set their minds to the task, preventative steps must be
248. Even the most vicious critics of Pinkerton have admitted that disparities in its
application are quite rare. E.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 1150. Not only prosecutors, but also
judges, can refuse to let a jury consider Pinkerton liability when they feel justice so requires. See,
e.g., United States v. Raffone, 693 F.2d 1343, 1346 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (holding that the failure to
give the instruction prevents the conviction of a co-conspirator from being affirmed on a
Pinkerton basis); United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755, 762-63 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
249. See The Poulterer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (K.B. 1610) ("A false conspiracy betwix
diverse persons shall be punished, although nothing be put in execution."); supra note 117.
250. E.g., Dennis, supra note 6, at 46 ("Why should an agreement.., be treated in effect as
an exception to the proximity rule?").
251. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387-88 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). As he
colorfully put it, the agreement to murder a man fifty miles away would suffice for conspiracy
because "it does not matter how remote the act may be from accomplishing the purpose," but
attempt liability could not so exist. Id.
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commensurate.252 Conspiracy law does this by attacking the group at the
moment it is formed and not waiting until the group comes too close to
success in carrying out any particular crime. It focuses not only on the
actual harm a group has caused but also on its potential for harm.
The risk of information extraction forces criminal organizations to
become less efficient-compartmentalizing information, monitoring,
chilling discussion, and so on. These costly practices, and their
accompanying destruction of trust within the criminal group, are most
likely to occur when conspiracy liability is inchoate. Inchoate liability
induces members of the group to defect early, for each has already
committed a crime at the time of agreement. This gives law enforcement an
omnipresent weapon to flip a conspirator, and also a crime with which to
prosecute the other members of the group. And, ex ante, the criminal
syndicate does not have to worry only about assuring loyalty of all
members at the end of a crime but throughout the planning and
development as well. Accordingly, the group constantly will need to
undertake costly preventative measures in order to minimize the danger
from flipped witnesses.
4. Impossibility
This year, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a federal court of appeals
and reaffirmed its view that a person can be guilty of conspiracy even when
the object of the agreement is impossible. 253 In United States v. Recio, a
Nevada police officer stopped two individuals driving a truck and
discovered between ten and twelve million dollars in narcotics. One of the
individuals cooperated with the government in a sting operation by
revealing the criminal plan. The truck was driven to Idaho and the
cooperator called a pager number. A caller returned the page and stated that
someone would come get the truck. A few hours later, an individual, Mr.
252. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 470 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that conspiracy
"serves a preventative function by stopping criminal conduct in its early stages of growth before it
has a full opportunity to bloom"); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 85,
at 924 ("When the defendant has chosen to act in concert with others, rather than to act alone, the
point of justifiable intervention is reached at an earlier stage."). In Britain, this feature is viewed
as conspiracy's chief advantage: "[T]he most important reason for retaining conspiracy as a crime
was that it enabled the criminal law to intervene at an early stage before a contemplated crime had
actually been committed." See Criminal Law: Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform, in
7 LAW COMMISSION REPORTS 483,495 (1979).
253. United States v. Recio, 123 S. Ct. 819, 822 (2003); see also United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S, 78, 86 (1915) ("A person may be guilty of conspiring, although incapable
of committing the objective offense."); Beddow v. United States, 70 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1934)
(similar); Thompson v. State, 17 So. 512, 515 (Ala. 1895) (stating that "[t]he agreement is the gist
of the offense" and that it is not "purged because subsequent events may render the consummation
of the agreement impossible"); Neal Katyal, Don't Gut Conspiracy Laws When We Need Them
Most, SLATE, Nov. 20, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2074255 (analyzing Recio).
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Recio, drove up to the truck, got into it, and began driving the truck away.
Government agents then arrested Recio. Recio's successful claim before the
Ninth Circuit was that he could not be charged with a conspiracy when the
drugs had already been seized unless the prosecution could prove that his
decision to conspire predated the seizure. Otherwise, Recio stated, the
object of the conspiracy, possession of narcotics with intent to distribute,
was impossible.
The Recio case is a textbook illustration of the way conspiracy law
singles out the agreement as a distinct malady because of the economic and
psychological harm of groups. Unlike a substantive offense, as to which
factual impossibility may be a defense,2 54 the harm of a conspiracy is not
confined to the likelihood that the agreement will be successful. Rather, the
law of conspiracy aims to punish the criminal agreement out of a
recognition that the agreement may produce other, unrelated, harms. Even
the impossible agreement may further a malicious group identity, leading
the individuals down a path of further criminal activity beyond their initial
object. In this respect, impossibility must be contrasted with a mens rea
defense: The type of person who believes (wrongly) that an object crime is
possible, and intentionally agrees to further it, poses a special danger to
society because he breathes life into a joint project dedicated to carrying out
a crime-and this project may then grow beyond its original moorings.
While the Court did not specifically address the point, there was a
marginal deterrence problem with the federal government's position in
Recio. The government contended that the timing of the defendant's
agreement to further the conspiracy, whether pre- or post-seizure, was
irrelevant.2 5 5 But if the government cannot tie any pre-seizure conduct of a
defendant to the conspiracy, despite the many opportunities for flipping, the
defendant is more likely to be a one-shot player. Accordingly, it may be
appropriate to tweak the Recio holding so that a defendant could receive a
256lower sentence when the evidence suggests that she is not a repeat player.
Irrespective of the tweak, the prohibition on impossible criminal
agreements targets, at an early stage, the escalation of criminal conduct
before the agreements take on lives of their own. The court of appeals
decision was out-of-step with this fundamental principle, and the Supreme
Court was wise to reverse it.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
defendant could not be guilty of the substantive offense of receiving stolen property when the
police in a sting operation sold him nonstolen property, but that the defendant was guilty of
conspiracy notwithstanding the impossibility defense).
255. See Brief for the United States, Recio (No. 01-1184), 2002 WL 1626147, at *20.
256. The facts of an individual case may create a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is a
repeat player. In a case like Recio, for example, where the defendant drove an unguarded truck
containing millions of dollars in narcotics, such an inference could be permissible.
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5. Withdrawal
Conspiracy law sets a tough standard for withdrawal. A defendant must
show "that he has taken affirmative steps .. to disavow or to defeat the
objectives of the conspiracy; and... that he made a reasonable effort to
communicate those acts to his co-conspirators or that he disclosed the
scheme to law enforcement. 2 57 The rule is generally justified on the ground
that it ensures "that withdrawal did occur and is not simply being invented
expost.'2 58 But the rule also has a robust ex ante effect.
The "disclosed the scheme to law enforcement" prong of withdrawal
aids information extraction because it lowers the sentences of those who
provide such information to authorities. As such, the doctrine nicely tracks
the trend toward information-based sentencing: Liability attaches not
because of what a person did, but because of what a person knew and did
not reveal. The "communicate [to] co-conspirators" prong, permitting
withdrawal without informing law enforcement, destabilizes conspiracies in
two ways. First, because defection from groups is more common when
members believe their activities are coming to a close, the withdrawal of
one member can prompt defection from the others, thus weakening the
group and providing additional opportunities for information extraction. 
259
Second, the prong provides an incentive for conspirators to chip away at
group identity and to reduce the dangerous effects of group behavior that
their presence facilitates. Because conspirators sit in a unique position to
influence the behavior of the group, 260 conspiracy law tries to align the
incentives of individual members in ways that will reduce the group's
criminal behavior. This is done in the shadow of the law-and works even
when law enforcement never learns about the operation of the criminal
conspiracy. T6
257. United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 1083 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65
(1978) ("Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a
manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient
to establish withdrawal or abandonment."); United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1481 (1 lth
Cir. 1990) (holding that refraining from criminal acts is not enough). Some jurisdictions
distinguish between withdrawal and renunciation by defining the latter to include practices that
thwart the success of the conspiracy and the former not to include them. While revoking one's
membership will reduce the identity of a group somewhat, thwarting the conspiracy is likely to do
more. The jurisdictions that draw this distinction should therefore provide greater benefits to
renunciators than to withdrawers.
258. United States v. Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141, 1150 (2d Cir. 1995).
259. See supra text accompanying note 102.
260. Ross & NISBETr, supra note 27, at 9 ("[W]hen trying to get people to change familiar
ways of doing things, social pressures and constraints exerted by the informal peer group
represent the most potent restraining force that must be overcome and, at the same time, the most
powerful inducing force that can be exploited to achieve success ....").
26 1. Even without the crime of conspiracy, renunciation and withdrawal can be dcfenses to
attempt and complicity charges. But these offenses occur at a later point in the formation of
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Insights from psychology about the influence of minorities add much to
understanding this effect. For example, the same Asch experiments about
group conformity mentioned in Part I found that error rates were reduced by
seventy-five percent when a single dissenter voiced disapproval of the
majority's view of line lengths. 262 This finding suggests that the withdrawal
doctrine's encouragement of conspiracy-thwarting behavior can have a
long-term effect on the entity's duration and attainment of goals. Other
studies have found that minorities in groups must be unwavering in order to
influence the majority,263 thereby illuminating why law requires an
unequivocal withdrawal.2
The effect of withdrawal on sentencing also closely tracks the price-
discrimination model. Withdrawal ends liability for further substantive
offenses, but not the initial liability for the offense of conspiring or other
substantive crimes already committed while the person was a member.265
The withdrawal rule thus bolsters marginal deterrence by imposing a
penalty on all conspirators, including withdrawers (thereby deterring some
from making an initial agreement), and by providing some benefit for
withdrawers, in that they avoid further substantive liability.
266
criminal plans. See supra note 237. By contrast, conspiracy law provides incentives for early
renunciation and withdrawal at a time when an individual is more receptive to them.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
263. For example, Serge Moscovici asked subjects in groups of six to indicate the color of
slides. In the first part of the experiment, two of the six people were confederates who claimed
they saw green when everyone else was seeing blue slides. The slides were called green by the
naive subjects approximately 8.5% of the time, and 32% reported seeing a green slide at least
once (as opposed to a control group that almost never called the slides green (.25%)). In the
second part of the experiment, the two confederates were inconsistent and stated their belief that
the slides were green and blue in a random fashion. In that circumstance, the conformity effect
dropped to an insignificant number-only 1.25% of the judgments were called green. SERGE
MOSCOVICI, SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 92 (1976) ("What transforms the minority
into a source or a target of influence is determined by the absence or presence of a definite stand,
of a coherent point of view, of a norm of its own."); Brown, supra note 26, at 27-28 (describing
Moscovici's studies).
264. See United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring an "affirmative
action"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(6) (1985) (stating that a withdrawal must have "thwarted
the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary
renunciation of [the individual's] criminal purpose"). Because this part of the withdrawal doctrine
is rooted in the idea of weakening the group, it will often not be valid until it is communicated to
the co-conspirators. See, e.g., State v. Klein, 116 A. 596, 599-600 (Conn. 1922). Indeed, some
statutes explicitly permit withdrawal only if the communication is made in time for the co-
conspirators to withdraw as well. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05(2) (West 1996).
265. See United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 59 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding a § 371
violation even though the defendant attempted to withdraw); United States v. Marolla, 766 F.2d
457, 461 (11 th Cir. 1985) (precluding withdrawal once an overt act is committed).
266. In addition to these five issues, the theory outlined in Part 1I may help answer other
doctrinal questions, such as the rules regarding statute of limitations and venue in conspiracy
cases. The statute of limitations on conspiracy does not begin running until the conspiracy is
terminated, and termination requires the success of the object of the conspiracy or abandonment.
See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (1910). The limitations period is far longer in order to
further information extraction and to combat the tendency of groups to engage in additional
criminal conduct, as Section L.A demonstrated.
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B. Further Aligning Theory and Doctrine
The principal aim of this Article has been to detail the functional case
for federal conspiracy doctrine. From this case, it is possible to sketch out
some shifts in policy that, either collectively or individually, may further set
doctrine in line with theory. These reforms can make conspiracies more
difficult to assemble, tougher to maintain, and harder to keep together.
1. Sentencing Reforms
The current penalty structure operates in ways anathema to information
extraction. This Subsection outlines several ways to promote information
extraction and to destabilize group identity.
Reversing the Sentencing Commission's Changes. The Federal
Sentencing Commission failed to consider many of the functions of
conspiracy law. The Sentencing Guidelines calibrate sentences by looking
to the base-offense level of the substantive offense-reversing the long
tradition of exclusion from merger. 267 They also reduce this base-offense
level for minor participants .268 The Guidelines further require sentencing on
the basis of "relevant conduct" and explicitly state that such conduct is
narrower than Pinkerton because it is confined to criminal activity that a
particular defendant agreed to undertake jointly.269 In total, these changes
reject the special danger posed by groups.
The venue rules permit a conspirator to be charged in any location where an overt act took
place. These rules prompted Justice Holmes to argue that conspiracy would "make impossible
hardships amounting to grievous wrongs" in an era when the nation extended "from ocean to
ocean," for the government could "prosecute in any of twenty States in none of which the
conspirators had been." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 386-87 (1912) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). However, because larger criminal entities have a greater ability to bribe law
enforcement and other officials, overlapping jurisdictions that investigate and prosecute
conspiracies mitigate the impact of corruption in a particular police department or prosecutor's
office. If conspiracy can be prosecuted at both the state and federal levels, and can be prosecuted
by any office in which an overt act occurs, the number of potential prosecutors and investigators
rises quickly. For this reason, the permissive venue rules offset heightened corruption risks. The
point here is similar to the claim that states should enact "converse-1983" laws to prevent federal
wrongdoing. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
267. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Xl.l(a)-(b)(2) (1998); see also id.
§ 2XI.1 cmt. n.2 ("Under § 2Xl.l(a), the base offense level [for an attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation] will be the same as that for the substantive offense.").
268. See supra note 226.
269. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.3 cmt. n.2; see also Julie R.
O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines" Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW.
U. L. REv. 1342, 1357 (1997). The Sentencing Commission did not erase the doctrine of
Pinkerton liability (although it did cast aspersions at it in section 11B), so it is still possible for
prosecutors to use it to seek substantive liability for a particular offense without being subject to
the limits of "relevant conduct" in section LB 1.3. In practice, however, prosecutors almost always
follow the direct route prescribed in the Guidelines for "jointly undertaken criminal activity" in
section 1B.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1380 [Vol. 112: 1307
Conspiracy Theory
A simple example cuts through the jargon to demonstrate how severely
these changes cripple information extraction. Suppose Abe lives in the pre-
Guidelines regime and is a minor participant in a $1 million bank robbery.
Bonnie is the main person behind this scheme, and while Abe certainly
agrees to help out, he does not do much of the hard work. In the course of
the conspiracy and without Abe's knowledge, Bonnie uses a firearm. The
relevant statutes in the federal code impose a maximum 240-month
sentence for bank robbery, 60 months for use of a firearm during a bank
robbery, and 60 months for conspiracy. 270 Accordingly, without the
Guidelines, Abe would be eligible for a sentence of up to 30 years-bank
robbery plus the nonmerged conspiracy charge plus the Pinkerton use of a
firearm. (Judges might not impose a 30-year sentence under these facts; the
relevant issue is that a prosecutor could threaten it as leverage for
information.) Now, suppose Abe lives under the Guidelines, where, for a
first-time offender such as Abe, bank robbery has a maximum 78-month
sentence and use of the firearm 57 months, and where conspiracy is not
considered a separate substantive offense. Since Abe did not agree to the
use of a firearm, he cannot be held liable for that under "relevant conduct."
Abe is therefore only liable for the substantive bank-robbery charge, which
reduces his sentence to 78 months. Furthermore, because he was a
"minimal participant," his sentence is reduced even further, by 4 levels (27
months). This yields a 51-month sentence, or slightly more than 4 years.
The formalization of these rules makes information extraction more
difficult, and, for most crimes, which carry sentences far lower than bank
robbery, extraction is even tougher.
A strong case therefore exists for the Guidelines to restore conspiracy
to its traditional function by resuscitating the merger exception and
Pinkerton liability. Of course, prosecutors are under no obligation to bring
all of these charges in a given case, but their ability to do so enhances their
information-extraction capabilities. Indeed, without a strong separate
offense of conspiracy, lawmakers will be under pressure to impose high
mandatory minimums for minor crimes to try to capture the information-
extraction benefit conspiracy law currently provides, with potentially
terrible consequences for those who commit crimes alone.
Target Repeat Players and Specialization. Government may consider
targeting those who commit crimes with the same conspirators. If a
270. Under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1, robbery of a financial
institution that resulted in losses between $800,000 and $1,500,000 is a 26-level offense, which,
for first-time offenders, has a maximum penalty of 78 months' imprisonment; under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) (2000), bank robbery has a maximum penalty of 240 months' imprisonment. And under
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1, use of a firearm during the course of a robbery
increases the offense level by at least five, which, in this hypothetical, would result in a 31 -level
offense-a 57-month increase; under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), use of a dangerous weapon during a
bank robbery increases the maximum sentence to 25 years, a 60-month increase.
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prosecutor can prove that the criminals are repeat players, then this fact will
suggest a tightly knit conspiracy in which defection is more difficult.271
Pinkerton liability essentially accomplishes this by increasing the penalties
for long-term participants. But in a world without Pinkerton, a sentencing
enhancement for repeat players would remove some of the rewards for
acting in concert with the same individuals. Similarly, if a conspiracy uses
mechanisms to keep members working over long time horizons (such as
informal deferred compensation packages after a certain number of years
worked and the like), these arrangements could be singled out for additional
penalties. At the state level, much of this can be accomplished by creating a
first-degree conspiracy offense for enterprises and a second-degree offense
for single-shot agreements.
In addition, the law could directly attack the specialization-of-labor
advantages of conspiracy. The current Guidelines might be thought to deal
with these problems through enhancements for crimes committed with the
use of special skills.272 Special skills are likely to be discrete inputs that are
observable by other members, and the law might want to discourage them
for team-production and specialization reasons. But the law could go
further and use enhancements when conspiracies have defined
organizational structures and clear roles for their members. By contrast,
current law on skills works at cross-purposes: It imposes the skills
enhancement on everyone except leaders, managers, and others who had a
substantial role in the offense. 2 73 This scheme creates negative substitution
effects, in that it encourages those with special skills to be leaders, and
encourages leaders to develop special skills. Apart from specialization, the
sentencing process can also be used to encourage conspirators to commit
acts of disloyalty by reducing the sentence of conspirators who can prove
that they thwarted the conspiracy's criminal objectives.
Encourage Defection Races. The current system already facilitates a
race to provide information to law enforcement, in that a prosecutor is
likely to provide a larger sentencing reduction to those who first provide
information. 274 But the law could be structured to create many more, and
271. Nalebuff, supra note 100, at 91 ("Of all the mechanisms that can sustain cooperation in
the prisoners' dilemma, the most common is one in which the players have a repeated or ongoing
relationship."); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27, 44 (1980)
(observing that self-enforcing agreements are not feasible when the date at which transactions
between the parties cease is definitively known). The Model Penal Code takes an analogous view
by suggesting that the group danger rationale only reaches those conspiracies that are continuing
enterprises. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. (1985).
272. Under section 3B1.3, a defendant who used a "special skill, in a manner that
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense," has his sentence increased
by two levels. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3.
273. Id. ("[11f this adjustment is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be
employed in addition to an adjustment under §3B 1.1 (Aggravating Role).").
274. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 929 (1999) (stating that "the first person to
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much faster, races. Sentencing rewards could be more explicit, stating that
when a conspirator's information is used to convict her co-conspirator of
sentence X, then that flipped conspirator will have his or her own sentence
reduced by a fraction of X.275 Alternatively, sentencing enhancements could
be used against conspirators who are convicted primarily on the basis of
testimony from flipped witnesses. For example, the law could provide that
if someone flips on A, and the prosecution's case was aided substantially by
the testimony of that cooperator, then A's sentence increases by ten percent.
The idea is to explain to the parties that a race is on, and that each needs to
flip or others will. Like a multiplayer prisoners' dilemma, when information
can come from many sources, each player has a large reason to defect, and
to defect quickly.
Flipping could conceivably reduce deterrence. A new entrant might
reason that her legal risks are lower because she can provide information,
making the criminal agreement easier to contemplate. 276 If a person is
thinking strategically to the point where she understands the benefits she
has from flipping, however, that person is also likely to appreciate that her
other conspirators can flip too. As such, flipping remains a disincentive to
contracting with criminals. Even if the person does join, under conditions of
mutual vulnerability, trust is not as likely to develop. 277 Rather, when a
person is thinking about defection from the moment he joins, he is not
likely to contribute to group identity. 278 Nevertheless, law enforcement
might introduce some uncertainty into the flipping calculus through
mechanisms like defection races. The race prevents a conspirator from
acting with assurance about a reward, and promotes ex ante deterrence.
provide the government with information about the crime and the participation of others often
receives the greater benefit" and that "defendants know early on from information provided by
their lawyers or other inmates .. that their best chance at a good sentence is to cooperate and
cooperate early").
275. Explicit zero-sum sentencing, in which a greater sentence for a conspirator means less
for the cooperator, will increase the rewards for flipping and at times may fracture group identity.
Such schemes could, of course, be inducements for perjury. See infra note 315. For these reasons,
explicit perjury laws against giving false statements to investigators, as well as setting the reward
at a low fraction of X, may be appropriate.
276. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1. 23 (1975) ("A ... problem that a system of awarding rights to enforcers on a
first-come first-served basis creates is allowing the offender to nullify the deterrent effect of the
law by turning himself in and receiving the fine or bounty to which an enforcer is entitled.").
277. See supra note 159 (discussing toll-gate studies). Moreover, so long as the penalty in the
statute books is high, a cooperator is likely to receive a large sentence since sentencing departures
generally reduce a percentage of the jail term. Because jail time is likely to have diminishing
negative returns, so that the first day of imprisonment is worse than the one-hundredth, a system
that halved sentences for cooperators would still provide an ample deterrent, provided the baseline
sentence is sufficiently great.
278. In particular, flipping arrangements resemble the first paper-chain group, in which group
identity is weak because individuals receive payoffs based on their personal performance. See
supra text accompanying notes 209-211.
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There may also be ways to use the bifurcated trial process to extract
information. As previously discussed, parties refuse to cooperate with law
enforcement because of loyalty to the group, the hope that if everyone stays
silent no case will exist, and the fear of reprisal. These reasons for silence
are not as salient once a conspirator has been found guilty of a crime.
Accordingly, a defendant could receive a modest reward for partially
flipping and providing useful information to law enforcement at the
sentencing phase. A more complex rule could seek to uncover deception
about information: In the sentencing phase, if conspirator A can prove that
conspirator B knew of an illegal act committed by A, and B did not reveal
such information to the government, then A's sentence would be reduced
while B's would be increased. Such rewards let the players know that
defection is likely to be inevitable at some point and will minimize use of
the ostrich defense throughout the investigation, trial, and sentencing
phases.
279
Use Third-Party Cooperation Agreements. Sometimes defendants will
not possess useful information but know someone who does. Some courts,
albeit rarely, have given defendants lower sentences when they convince
third parties to help the government. 280 Such practices, if employed more
often, could fragment group identity by sowing distrust. Anyone associated
with a convicted criminal will be distrusted by the group because the
convict will gain if the associate is induced to testify. Third-party
agreements ex post result in significant information being provided to law
enforcement, and ex ante fragment trust by enlarging the range of possible
sources for law enforcement. Even if the government is not successful in
flipping a defendant before trial or sentencing, these agreements extend the
time horizon for extraction, further contributing to the climate of distrust
within the firm.
Criminalizing Indemnification. Conspiracies often reward individuals
who do not flip and go to jail by taking care of their families.28 ' This is
279. Under this approach, conspirators would know that their claims about being out of the
loop are likely to be rebutted in the sentencing phase. Unfortunately, the Guidelines' reductions
for minor participants can hurt information extraction. Because this inquiry focuses on what
defendants knew, defendants may fear that the information they provide will be used at sentencing
to show that they are not minor participants. Such practices are formally barred by law, but the
government could go further to permit sentencing proffers in front of separate prosecutors. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.8 cmt. n.3 (1998) (stating that "use of [proffered]
information in a sentencing proceeding is restricted" by criminal and evidentiary rules).
280. See United States v. Doe, 870 F. Supp. 702, 704 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting that such a
procedure had been successfully used at least eleven times nationwide); see also G. Adam
Schweickert, III, Note, Third-Party Cooperation: A Welcome Addition to Substantial Assistance
Departure Jurisprudence, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1445 (1998) (describing the third-party cooperation
process).
281. See supra note 196. Suicide bombers are often lured to commit such acts with similar
promises. See Barbara Demick, Israel Targets Pro-Iraq Palestinians over Money Gifts, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at 3 (making this observation).
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nothing more than an indemnification arrangement, and there is a wide
literature suggesting that such arrangements in the corporate context
encourage dangerous behavior. 82 Indeed, indemnification of judgments in
the securities field is impermissible for directors and officers of
corporations. The case for outlawing indemnification arrangements here is
twofold: (1) These insurance arrangements are a substitute for additional
payment to conspirators, and forcing the entity to pay more up-front in
wages creates cost deterrence ex ante; and (2) ex post indemnification
arrangements make it more difficult for law enforcement to extract
information from criminal defendants.283
2. Exculpatory Flipping
The current sentencing scheme only rewards defendant-witnesses who
direct blame at someone else, but the same logic that undergirds this system
also applies to settings where individuals possess information suggesting
that a suspect, defendant, or convict did not commit a crime. In a system
that concerns itself so much with information extraction and trumpets the
principle that it is "better to let ten guilty people go free than to convict one
innocent," it is jarring to find no provision or practice regarding exculpatory
flipping. Prosecutors and the Sentencing Commission should provide for
214
sentencing departures in such circumstances.
While exculpatory information may be more difficult to obtain than
inculpatory data, conspirators may receive access to information about
282. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 789, 825, n.94 (1984) (describing "the
evident 'moral hazard' problem that arises in this context"); Gillian Lester, Unemployment
Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REv. 335, 362 (2001) ("The more complete
the indemnification, the higher the likelihood of moral hazard assuming psychic costs are not
prohibitive.").
283. Outlawing such indemnification agreements sounds difficult to enforce, insofar as it may
be difficult to catch two people making a private agreement. Enforcement, however, would take
place following a conspirator's arrest at a time when the government can monitor payments made
to the family of the conspirator. It may seek forfeiture of that money and attempt to induce the
family to cooperate in revealing the source of the money. Similarly, law can attack
indemnification of death risks by requiring funeral homes to report suspicious arrangements (such
as large cash payments); it could examine the financial transactions that families of homicide
victims engage in after the death of the victim, and so on. Widespread publicity about the ease of
such follow-the-money investigations will drive up the cost of adding co-conspirators to
conspiracies.
284. In addition, rewards could be given to individuals who provide information that helps
protect law enforcement's sources and methods. There is some evidence that this, at least, is
happening. See Evan Pressman, FBI Investigating Possible Probe Leak from U.S. Attorney's
Office, CNN.CoM, June 26, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/200 1/LAW/06/26/usattomey.mobmole/
index.html (stating that a mafia defendant "in an attempt to win reduced jail time" told the
government of "a person associated with the United States attorney's office in the Southern
District of New York" who gave the Genovese crime family "two lists of mafia members who
were about to be indicted").
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wrongly accused or convicted individuals in the course of their dealings. In
many cases, the line between inculpatory and exculpatory information will
not be great, in that to exculpate one person, a witness will inculpate
someone else. In those settings, a premium can be awarded for information
that accomplishes both aims.
One drawback to this scheme is that it could encourage strategic
withholding. If exculpatory information receives a special benefit, then
individuals who have such information might save it for a circumstance in
which they might need it, such as after they have been arrested. This
drawback applies to inculpatory information as well (although holding back
exculpatory information might increase the chance that the government will
further their mistaken investigation). The solution, in both cases, is to
reward information that comes out as soon as it is discovered. The longer
someone sits on information, the less value it should receive. 285 Of course,
some will sit on information because they do not see any payoff to
disclosing it until they are staring at a prosecutor from across the table. For
that reason, law should create lines of communication between information
sources and police that pay for early disclosure of information. This is
exactly what I will now consider.
3. Nonsentencing Rewards
The government can promote many of its goals without reducing
criminal sentences by paying rewards for information when the information
leads to criminal convictions. By discouraging the flow of knowledge
among members of a conspiracy, inefficiencies are created by this kind of
information warfare. Several reward schemes currently exist. 286 To get
some sense of the amount of money the federal government spends on
285. Law enforcement will not always be able to discern whether someone sat on
information. But those who provide information will need to provide corroborating details. Much
of that information will have a date attached to it, such as a witness who claims to have seen
something or have been told a fact by someone on a certain day. Because many defendant-
witnesses will have to provide these details to back up their information, they will be hesitant to
misstate the date at which they received the information. Their hesitation can be increased through
a legal rule that places sentencing departures in jeopardy if a defendant has been shown to have
lied about the date.
286. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2000) (providing for a ten percent reward for information
leading to insider-trading convictions); 18 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000) (authorizing punishment of those
who accept rewards with the intent to defraud); id. § 1751 (g) (authorizing the Attorney General to
pay rewards for information about threats to the President); id. § 3056(c)(1)(D) (authorizing the
Secret Service to offer rewards); United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1540 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(upholding rewards for a witness in a narcotics case and stating that "there are strong public
policy justifications for permitting law enforcement officials to offer additional incentives to
encourage citizens to come forward with knowledge of crimes"); Pub. No. 733, Rewards for
Information Given to the Internal Revenue Service, in IRS MANUAL (CCH), at http://tax.cch.coml
IPnetwork (providing that the District Director shall pay informants "10 percent of the first
$75,000 recovered, 5 percent of the next $25,000, and 1 percent of any additional recovery").
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informants, I used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to file requests
from several law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately, the FBI took a view
contrary to the other agencies and claimed that general FOIA exceptions
precluded disclosure of this information. 287 But the Customs Service stated
that it spent $13.23 million in 2000 and S16.80 million in 1999,288 the Drug
Enforcement Administration spent $33.57 million in 2000 and $30.77
million in 1999,289 the Secret Service spent approximately $671,000 in
2000,290 and the IRS spent $497,000 in the same year.29' These low
numbers suggest that the federal government primarily relies on flipped
witnesses, rather than on monetary rewards.
At the state and local level, however, there is a remarkable
development-the trend toward Crimestoppers Programs. 292  These
programs anonymously pay for information that leads to a criminal arrest,
typically for felonies.293 These programs are localized and not always
obvious to those with information. Moreover, the divergence in procedures
nationwide is bound to create uncertainties. Indeed, the federal government
does not have a Crimestoppers Program, 9 and its general reward statute
287. See Letter from John M. Kelso, Section Chief, Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts
Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Neal Katyal (Sept. 5, 2001) (on file with author)
(applying three exceptions for declining to provide information). All FOIA requests were filed
months before the tragedy of September 11, 2001.
288. Letter from Gloria L. Marshall, Director, Information Disclosure, U.S. Customs Service,
to Neal Katyal (Oct. 23, 2001) (on file with author).
289. Letter from Kathcrine L. Myrick, Chief, Freedom of Information Operations Unit, Drug
Enforcement Administration, to Neal Katyal (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file with author).
290. Letter from Gary L. Edwards, Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Officer, U.S.
Secret Service, to Neal Katyal (Sept. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
291. Letter from Symeria R. Rascoe, Disclosure Program Analyst, Internal Revenue Service,
to Neal Katyal (Nov. 28, 2001) (on file with author). The 30-year-old IRS program receives more
than 10,000 applications each year and has paid more than 17,000 informants $35.1 million in
rewards. It has led to the recovery of more than $2.1 billion in taxes. Conspirators are eligible to
receive rewards under this program. Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching Jbr
Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1141, 1142-43. The IRS keeps the identity of its informants confidential, even after the case
is over and the agency has paid the bounty. I.R.C § 301.7623-1(e) (2002); 19 C.F.R. § 161.15
(2002).
292. See Crime Stoppers Int'l, Inc., Statistics Since Inception, at http://www.c-s-i.org/
stats.htm (last visited June 13, 2002) (providing activity and financial data for more than 1100
programs worldwide); Crime Stoppers USA, Inc., Membership List, at
http://www.crimestopusa.com/memberdisplay.htm (last visited June 13, 2002) (listing 142
programs but stating that its list is not exhaustive because several cities' programs, such as
Washington, D.C., are not members).
293. A common procedure is to issue callers an identification number at the time of giving
the information. Then callers are asked to call back in a week and give their identification number
to see if they are eligible for a reward. If the caller is eligible, the police will advise them to go to
a certain bank and present the teller with the identification number. Crime Stoppers of W. Cent.
Fla., How Crime Stoppers Works, at http://www.crimestopperstb.com/CrimestoppersHome.htm
(last visited June 13, 2002).
294. Moreover, the FBI's web-based tip page does not appear to promise confidentiality or
anonymity. See FBI, FBI Tips and Public Leads, at https://tips.fbi.gov (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
As such, criminals may fear that providing information to the police may result in their own
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specifically exempts co-conspirators from monetary rewards. 295 The federal
government could take the lead and create a nationwide program andprocedures that promote the visibility and reliability of monetary rewards.(Tracking the suggestion from the preceding Subsection, these monetary
rewards should not only be for inculpatory information, but also for
exculpatory information.) With greater certainty about payment will comegreater amounts of information.296 As information flows, conspiracies will
also have to incur greater monitoring costs, thereby reducing their gains and
fracturing trust even further.
Research about cognitive dissonance reveals a subtle benefit ofCrimestoppers Programs-they prime conspirators for greater acts ofdefection. Because of the sunk-cost trap, individuals have a tendency to actin line with their previous decisions. 297 Indeed, marketers use a "foot-in-
the-door" strategy-such as the pledges universities ask their graduating
seniors to sign committing to small alumni contributions. Such tactics cuepeople to escalate their course of activity. Crimestoppers rewards, by
encouraging conspirators to profit at the expense of their criminal group,
can ultimately facilitate significant cooperation with prosecutors down the
road. And a nationwide crimestoppers program would provide rewards not
only to members of a conspiracy who turn on their co-conspirators, but also
to other individuals as well, thus enlarging the pool of individuals who may
provide information. 298
capture. There may be ways to minimize this fear. For example, each time a tip comes in, anofficer could assign a confidential code to the tip. The caller could be told to remember a certainpassage on a page in a popular book, or a series of alphanumeric symbols. But the identity of thecaller would not be known to law enforcement. If the caller were ever arrested, he could informthe authorities that he was a participant in the contingency reward program, and repeat the
confidential code. (No tipper would ever have an incentive to reveal the confidential code, fordoing so would risk letting another person use it to reduce a sentence.) The code could be checkedto see if it provided any useful information, and, if so, a reward could be granted in the form of alowered sentence.
295. 18 U.S.C. § 3059 (2000) allows for a maximum award of $25,000 for informationleading to the capture of anyone charged with violation of a federal criminal law or to the arrest ofany such person. But it specifically makes ineligible anyone who "knowingly participated in theoffense" as well as "a person whose illegal activities are being prosecuted or investigated [and, inthe judgment of the attorney general,] could benefit from the reward." Id.296. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 291, at 1181. For example, when the False Claims Actwas clarified to make qui tam rewards more likely and to remove administrative discretion todecline them, the number of qui tam suits increased markedly. Id. at 1155 ("The FCA changeshows that an increase in certainty of reward, or at least the creation of a check on agencydiscretion, increases the incentive to inform.").
297. See supra text accompanying notes 122, 163.298. One of the likely sources of information will be from rival firms. Because rivals oflenknow each other's business dynamics, from illegal suppliers to the identities of group members,they are strategically positioned to provide information to the authorities. Their interests oftenalign with law enforcement, insofar as removing a rival firm from operation can help securegreater profits for the conspiracy.Some economists have argued that monopoly organizations might reduce violence; yet thebrunt of organized crime still occurs in competitive markets that diminish these positive effects.
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In addition to rewarding individuals for information of someone's guilt
or innocence, these programs can also target assets of criminal entities to
incapacitate groups. Money-laundering statutes already accomplish this to
some degree by reducing asset liquidity. But a conspiracy-based approach
could go further, and provide a finder's fee, say ten percent, to those who
report assets of criminals if they are recovered. Some small portion of this
finder's fee could even be given to conspirators who provide such
information. The idea is to use criminal law to target group resources in
ways that make conspiracies harder to operate.299
Governments could also authorize civil suits against conspiracies. At
least as early as the eighteenth century, England used qui tam actions to
reward private citizens who brought actions against criminal enterprises. 30 0
A modem whistleblower statute could permit anyone, including a member
of a conspiracy, to allege criminal wrongdoing and recover a small fraction
of the judgment. Such statutes would authorize such suits if no indictment
against the plaintiff has been brought, or if an indictment has been brought
and the government has agreed to let the suit proceed.30 '
Under this scheme, nonconspirators may become whistleblowers, but
conspirators often may not because doing so alerts officials to their illegal
acts. Some, however, may bring suit because they believe that law
enforcement already has learned of their criminal acts. In such a situation,
whistleblower statutes could further the race to defect and quickly unravel
the conspiracy. If a conspirator believes that the group's acts have been
See Dick, supra note 71, at 718. To the extent that firms can diminish competition, it may promote
cost deterrence. If firms are battling over the street-level price of cocaine, they will attempt to sell
it at the cheapest possible cost while maintaining a profit. But remove the rivals, and the incentive
to sell it at that cost may disappear. The higher cost will generate additional profit for the
conspiracy, but it will also deter new users from purchasing cocaine. On the other hand, these
greater profits can be reinvested back into the criminal enterprise and a larger enterprise can have
economies-of-scale advantages and a stronger reputation.
299. An anonymous system, however, can be clogged with spurious information (anyone
who has doubts about this should check their e-mail). Individuals could generate lots of false
information to throw the authorities off of a criminal trail. If this practice develops, it will severely
compromise the ability to use anonymous tips. There are ways to use pseudonymity to minimize
these costs. For example, every person picks a pseudonym and law enforcement would simply
have a master list of all pseudonyms, but not the identities of each holder. Credibility would
develop around pseudonyms, just as they do around Internet pseudonyms, and those who cry wolf
too many times are likely to be disregarded by the cops. And those that provide useful information
over time will engender quicker government responses.
300. See Langbein, supra note 91, at 84; Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam,
1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83-91.
301. The strategy here would be patterned after modem qui tam statutes, which allow private
individuals to recover a certain percentage of money against those who defraud the federal
government. In the first few years after the False Claims Act Amendments of 1986, which
liberalized the qui tam suit, the government recovered more than one billion dollars. Press
Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers over $1 Billion in Qui Tam
Awards and Settlements (Oct. 18, 1995), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre 96/October95/
542.txt.html. It permits a reward against an informant with unclean hands, so long as the
informant is not convicted of a violation. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 291, at 1146.
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detected, he might file suit to reap the civil benefits and then try to seek a
cooperation agreement. 30 2 Moreover, the fear of defection alone will create
massive inefficiencies in the criminal organization, reducing its gain and
promoting cost deterrence. It will also further destabilize group identity by
providing individual rewards instead of joint ones.
If a new qui tam statute is politically unpalatable, a simple change to
the standing requirements of RICO, so that members of a criminal
organization could file civil suits against it, may have a powerful effect.
30 3
At present, only aggrieved parties can file suits against an entity; some
judges have further held that only innocent parties have standing to sue.
30 4
Liberalizing the standing requirement creates monetary incentives for
people to come forward and provide information.
On the other hand, such a change can create a further inducement to
join a criminal enterprise by increasing the payoff and can send a negative
message to the law-abiding majority. These objections may preclude
adoption of the above changes, although flipping (an entrenched method of
law enforcement) suffers from similar defects.30 5
4. Publicity
Law enforcement is not the only way to combat conspiracy.
Government should seek to promote public messages, whether through
advertising, media briefings, outreach to religious leaders, or other
measures that make conspiracies more difficult to create and operate. For
example, government should promote the view that many conspirators are
receiving rewards for information, although of course such information will
need to be sanitized to protect the identity of cooperators. Such publicity
will deter people from joining a conspiracy by increasing the perceived
probability of detection. Because people tend to get their understandings
302. Whistleblowers will be more likely to come forward if their lawyers can make proffers
to prosecutors. This suggests that law enforcement could set up mechanisms to ease
communication between potential defectors and the police, such as anonymous proffers given by
legal counsel and separate teams of prosecutors that listen to and evaluate them. Accordingly,
whistleblowing might be more common than one might initially suspect.
303. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000) (stating that the current standing requirements permit civil suits
to be filed by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property"). There are ways to structure the
incentives to encourage races for information-such as providing a higher percentage or all of the
reward to the first filer (a system like the one used for patents).
304. E.g., Ross v. Bolton, No. 83 Civ. 8244 (WK), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18717, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1991) ("It was not the Congress' purpose in enacting RICO to provide civil
remedies for one conspirator against another."); see also Loren E. Kalish, Note, Plaintiffs in
Complicity: Should There Be an Innocent Party Requirement for Civil RICO Actions?, 47 EMORY
L.J. 785, 789-802 (1998) (examining standing requirements).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 79-97 (outlining the advantages of cooperators to
law enforcement); supra text accompanying notes 276-278 (explaining why flipping does not
generally provide a further incentive to conspire ex ante).
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from other people, government can sometimes engineer an informational
cascade.
306
Furthermore, such publicity will induce greater numbers of people who
have already joined a criminal group to defect. If conspirators learned that
the government has persistently made use of information provided by co-
conspirators, it could alter the impression that criminals are bonded to each
other. Dan Kahan's brilliant analysis of reciprocity has shown that
enforcement tactics that suggest crime is pervasive can often cue additional
crime. 307 Similarly, law enforcement could publicize the fruits of every
flipped witness and informant with the hopes of sowing distrust among the
group. When individuals in a conspiracy distrust their compatriots, they are
more likely to flip.
30 8
At the same time that the law publicizes its successes with flipping, it
should also act to counter the "advertisements" for conspiracies. Law
enforcement could target symbols of group membership--via increased
enforcement of law against those wearing visible identifiers such as gang
colors-to minimize collective identity. 30 9 Group identity can also be
destabilized by manipulating an individual's perception of his comparative
and normative fit with other group members. Cooperation is more likely
when a criminal is made to feel closer to a different group. For this reason,
306. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 82 ("The result of this process can be to produce snowball or
cascade effects, as small or even large groups of people end up believing something-even if that
something is false-simply because other people seem to believe that it is true.").
307. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 342-43 (2001).
Publicized flipping inverts the well-known scheme of promoting cooperation by cultivating the
appearance that others are cooperating. See Craig D. Parks et al., Actions of Similar Others as
Inducements To Cooperate in Social Dilemmas, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 345,
346 (2001) (discussing public television's "viewers like you" fund-raising campaigns).
308. See supra note 170. One lesson from the psychological literature is that the more
information people get about the lack of cooperation of their peers, the easier it is to induce
defection. Indeed, somewhat perversely, people are more likely to cooperate when cooperation
rates are unknown than when they know other parties are cooperating. Consider the delicious
result obtained by Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky's two-player prisoners' dilemmas. They found
that 16% of subjects cooperated after they were told that the other player had cooperated, while
only 3% cooperated when they were told that the other player had defected. By contrast, the rate
of cooperation for individuals who were not told what the other player did was a whopping
37%-more than twice the cooperation rate of those who learned that the other player had
cooperated! Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential
Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449. 454-55 (1992). They suggest that the
players in the dark cooperate because they hope to induce cooperation by the other player. Id. at
458 (observing that players may have cooperated "as a way of 'inducing' cooperation from the
other"). This suggests that publicity should cast the decisions about defectors as a fait accompli-
that there are already unknown defectors among the group. Criminals might not want to flip
because they fear that doing so implies that others have already flipped or they fear that defection
will subtly cue others to defect as well. See id. (stating that people tend to "select actions that are
diagnostic of favorable outcomes even though they do not cause those outcomes").
309. While outlawing such identifiers is in obvious tension with the First Amendment, law
enforcement might accomplish much of the same by increasing the probability of enforcement of
other laws (such as those regarding violence, drugs, and the like) against those who overtly
display particular gang-identified symbols.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1391
The Yale Law Journal
community prosecutors and police may have the credibility to persuade
residents that conspiracies are creating localized harms. Moreover, in the
cooperation process, law enforcement should emphasize that the conspiracy
is doing harm to the prospective witnesses' loved ones, their communities,
and other institutions of personal value.3"0
Finally, conspiracies are attractive because they offer a new social
identity. Accordingly, governments must also work with teachers,
community leaders, prominent athletes, and others to attack the
nonpecuniary reasons for group crime. Governments could get more
involved, for example, in promoting their message in small groups in
schools and religious institutions. Social psychologists have shown that
many of the most successful ways to break group dynamics involve the
introduction of new norms into the group through peer discussion.31' Legal
solutions to conspiracy should, therefore, be supplemented with aggressive
outreach measures that combat the social dynamics that lead individuals to
conspire.
5. Prosecutorial Reforms
The above account of conspiracy law is one that depends on
trustworthy and knowledgeable prosecutors. In order for information
extraction to work properly, prosecutors must accurately discern the level
of knowledge individuals have, as well as the level that they should have,
given their role in a conspiracy. They must develop judgment about which
entities are likely to be engaging in real harm, and which ones are simply
discussion groups.3 12 Prosecutors must also develop relationships of trust
3 10. If government can get across the message that lawbreaking has not been rewarded as
highly as the individual might think, then cooperation can also be induced. Psychologists have
found that it is possible to increase cooperation by revealing that noncooperators do not receive
high individual payoffs. Craig D. Parks et al., Actions of Similar Others as Inducements To
Cooperate in Social Dilemmas, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 345, 351-52 (2001)
(empirical study). This finding suggests that if law enforcement can point to examples of heavy
jail time, physical violence, and poor financial compensation over time, information extraction
may increase.
311. For example, during World War 1I, nutritionists tried to change food consumption
patterns away from traditional meats that were in short supply (like beet) toward sweetbreads and
kidneys. Lectures were given and pamphlets were sent out, but behavior did not change. However,
when homemakers were brought into groups where a trained leader explained how families could
overcome their obstacles to these foods, discussion ensued and group commitments were forged,
leading over thirty percent to try them. See ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 27, at 219-20. Similar
findings have been found regarding health practices and childcare. Id.
312. First Amendment issues will arise in some cases, see, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165, 184-92 (1st Cir. 1969) (conspiracy prosecution of Dr. Spock); United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), but it is possible to carve out special rules, see Johnson, supra note
1, at 1139, 1156 (suggesting this possibility). See generally John J. Dystel, Note, Conspiracy and
the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970). There may be other solutions to the problem, such
as increasing the overt act requirement. See FLETCHER, supra note 241, at 225 (advocating this
method).
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with criminal actors to create rival affections. Fastidious safeguards against
the misuse of proffered evidence are also necessary.
313
In order for flipping to shift group identity, prosecutors must focus
particularly on the character and disposition of a cooperating defendant.
Buying information through rote offering of lower sentences will not yield
the same payoffs-either in terms of cooperation rates or long-term
reductions in crime. The cooperation process has the potential to fold
criminals back into the mainstream of society and offer them a second
chance. However, reaching this potential requires prosecutors not to simply
eye conviction rates, but also to develop a feel for the human side of
cooperation and the shifting of identity. They must also learn to reverse the
effects of cognitive dissonance by using "foot-in-the-door" strategies that
first seek small acts of cooperation from potential witnesses and only later
314
seek larger ones.
These types of prosecutorial determinations are not capable of being
legislated or imposed from above. Instead, they require day-to-day attention
from the leadership in prosecutors' offices, good examples from
supervisors, and extensive training of new attorneys. Some structural
devices, such as institutionalizing review boards that examine how
cooperating witnesses are treated in individual offices may help to instill
such attitudes. Using insulated standing teams to hear proffers, subject to
review by specialized ombudsmen, may also help. Those who make hiring
decisions will need to review candidates' willingness not simply to win
cases in front of them, but to take a long-term approach to crime.
Ultimately, however, prosecutors will have to train and watch each other to
ensure that they are maintaining fidelity to the purpose of conspiracy law.
The risk always looms that conspirators will lie? 15 Concerns about
reliability, however, pervade the criminal justice system; restrictions on the
use of flipped witnesses may force prosecutors to rely on more unreliable
313. If prosecutors use such information, it will ex ante lead to less information transmitted
during the proffer. "Promises of immunity are important weapons in the fight against large-scale
criminal enterprises; the government often snares big fish with information gained from little
fish," but the system works "only if each side keeps its end of the bargain: the informant must
provide accurate information, and the government must not use that information against the
informant." United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245, 246 (7th Cir. 1990).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 122, 163.
315. For example, scandals in the 1730s drew attention to the perjury incentives created by
Britain's monetary rewards. John Langbein has traced the decision to permit defendants access to
counsel, in part, to these scandals. LANGBEIN, supra note 94 (manuscript at 96). Similar concerns
existed during the English crown witness system, see Regina v. Farler, 173 Eng. Rep. 418, 419
(Worcester Assizes 1837) (stating that "the danger is, that when a man is fixed, and knows that his
own guilt is detected, he purchases impunity by falsely accusing others"), and manifested in some
early American practices as well, e.g., Harris v. State, 15 Tex. Ct. App. 629, 634 (1884) (warning
that a state's promise to drop charges against one of six defendants, depending on which one gave
the most powerful testimony to the grand jury, would tempt a witness to swear to "any and all
things").
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sources, from unnamed confidential informants to mere innuendo.316
Flipped witnesses in many cases will yield information that, on balance, is
more reliable than other available sources. 317 As the Supreme Court has
pointed out, the reliability concerns are not so great as to toss out the
testimony altogether since prosecutorial techniques and the adversarial
system can bring out inaccuracies. 318 Consider three prosecutorial devices.
First, the government can delay the timing of the reward, so that the
sentencing reduction is not effective until a prosecutor believes the
defendant has provided accurate information and makes an application to a
court. Second, a prosecutor can test an individual's testimony against other
corroborating facts in the case. While corroboration will vary, well-trained
prosecutors will seek high degrees of corroboration before using testimony
from a cooperator-defendant because they know "the proven rule of thumb
that the jury will not accept the word of a criminal unless it is corroborated
by other reliable evidence.,,3' 9 Third, the prosecution can conduct a proffer
session in which the witness walks the prosecutor through every relevant
fact and detail. The same walk-through can be carried out again later in the
316. Indeed, a system of flipping may encourage conspirators to document criminal activity
and overt acts. Such documentation not only provides additional reliability in the event that the
person is actually flipped, it also may be discovered independently by law enforcement and
thereby increase the probability of detection of the group. For example, under the crown witness
system, one highway robber maintained a journal of his offenses precisely to provide evidence
deemed sufficiently reliable to the Crown. Upon being apprehended and "[bleing asked by the
court what was his design for keeping a journal,.., he replied ... [that] it was for his own safety,
that he might be more exact when he would have the opportunity to save himself by becoming an
evidence." Peter Linebaugh, The Ordinary of Newgate and His Account, in CRIME IN ENGLAND
1550-1800, at 246, 265 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977). 1 am grateful to John Langbein for directing me
to this source.
317. Because the witnesses have been on the inside of an operation, they are particularly
suited to knowing the details of a conspiracy. The prosecution, moreover, can insist on a
defendant's "full and fair" cooperation and "truthful" testimony in exchange for a
recommendation of leniency. See generally H. Lloyd King, Jr., Why Prosecutors Are Permitted
To Offer Witness Inducements: A Matter of Constitutional Authority, 29 STETSON L. REV. 155,
179 (1999) ("Critics of witness inducement agreements have failed to offer empirical evidence in
support of their claims that these agreements produce inherently unreliable evidence.").
318. The Court in Hoffa v. United States stated that the cooperating witness,
perhaps even more than most informers, may have had motives to lie. But it does not
follow that his testimony was untrue, nor does it follow that his testimony was
constitutionally inadmissible. The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal
system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination and the
credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury.
385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966).
319. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1425 (1996); see also id. at 1385 ("Ordinary decent people are predisposed
to dislike, distrust, and frequently despise criminals who 'sell out' and become prosecution
witnesses."); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt
on "Substantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29
STETSON L. REV. 7, 45 (1999) (stating that "[a]s a rule, such testimony helps the government only
where it is woven into a fabric of corroborating detail from untainted sources"); Yaroshefsky,
supra note 274, at 932-35 (discussing corroboration).
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investigation, and if there are variances in detail, the prosecutor can begin
to sense that something is afoot.
Other traditional tools promote reliability as well. Prosecutors are
required to disclose cooperation arrangements to the defense,320 and the
defense is permitted to impeach a witness's credibility on the basis of a
promise for a reduced sentence. Jury instructions further clarify reliability
concerns. 32 Perjury law provides additional safeguards when witnesses
testify; a revitalized approach could attach liability not only for statements
made under oath, but also for false statements that were intentionally made
to law enforcement during the investigation stage.
Other steps could be taken. For example, the United States Attorneys
Manual and other prosecution guides could be rewritten to reflect the
centrality of reliability and honesty in the cooperation process.322 Formal
review within the executive branch of prosecutorial decisions and reliability
may also prove helpful.323 Jury instructions could be written to focus more
on reliability. 324 So, too, government attention during the proffer process,
witness segregation, and perhaps even polygraph testing may be used.325 In
320. Giglio v. United States requires prosecutors to disclose evidence to defense attorneys
that goes to the credibility of government witnesses, including promises of immunity, if the
evidence could reasonably affect the jury's judgment, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). In addition, Rule
1 l(e)(2) requires disclosure of a plea agreement to the court "in open court or, on a showing of
good cause, in camera." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e)(2).
321. "The use of informers... may raise serious questions of credibility. To the extent that
they do, a defendant is entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and to
have the issues submitted to the jury with careful instructions." Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 757 (1952); see also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103 (1972) (observing that
"[a]ccomplice instructions have long been in use and have been repeatedly approved," and that
"[i]n most instances, they represent no more than a commonsense recognition that an accomplice
may have a special interest in testifying, thus casting doubt upon his veracity"); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (similar).
322. See David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 509, 528-30 (1999) (making such a proposal).
323. The United States Department of Justice recently decided to strengthen its procedures
regarding confidential informants, creating a special Confidential Informant Review Committee.
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants (Jan. 8,
2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroor/ciguidelines.htm. These new regulations
specifically do not apply to cooperating witnesses, see id. pt. I.A.2, but they could be extended to
such witnesses. Formal review would also help avoid a key explanation for unreliability:
inexperienced line prosecutors. See Yaroshefksy, supra note 274, at 950-52.
324. Consider the following pattern jury instructions in the Sixth Circuit:
The use of paid informants is common and permissible. But you should consider [such
a witness's] testimony with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses.
Consider whether his testimony may have been influenced by what the government
gave him.
... Do not convict the defendant based on the unsupported testimony of such a
witness, standing alone, unless you believe his testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.
I EDWARD J. DEViTr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 15.02, at 480 (4th ed. 1992).
325. Rowland, supra note 80, at 681-84 (suggesting such alternatives to bolster reliability). A
seasoned former law enforcement official, Judge Trott of the Ninth Circuit, has warned that
"[c]riminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what they want, especially when what
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addition, it may be possible to modify discovery rules further to provide
more information to defense attorneys about cooperators.326
It is of course possible that prosecutors cannot be trusted with such
discretion, with respect to both cooperator reliability and the doctrine of
conspiracy more generally. As indicated at the outset, this Article has not
tried to answer this criticism, for it is ultimately an empirical matter that we
are presently unequipped to answer. There are reasons to doubt that
prosecutors, in whom our system confides so much, are incapable of the
task-such as their popular accountability, codes of ethics, training,
supervision, and the like.327 If these mechanisms ultimately fail and
conspiracy law must be abandoned or cabined, however, this Article has
detailed the severe law enforcement costs and missed opportunities that
arise from untrustworthy prosecutors.
The unscrupulous prosecutor problem, after all, is one far larger than
conspiracy law itself. If we deal with it by curbing conspiracy doctrine, it
may risk leading these bad apples toward even more unsavory and less
reliable practices. (Indeed, hiding concepts like information extraction
forces the government to claim that a defendant's commissions justify the
large sentences authorized by conspiracy law-inviting ridicule in some
cases and deflecting from training prosecutors to be fairer and more
accurate assessors of information potential.)3 2 8 By drawing attention to the
functional benefits of conspiracy law and highlighting the role of
they want is to get out of trouble with the law." Trott, supra note 319, at 1383. But even Judge
Trott's harsh warning recognized that "[n]otwithstanding all the problems ... the fact of the
matter is that police and prosecutors cannot do without [using criminals as witnesses]-period."
Id. at 1390. He continues: "[F]requently the only persons who qualify as witnesses to serious
crime are the criminals themselves. Terrorist cells are difficult to penetrate. Mafia leaders use
underlings to do their dirty work.... Snitches... are therefore indispensable weapons in a
prosecutor's battle to protect a community from criminals." Id. at 1391. Judge Trott usefully put
forth many other suggestions for prosecutors to use to promote reliability, such as building a case
on the basis of evidence that corroborates the cooperator's story rather than using the witness
herself, getting all the information in writing, and using particular interrogation techniques. Id. at
1392-413.
326. See Hughes, supra note 187, at 29-30. Procedures might also be developed whereby
judges screen cooperating witnesses before they testify (a process somewhat similar to a Daubert
hearing for scientific expert testimony).
327. The pardon power also may check abuse. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, A Christmas Carol,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2000, at A19 (describing the presidential pardon of Dorothy Gaines, a
minor player in a drug conspiracy).
328. As such, the benefits of conspiracy law are sufficiently strong that it may be worth
trying to trade other devices, such as mandatory minimums, to retain the doctrine. See supra note
118 (noting problems with mandatory minimums); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 129, at 1963-66
(discussing the harms of mandatory minimums, particularly in the plea bargain context); William
J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, Ill YALE L.J. 2137, 2141-42 (2002) (discussing
trading certain doctrines for others to aid law enforcement and protect citizens). Many cooperation
agreements undoubtedly take place in the low-visibility plea setting, but because these agreements
may later become more visible in the course of trying or sentencing co-conspirators, avenues for
error checking may present themselves. Other general mechanisms to regulate plea bargaining
may also reduce abuse. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 129, at 1950-51, 1957-66.
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information extraction, this Article has endeavored to start the debate on
whether the conspiracy doctrine as actually implemented promotes net
social good.
CONCLUSION
Criminal law can profitably borrow from insights generated by
corporate law scholars and organizational theorists. This body of work is
generally concerned with making legitimate enterprises operate in a more
efficient manner. By reverse engineering these concepts, law can stymie
criminal conspiracies. In particular, conspiracy law should encourage the
use of excessive monitoring, chill discussion within the firm, lead it to
compartmentalize information, strive to create team-production problems,
impose vicarious liability to make illegal firms more inefficient, make it
difficult for the parties to use default rules and off-the-rack principles to
reduce transaction costs, refuse to extend legal enforcement to intra-firm
disputes, and water down their intellectual property. Federal law attempts to
do some of this, although its choices are often unconscious and consistently
undertheorized.
Work by psychologists both refines and supplements this picture.
Groups behave differently than individuals, in their proclivities toward risk,
in their ability to perform tasks, in their loyalty structures, and in their
belief systems. Because this psychological data demonstrates that criminal
groups pose special dangers to society, additional punishment for
conspiracy is appropriate. The psychological insights also generate policy
prescriptions for undermining groups once they have formed. In particular,
legal doctrines that create an atmosphere of distrust within the firm are
likely to fray group identity, contributing to more defections and less
productivity. The lessons of group behavior also illustrate why particular
sentencing processes-such as the section 5K motion-can alter dangerous
social identities through solemn courtroom proceedings.
No doubt this analysis will fail to persuade everyone. Those who
distrust prosecutors and the safeguards in the criminal justice system will
still have the same objections to conspiracy law. My aim here has been
more modest-to detail the substantial and underappreciated benefits of
conspiracy law on information extraction as well as on the formation and
identity of criminal groups. Understanding these benefits will generate a
more informed debate on the contours of conspiracy law, and may lead
those disinclined to trust the criminal justice system to fix that system
before abolishing a doctrine that serves many useful purposes.
More generally, underlying the claims regarding conspiracy are three
larger methodological moves that deserve further analysis. First, criminal
law, as with other areas of law, has neglected group behavior due to
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legalistic and microeconomic concerns with individual behavior. To recall
one illustration, the individualistic assumption that greater certainty
regarding a sanction will promote deterrence operates quite differently with
respect to groups. Second, theories of criminal law have neglected the role
of information. Blinded by aphorisms about American law's avoidance of
affirmative duties, we have lost sight of just how much our system grades
offenders on omissions. This analysis suggests, for instance, that the case
for revival of misprision of felony is stronger than many have assumed.
Third, a proper approach to criminal law requires an understanding of both
psychology and economics. An economist, for example, may focus too
much on price discounts for cooperation, whereas social identity is crucial
to understanding why individuals do not flip even with massive discounts.
A psychologist, by contrast, may slight important features of group
behavior, from specialization to team production.
Twentieth-century criminal law began with great interdisciplinary
promise in incorporating advances in psychiatry, and concluded with the
hope of integrating microeconomics into its picture. By viewing conspiracy
through this refurbished interdisciplinary lens, law can move further in its
quest to understand and respond to dangerous forms of human behavior.
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